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After 20 Years
As Stephen Yates has analyzed it, the TRA has proved to be a "surprisingly effective" guide for U.S. policy. Over the past 20 years, it has allowed the United States to preserve peace, promote freedom, and maintain flexibility in balancing its relations and interests with governments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. It has been a source of clarity and consistency for U.S. policy from administration to administration, Democrat and Republican alike. It has maintained its relevance and effectiveness in the face of changing policies in the U.S. and Taiwan, and remains an important safeguard against any administration's sacrificing U.S. interests in Taiwan in pursuit of improved relations with mainland China. By deterring aggression by the mainland, the United States has protected Taiwan from being forced into negotiations with China under the threat of armed attack or other forms of coercion. The TRA maintains the stable and secure environment within which Taiwan has become one of the world's leading free-market democracies. The legal and policy framework created by the TRA has allowed the U.S. government and the American people to enjoy substantive relations with the governments and people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Although many things have changed, some things remain the same. Taiwan is still a much more significant export market for U.S. goods than is mainland China. The United States still conducts government-to-government business with Taipei, although such dealings are managed through a private non-profit corporation, the American Institute in Taiwan, instead of through normal diplomatic channels. The United States continues to provide Taiwan with defensive arms, and such transfers remain as objectionable to Beijing now as they were in 1979. A fragile peace survives in the Taiwan Strait. None of this would have been possible, as Ronald Reagan noted in 1980, had it not been for "the timely action of the Congress, reflecting the strong support of the American people for Taiwan." From the Taiwanese perspective, the TRA also is seen as a success. "The results have been dramatic on four levels," Chien-jen Chen, Director-General of the Government Information Office, declared at the 20th anniversary conference. Domestically, he explained, Taiwan has remained secure and has prospered. It also has made the transition from an authoritarian form of government to a fully democratic one. Bilaterally, relations of every sort between Taiwan and the United States have flourished. At a trilateral level, the TRA has spelled out a clear framework for U.S.-Taiwan ties that has, in a way, allowed Taipei and Beijing to at least begin a cross-strait dialogue and take the first steps toward confidence-building. And at a multilateral level, the security of Taiwan and the subsequent stability the country has enjoyed over the past 20 years have fostered regional stability and multilateral prosperity throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Both countries also have identified shortcomings in the TRA. Helms noted that in 1982, President Reagan--"much to my dismay"--signed the "August Communique" with Red China in which he agreed to limit and gradually reduce U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Ever since, Communist China has been "browbeating" the United States to cut arms sales to Taiwan, Helms said, and now, "sensing the Clinton Administration's boundless desire to appease them, are ramping up the pressure as never before. I am fearful that our arms sales to Taiwan (will) be sacrificed next." Chien-jen Chen cited the TRA's "deliberate use of ambiguity in stating the U.S. stance regarding the status of Taiwan vis-á-vis the mainland regime, or what actions the U.S. might take if Beijing were to resort to military force to back up its specious claim of sovereignty over Taiwan." At the same time, the TRA is "unambiguous about stating the need for a peaceful resolution to the cross-strait issue and about spelling out the right to sell defense weapons to Taiwan in sufficient quantities to preserve Taiwan's security." This has given Beijing a clear message about what standards of behavior toward Taiwan are unacceptable, while leaving the terms of any American response up to each U.S. administration to decide. This combination of clarity and ambiguity has led to praise of the TRA as a particularly visionary act of legislation. "Nevertheless, this strength can also be seen as the law's potential weakness," said Chien-jen Chen. It is clear from the legislative history of the law, he maintained, that Congress intended for Taiwan to continue participating in important international bodies and organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. However, unrelenting pressure from Beijing over the years has resulted in Taiwan's exclusion from such bodies. Various U.S. administrations, from some people's viewpoints, and under certain circumstances, attempted to accommodate Beijing by agreeing to place restrictions on arms sales to Taiwan or to explicitly declare U.S. lack of support for an international role for Taiwan in international bodies and activities. This "straying from the spirit" of the TRA has in part been possible because of the very ambiguity of the wording embodied in the Act, said Chien-jen Chen.
It was written by Alan L. Dessoff and did not involve the editorial staff of this newspaper.
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