Destroyer Drama

One of the biggest decisions Mabus must make is how many additional DDG 51 destroyers the Navy will need in the future, and how many more it can afford.

In April 2009, Pentagon Chief Robert Gates, implementing a plan the Navy had been eying for months, reversed years of shipbuilding plans by halting production of the advanced - but costly and often-delayed - DDG 1000 destroyer at just three ships, while restarting production of DDG 51 destroyers.

As veteran journalist Christopher P. Cavas reported in Defense News, the plan would make Northrop Grumman the lead shipbuilder for new DDG 51s - at the company's Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula, Miss. Northrop is one of Mississippi's top employers.

Under the plan, Ingalls also would become the lead yard for development of future designs of the DDG 51s. But, so far, Navy and Pentagon officials say they have yet to determine just how many additional DDG 51s will be built at Ingalls. The ship swap plans means all three DDG 1000-class destroyers will be built at General Dynamics' Bath Iron Works shipyard in Maine. "Most observers felt the proposed swap was a reasonable reallocation of resources that would benefit both shipyards and provide the Navy with cost savings," Cavas wrote.

Littoral Combat Ship Costs

Mabus took over during a years-long effort inside the Navy to pare down the cost of the new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, intended to give the Navy a fleet of shallow-water ships.

Initial cost estimates pegged the per-ship price tag at $220 million. But numerous problems have pushed cost expectations to more than $450 million-a-ship. Concerned lawmakers responded to those estimates by imposing a $460 million cost cap per ship. Lawmakers have raised the possibility of forcing the Navy to reopen the LCS competition if technical design issues are not soon corrected and costs decreased.

Mabus will play a key role in deciding how the service will continue trying to deflate program costs. He also will help the Navy decide if it needs, and whether it can afford, more than the 55 ships included in current spending plans.

Fighter Gap

Since 2009, the Navy has warned it faces a shortfall of fighter aircraft between now and 2025.

Congressional Research Service naval analyst Ronald O'Rourke broke down the Navy's fighter shortfall projections. "The Navy projects that a current strike-fighter shortfall of about 15 aircraft will grow to about 30 aircraft in FY2009, to more than 50 aircraft in FY2016, and to more than 90 aircraft in FY2017-FY2020, before declining to more than 50 aircraft in FY2021 and to roughly zero aircraft by FY2025. At its peak in FY2017, the Navy states, the Dept. of Navy projected strike-fighter shortfall will be 125 aircraft, of which 69 will be Navy strike-fighters," according to O'Rourke.

In 2008, Boeing began a public campaign pushing its F/A-18 fighter, which the Navy and Marine Corps already fly, as the remedy to the Navy's alleged problem. The shortfall, according to naval officials, would be created because the service soon will stop buying F/A-18s and will not buy new F-35 carrier variants in sufficient numbers until next decade. Boeing wants to sell the Navy more F/A-18s during that span.

Mabus must decide how many more F/A-18s the service can afford at a time when its shipbuilding costs are increasing.

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