Proposed Ship Speeds Into Gathering Storm

Navy officials moved quickly when Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld began prodding Pentagon chiefs for imaginative ways to "transform" the military to deal with new global threats. They promptly proposed a multibillion-dollar fleet of light, super-speedy ships that would look like nothing else in the Navy's arsenal.

The "Littoral Combat Ship" (LCS), designed to perform a host of missions along enemy coastlines, would meet many of Rumsfeld's requirements, the Navy said: versatile enough to sniff out and destroy missiles hidden in Chinese harbors, to launch submarine-tracking helicopters and to intercept terrorists with small, fast boats.

But some congressional leaders and military analysts are saying "not so fast" to plans for the LCS and several other high-tech -- and high-cost -- weapons systems being proposed in the name of military transformation. Will they justify their price tags, they want to know, or will contractors and Pentagon brass exploit Rumsfeld's initiative to deploy expensive new weapons systems without making the tough decision to eliminate existing equipment and systems.

Rep. Roscoe G. Bartlett (R-Md.), who chairs the projection forces subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, was taken aback at a recent hearing when a top Navy official acknowledged that "rigorous analysis" of the need for the LCS came mainly after the Navy decided to press for the program. "We're concerned that the cart has been put before the horse in terms of procurement decisions, before there's an analytical justification," Bartlett said later. "Before we commit any big amounts of money, we'll know where we're going."

Other congressional panels also are pressing military officials to explain why submarines, tanks and guns that performed well in Iraq -- or weapons systems now coming on line -- cannot handle future threats. They want the Pentagon to identify more clearly the enemies the new weaponry is intended to confront.

Studies by congressional budget experts and outside analysts generally agree that U.S. commanders will not be able to afford all the new systems they have under development or on the drawing board. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that acquiring 60 LCS craft, for example, could cost at least $15 billion, more than half the annual budget of the National Institutes of Health.

Even bigger outlays would be required for the Army's signature Future Combat System -- which envisions dozens of light, fast-moving vehicles linked by sensors and computers -- and for the Air Force's Joint Strike Fighter.

The LCS proposal may serve as an early case study of the promise and pitfalls of Rumsfeld's effort to overhaul the military. Military scholar Michael E. O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution has called LCS "one of the symbolic and key systems for those who favor transformation."

The House Appropriations Committee last month approved $158 million to start development in 2004 and indicated it was "very supportive of the Navy's concept." But it also expressed concern about the Navy's approach in a report attached to the 2004 defense spending bill.

"There is no definition of the requirement and no 'road map' of how the Navy will achieve the system required," the report stated.

The Navy has promoted the LCS as "relatively inexpensive," but that is true only by Pentagon standards. The estimated cost of each ship, with combat payload added, is about $250 million. That sum could fund all the federal government's arts and humanities efforts for one year.

The Bush administration has budgeted $4.1 billion for the program in its five-year defense plan.

Navy officials describe the LCS as a key member of a futuristic family of ships that includes a next-generation destroyer, the DD(X), and a guided missile cruiser, the CG (X). Six industry teams, including major defense contractors and all major shipyards, have proposed a number of breakthrough designs.

The Navy is studying a range of possible designs, several based on high-speed ferries used abroad. A team led by General Dynamics Corp. is proposing a trimaran-style hull. NorthropGrumman Corp. has offered a single-hull craft made of lightweight composite materials. The Pentagon soon will ask one or more of the teams to build a prototype.

The idea for a breed of small, fast ships was put forward in the 1990s by a group of Navy officials and defense intellectuals. They were looking ahead at the shallow-water missions and localized skirmishes in which the post-Cold War Navy was likely to be involved.

A speedy, lightly manned vessel, they believed, could clear out mines, submarines and other threats in shallow coastal waters. A coastal ship called "Streetfighter" was promoted by Capt. Wayne P. Hughes of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., and Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski, then-president of the Naval War College in Newport, R.I.

A naval aviator who previously commanded the aircraft carrier USS Midway, Cebrowski was not wedded to the expensive, heavily manned ships of the Cold War. The LCS, Cebrowski has argued, would be well-suited to "babysit the petri dish of festering problems we have around the world."

But according to a Congressional Research Service analysis, some in the Navy doubted that a ship as small as the Streetfighter could survive in combat. "Most Navy leaders at the time appeared to politely resist the idea of the smaller combatant ship," it said.

When Rumsfeld tapped the retiring Cebrowski to direct the Pentagon's new Office of Force Transformation in October 2001, the concept found a highly placed backer. A month later, Adm. Vern Clark, the chief of naval operations, embraced it.

Skepticism about the program continues to run deep in the Navy, where some senior officers worry the LCS will compete for limited funds against submarines, aircraft carriers, and even the future destroyers and cruisers needed to defend the smaller ships.

The Congressional Budget Office has warned that the Navy's plans for expanding its surface fleet, based around the LCS and the next-generation destroyer and cruiser, could "crowd out funding for other ship programs." To solve this budgetary problem, it suggested the Navy might consider delaying the mothballing of existing destroyers and cruisers, or even canceling the LCS program.

"The [Navy] surface and aviation people think LCS is one of the dumbest ideas that has come down the road," one retired admiral said. "If you buy LCS, you're not going to [be able to afford] something else. But I don't see what LCS does."

Ronald O'Rourke, a naval analyst with the Congressional Research Service, told a Navy symposium earlier this year that "LCS was the product of an analytical virgin birth. . . . That is going to be a problem for this program down the road," according to a report in Defense Daily.

Senior submarine officers have told Congress confidentially that the LCS is not needed to hunt down diesel subs, such as those used by China, because Virginia-class submarines could do the job. The LCS could also create logistical challenges, they said, because it would not carry enough fuel for long distances without access to a tender.

A House-Senate report on the 2003 defense authorization act demanded to know why the Navy did not explore using submarines, helicopters, frigates and unmanned craft for missions in hostile coastal waters, before deciding on the LCS. It said the program had "not been vetted through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council process, particularly regarding possible alternatives."

A Senate Armed Services Committee report issued in April was even blunter. "The committee is concerned that the analysis underpinning the LCS requirement is not sufficient," it stated.