Will Libya become Obama’s Iraq?

In making his case this past week for the use of force in Libya, President Obama sought to assure the American people that this intervention is prudent and wise, and that it bears no resemblance to the controversial and costly war in Iraq. He even tried to preempt the comparison altogether, explaining why his administration will not attempt to overthrow Moammar Gaddafi by force: “To be blunt,” Obama said, “we went down that road in Iraq.”

Message: I am not Bush, and Benghazi is not Baghdad.

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Given the most obvious differences between Iraq and Libya — no ground troops in Libya and no U.N. resolution in Iraq — few will take issue with Obama’s protestation. Yet, Obama’s road in Libya may prove more similar to President George W. Bush’s than it now appears.

For those of us who were deeply engaged in the Iraq war, it is hard not to hear the echoes and recognize the potential pitfalls in America’s new military intervention. Despite the different circumstances, the Iraq war, and the Afghan war as well, offer hard-won insights about the nature of coalitions, the limits of military force and the power of unintended consequences. Considering them now offers us a chance to avoid repeating past mistakes in Libya, particularly ones that proved so costly to us and the people we were trying to help.

To succeed, you need clear goals.

The Bush administration went into Iraq with a multitude of objectives, from finding and destroying weapons of mass destruction to building a new democratic country in the heart of the Middle East. But even at the highest levels, U.S. officials disagreed over how central the creation of a democratic Iraq was to American ambitions and interests. This ambiguity of purpose helped create a serious dilemma: The United States undertook a complicated, multifaceted occupation and nation-building project without the planning and resources required for it to succeed.

Yet, even after Obama’s speech Monday at the National Defense University, it remains unclear what the president considers an acceptable outcome in Libya. Engaging in military action and claiming a desire for regime change, yet expressing unwillingness to use force to achieve that aim, even while providing support to those seeking to oust Gaddafi — this is a recipe for confusion, both within the administration and among the public. The president’s lack of clarity could erode domestic support for the operation, particularly if it grows lengthy and messy. It could also slide the administration into a more ambitious mission than is in U.S. interests or lead to Arab disappointment over a more limited American role.

Don’t sell the American public on a best-case scenario.

Bush’s national security team was criticized for suggesting that the invasion of Iraq would be quick, cheap and simple. This presentation turned out to be wrong, not because the costs and difficulties of ousting Saddam Hussein by military force were higher than expected, but because the administration failed to factor in the potential difficulties of a post-Hussein Iraq and the possibility of a protracted and complicated U.S. role in the country.