Even with Osama bin Laden dead, the nexus between the Pakistani state and a syndicate of Islamic extremists remains a threat. Pakistan’s military continues to support the Taliban, the Haqqani network and Hizb-e-Islami against coalition and Afghan forces. The number of Pakistani operatives fighting for the Taliban and other insurgents has increased over the past year, senior Afghan officials say.
Pakistan has not been forthcoming about its motives, but several are plausible. It could be defensively hedging against a strong Afghan government that is close to India, Pakistan’s regional adversary. Islamabad might be concerned that Afghanistan could reduce cross-border water flows by building dams on the Kunar River and attempt to press for concessions on territorial disputes, or that India and Afghanistan might use Afghan territory to support Pakistani groups hostile to the government.
In sustaining the extremist threat, Pakistan may see a way to keep the United States engaged in the region and, therefore, financially supportive of its military and civilian government.
Alternatively, Islamabad could view installing a subordinate regime in Kabul as a first step in an ambitious plan to consolidate regional hegemony in Central Asia. When the city of Herat fell to the Taliban in 1996, the Pakistani former intelligence official Sultan Amir Tarrar — better known as Col. Imam — was helping Taliban forces. He reportedly messaged headquarters: “Today Herat, tomorrow Tashkent.”
The U.S. approach since Sept. 11 has not obliged Pakistan to clarify its intentions. Islamabad continues to deny that it is even aiding insurgents. So having a frank discussion — one that might lead to pragmatic, mutual accommodation — has been impossible. As we draw down our forces in Afghanistan, persuading the Pakistani military to abandon its strategy of supporting extremism and backing Afghan insurgents will become more critical and more difficult. Without Pakistan’s cooperation, the insurgency will continue, but in light of our announced departure, Islamabad will see even less reason to stop sponsoring proxies as it prepares for the post-U.S. struggle in Afghanistan.
Yet a destabilizing outcome is not inevitable. Washington has considerable leverage that it has not used to optimal effect. Pakistan relies on the United States and international organizations to remain solvent; its economy would be on the ropes but for a two-year $7.6 billion International Monetary Fund loan package. Coalition support funds from the United States alone are equal to about 25 percent of Pakistan’s defense budget.
Meanwhile, the expansion of northern routes through Central Asia provides the United States with alternatives to Pakistani supply lines. The drawdown of forces will further reduce Washington’s logistical requirements, giving it greater freedom to launch unilateral operations against terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan.
In the short term, the United States should implement a two-phase strategy to insist on real change in Pakistan’s hostile policies.
To preclude Pakistan from manipulating different departments and senior officials, the Obama administration, as a united front, should offer a stark set of positive and negative inducements. A clear choice will clarify whether Pakistan’s intentions in Afghanistan are principally guided by fear or by ambition.
In exchange for Pakistan playing a constructive role in Afghanistan, the United States should be willing to: support expanded IMF and other multilateral assistance; sustain financial and military aid; and promote a major, multilateral diplomatic effort to mediate disputes among Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. The initial focus must be accepting a reasonable agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan and reconciliation with Pakistan-backed insurgents who accept U.S. red lines, followed by an India-Pakistan peace and normalization process. We should also support multilateral investment in infrastructure projects that would integrate Pakistan in regional commerce.
If positive inducements prove insufficient in securing reliable Pakistani cooperation, the United States should curb military assistance; mobilize coordinated financial pressure against Pakistan through allies and the IMF; and expand military operations against insurgent and terrorist targets in Pakistan.
We should also continue to expand the northern corridor that now transports more than 40 percent of U.S. supplies delivered by land to Afghanistan.
Should Pakistani intransigence persist, the United States will need a long-term strategy that manages the threat from Pakistan and embraces a broad multilateral effort to assist those Pakistanis who seek to transform their country. This would, in part, require the United States to maintain a military presence in Afghanistan to counter the terror threat and assist in preventing the victory of Pakistani proxies in Afghanistan. We would also need to consider accelerating security ties with India as part of a containment regime against Pakistan. Most important, the United States would have to channel bilateral assistance to Pakistan in a way that empowers moderate civil society but reduces support for the military.
There is no guarantee this approach will overcome the ideological and religious allegiances that inspire Pakistani support for the insurgency in Afghanistan. Ultimately, only the Pakistani people and a new generation of civilian leadership can rein in the country’s military leaders.
The writer, a counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Nations during the George W. Bush administration.