With last week’s tumult in Italian markets, the European financial crisis has entered a new and far more dangerous phase, threatening both European monetary integration and the global recovery. Last week’s drama surrounding bond auctions in Europe’s third-leading economy should convince even the most hardened bureaucrat that the world can no longer let policy responses be shaped by dogma, bureaucratic agenda and expediency. It is to be hoped that European officials can engineer a decisive change in direction, but if not the world can no longer afford the deference that the International Monetary Fund and non-European Group of 20 officials have shown European policymakers the past 15 months.
Three realities must be recognized if there is to be a chance of success.
First, systemic confidence is essential in a financial crisis. Teaching investors a lesson is a wish, not a policy. U.S. policymakers were applauded for about 12 hours for their willingness to let Lehman Brothers go bankrupt. The shattering consequences that had on confidence are still being felt. The European Central Bank is right that punishing creditors for the sake of teaching lessons or building political support is reckless in a system that depends on confidence. Those who let Lehman go believed that because time had passed since the Bear Stearns bailout the market had learned and so was prepared. In fact, the main lessons learned had to do with how to best find the exits, and uncontrolled bankruptcies had systemic consequences that far exceeded their expectations.
Second, no country can be expected to generate huge primary surpluses for long periods for the benefit of foreign creditors. Meeting debt burdens at rates the official sector — let alone the private sector — is charging for credit would involve burdens on Greece, Ireland and Portugal comparable to the reparations’ burdens that John Maynard Keynes warned about in “The Economic Consequences of the Peace.”
Third, whether or not a country is solvent depends not just on its debt burdens and its commitment to strong domestic policies but also on the broader economic context. Liquidity problems left unattended become confidence problems. Debtors who are credibly highly solvent at interest rates close to or below their nominal growth rates become insolvent at higher interest rates, putting further pressure on rates, exacerbating solvency worries in a vicious cycle. This has happened in Greece, Portugal and Ireland; it is in danger of happening in Italy and Spain.
In short, the approach of the official sector lending more and more to countries that cannot access the market at premium rates of interest is unsustainable. The debts incurred will largely never be repaid even as their size discourages private capital flows and any growth-creating initiative. Assertions that the most indebted countries can service their debts in full at current interest rates only undermine policymakers’ credibility when they assert that the fundamentals are relatively sound in Spain and Italy. Further lending at premium interest rates only increases the scale of the necessary restructuring. It is reasonable to argue that recognition of debt unsustainability in Greece has been excessively deferred. It is not reasonable to argue that Greek reprofiling or restructuring alone will address a growing general crisis in confidence.
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