President Dmitry Medvedev, speaking about the Iran nuclear issue, produced a jewel of diplomatic casuistry when he stated that although sanctions do not usually work, sometimes they are necessary. Many observers interpreted this as a subtle change in the Russian position to meet the United States in the new, more positive atmosphere, created by the cancellation of U.S. plans to deploy a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. The issue, however, is not so much about sanctions as it is about strategy.
And the strategy is still lacking. The U.S.-European ideato prevent Iran’s development of nuclear weapons rests on the belief that Iran will knuckle under if the Security Council members — including Russia and China — join in a common front to demand that Iran comply with its obligations as a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and observe Security Council resolutions. The Kremlin’s plan for dealing with Iran downplays sanctions and assumes that the controversial issue will be decided on the basis of goodwill. The Kremlin is right about one thing, however. Sanctions alone will not keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
If this approach fails, the West will be faced with a difficult dilemma: Either to try to contain and deter Iran by nonmilitary means or resort to air strikes against Iranian nuclear targets — using the Israeli Air Force, the U.S. Air Force or a combination of the two.
Moscow very well may be forced to join the West on a nonmilitary basis, thus admitting it had miscalculated its strategy on Iran, or face a barrage of sharp criticism from the West for having de facto helped Iran defy the United States and its allies.
Any strategy needs to proceed with a few basic truths about nuclear weapons and countries that seek them. Nations seeking to join the nuclear weapons club areon aquest for security and status. In this sense, Iran is no different from India, Pakistan, China or France. Iran is interested, above all, in gaining security for the ruling regime. What is also certain is that Iran, despite President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s inflammatory, malicious anti-Israeli rhetoric, is unlikely to use nuclear weapons to attack. But the Israelis do not want to take any chances with Ahmadinejad should he wish to follow through with his promise to wipe Israel off the face of the Earth.
Another unwelcome truth is that if a nation the size of Iran—with its rich energy resources and its inflated ambition and self-image—is determined to build nuclear weapons, it won’t be stopped. At best, a nuclear program can be delayed using surgical air and missile strikes, but short of a military occupation of the country, Iran’s nuclear program will inevitably continue.
A successful approach would go beyond the nuclear issues and address Iran’s perceived needs and ambitions. Dealing with both is crucial. Tehran wants a noninterference policy from the United States. This should be offered in exchange for a certifiable commitment to stop. Iran also wants to be a regional power. The future U.S. policy in Iraq and Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon and the Gulf will be critically strengthened if the United States is able to acknowledge Iran as a prominent regional leader.
Iran should also realize that there are serious costs involved if the engagement policy fails. For both political and psychological reasons, a common stand by all the permanent members of the Security Council is of special importance. The present rapprochement between the United States and Russia needs to be translated into a coordinated approach where sanctions and opportunities become incentives pushing and pulling Iran toward a solution that is both in the interest of security and the long-term national interest of Iran itself.
To develop such a strategy and implement it will be extremely difficult. The wounds of the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis 30 years ago still run deep, and anti-Iranian sentiment remains high in the United States. Nonetheless, President Barack Obama should not retreat from his commitment to solve the Iranian problem through acalculated outreach to Tehran. A failure to think big and act boldly could put President Obama into a position where he would have to either accept a major policy failure or make a desperate and fateful decision.
Moscow needs to take its global responsibility as a permanent member of the Security Council seriously. Stopping proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iran is clearly not only a concern in the West. Russia has said it wants an active part in world governance. Iran is a test case for the strength of that commitment.
Dmitri Trenin, an author and former fellow at the NATO Defense College,is director of the Carnegie Moscow Center.
This article was initially published in The Moscow Times
