The United States could play a supportive role, ensuring that the effort is based on a solid strategic framework, filling in where donors fall short and bringing attention to top priorities. The existing “contact group” could be a vehicle for the United States to contribute without burdening it unduly.
Whichever option is chosen, the NTC is expected to combine with other legitimate interlocutors to form an interim authority to take over governance. International assistance should be conditional on inclusivity, which is vital. Many Gaddafi-held towns have formed councils that can be drawn upon to provide appropriate representation. These indigenous Libyan initiatives must not be inadvertently bypassed or destroyed once the Gaddafi regime is gone, as has happened in other post-conflict situations. The local councils could be particularly effective in mounting “neighborhood watch” operations to prevent public disorder, an approach taken during the protests in Egypt.
Preparation of a constitution (Libya currently has none) and elections at various levels will take several years. Mine-clearing and retraining the police, army and judicial systems will take the better part of a decade. Accountability for past crimes and justice for those who abused power under the Gaddafi regime may take longer. Once restored to pre-crisis production, Libya’s oil and gas can pay for reconstruction, but immediate financial requirements will be large.
The coherence of international efforts will depend on setting out from the start a clear set of agreed principles toward which the Libyans and international community will work. This can best be done in a new Security Council resolution; if that proves politically impossible, it could also be done in a statement by the contact group or under U.N.-E.U. leadership. The goals should include a united and sovereign Libya within its well-established borders and under the rule of law that can sustain, govern and defend itself through inclusive democratic institutions, using Libya’s resources transparently and accountably for the benefit of all its people.
If a U.N.-E.U. effort fails to ensure stability in Libya, the United States should be prepared to mobilize and support a NATO-led effort, including, if necessary, the deployment for a limited duration of U.S. ground forces. Only NATO has the military capacity required. Unilateral U.S. intervention would entail risks without commensurate gains to vital national security interests.
Daniel Serwer is a lecturer and senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a scholar at the Middle East Institute. He blogs at www.peacefare.net. This column was adapted from a Center for Preventive Action contingency memorandum he wrote for the Council on Foreign Relations this month.
Loading...
Comments