Statement of George J. Tenet, Former Director of Central Intelligence

Delivered April 1, 2005 in Response to Final Report of the Silberman-Robb Commission:

I learned for the first time from the Silberman-Robb Commission the account of a conversation that allegedly occurred in late September or October of 2002 between a CIA Directorate of Operations Division Chief and the representative of a foreign service regarding a CIA request to secure direct access to Curveball.

The representative of the foreign service, it is now reported, responded to CIA's division chief responsible for relations with the foreign service with words to the effect of "You do not want to see him (Curveball) because he's crazy. Speaking to him would be "a waste of time." The representative reportedly went on to say that his service was not sure whether Curveball was telling the truth; that he had serious doubts about Curveball's mental stability and reliability; and that Curveball had had a nervous breakdown. Further the representative of the foreign service is said to have worried that Curveball was "a fabricator". The representative reportedly cautioned the CIA division chief that the foreign service would publicly and officially deny these views if pressed, because they did not wish to be embarrassed.

It is both stunning and deeply disturbing that this information, if true, was never brought forward to me by anyone in the course of the following events.

1. The coordination and publication of a classified National Intelligence Estimate 2. The declassification and publication of the NIE's key judgments and findings 3. The production and publication of an unclassified White Paper on Iraq's WMD capabilities

4. The preparation of testimonies both closed an open before the Senate Intelligence, Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees

5. The briefings provided to members of Congress in which Curveball's information regarding Iraq's mobile BW production capability was cited

6. The preparation of Secretary Powell's speech to the United Nations

7. The White Paper CIA and DIA issued in May of 2003 regarding the trailer found in Iraq

8 CIA's internal inquiry into Iraq WMD directed by the Deputy Director of Intelligence

9 My speech at Georgetown University in February of 2004 and subsequent appearance before the Senate Intelligence Committee in closed session on March 4, 2004

In all of these formal presentations, Iraq's ability to produce biological weapons in the trailers cited by Curveball was cited in one way or another. At no time did anyone in the analytic or operational chain of command come forward to tell me of the specific information imparted by the representative of a foreign service to the CIA division chief in late September or October of 2002.