What’s driving this crucial next round of bargaining is the torque of mutual pressure: Iran wants quick relief from sanctions that are crippling its economy. The United States wants to halt an enrichment program that every month is moving Iran closer to nuclear-weapons capability. Administration officials see their goal, in the first phase, as stopping the clock — and even adding a little more time. The aim is to relieve time pressures on both sides enough and provide sufficient additional transparency to allow the extended bargaining.
As in any negotiation, each side wants maximum benefit at minimum cost. Economists speak of a “price search” to discover an equilibrium point at which a market “clears” and a deal is struck. But sometimes the lines never cross: The demands of one side are greater than what the other is willing to pay — and an otherwise doable deal is never reached.
Though negotiators appear hopeful on both sides, achieving this balance may prove impossible. Hard-liners in Iran may reject a verifiable halt (let alone a reversal) of enrichment; hard-liners in the West may refuse any face-saving offer to Iran that Tehran could claim endorses a “right to enrich.” (The administration doesn’t recognize any such right.)
What has been notable in recent weeks, however, has been the convergence toward the elements of possible compromise. The United States’ idea is that both sides would temporarily turn down their “spigots” of pressure. The West might allow Iran access to a limited portion of its oil revenue that has been frozen by sanctions. Iranian sources have told me Iran might respond by converting its existing stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium to fuel rods or plates, and capping its stockpile of 3.5 percent enriched uranium. Each side could later reopen these spigots — of Western sanctions and Iranian enrichment — if interim negotiations don’t produce a final agreement.
If the administration’s “freeze and reverse” approach is adopted, the crucial issue would be Iran’s array of centrifuges and other enrichment technology. Israeli experts have insisted that Iran must show it doesn’t have “breakout” capability by mothballing centrifuges (especially the newer, more efficient models) and by refraining from bringing online a planned heavy-water nuclear reactor at Arak. Otherwise, say the Israelis, the Iranians could continue to creep closer to breakout capability under the cover of negotiations.
Iranian and American experts have both described over the past few months the same framework for a final deal — a verifiable set of procedures that reassures the West that Iran couldn’t dash to make a bomb using its existing centrifuges or any covert facilities. This would mean a level of intrusive inspection that would be hard for the Iranians to accept, but Iranian President Hassan Rouhani told me in September that Tehran would consider such transparency measures.
Although Israel isn’t formally a part of the negotiation, it can shape the outcome by influencing Congress’s willingness to lift sanctions. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has insisted on an optimal deal that would essentially dismantle Iran’s enrichment capability. Amos Yadlin, the influential former head of Israeli military intelligence, has said he would support a “good deal” that falls short of Netanyahu’s maximum but still would “widen the distance between Iran and the bomb, should Iran unilaterally abrogate the agreement.”
Yadlin listed elements of this acceptable good deal, including a strict limit on the number of Iranian centrifuges in operation (now about 10,000), a 3.5 percent cap on enrichment, removal of all enriched material from Iran and its return in a form that can’t be used in nuclear bombs.
Do the rewards of making a deal outweigh its costs? That’s the calculus both sides will have to weigh for the next few months. It’s a makeable putt, as golfers like to say, but far from a sure thing.
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