Chalabi, Shunted to Sidelines, Shares His Playbook for Iraq

The next priority should be to shake off U.S. tutelage and show Iraqis they have a government that really is in charge of the country, Chalabi declared. Even if the departure of U.S. troops is not a practical possibility, he said, the Iraqi government should display as much authority as it can under the circumstances.

"This is a quandary," he acknowledged. "The Iraqi government needs to assert itself as an Iraqi government, independent of the Americans, but it has to rely on the Americans to assert itself."

As he and many Iraqis acknowledge, Iraq's army and security services have not acquired the numbers or ability to confront violent resistance to U.S. occupation. As a result, the 141,000 U.S. troops and about 25,000 other foreign forces in Iraq will be in charge of security for the foreseeable future.

Allawi has few tools to back up his repeated pledges to crack down on the anti-occupation underground, Chalabi said, but he should move swiftly to give Iraqi security forces visibility on the streets. "At this time, the government doesn't have the power, but it has to show that it is doing it."

A good place to start, Chalabi suggested, would be with the new Iraqi National Intelligence Service set up by the CIA to replace Hussein's much-feared services. The new intelligence apparatus, hundreds strong, was organized in secret without a known budget or statute, he said.

The director, Brig. Gen. Mohammed Abdullah Shahwani, was recruited by the CIA station in the Jordanian capital Amman after he fled Iraq in 1991, Chalabi said, and has been a favorite ever since. A member of Iraq's Turkmen minority, Shahwani reports directly to the prime minister but is closely supervised by CIA officers, Chalabi added. Under their guidance, the service has turned much of its focus toward neighboring Iran, he said.

According to a report prepared in April by knowledgeable officials for members of the now-disbanded Governing Council, the service roster is two-thirds Sunni Muslim and one-fourth Shiite in a country that is about 60 percent Shiite, giving rise to fears that the new service has incorporated many former members of Hussein's Sunni-dominated services.

"This won't fly here," Chalabi said.

Next, Chalabi said, the new government should grab control of the country's finances. Specifically, he said, it should demand a full accounting of how Bremer, who had check-signing authority, spent funds from the Development Fund for Iraq, a pool of cash from Iraqi oil sales designated to pay for reconstruction.

KPMG, the firm contracted to do an audit, issued an interim report recently complaining that lack of cooperation from Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority was preventing it from meeting a June 30 deadline.

In addition, Chalabi said, the U.S. Embassy, which replaced the occupation authority on Monday, has sought power to disburse some of the funds even though political authority has been returned to the Iraqi government. Allawi's government should insist that the money flow exclusively through the Iraqi Finance Ministry, Chalabi said.

Another step the government should take to show Iraqis that it is in charge is to shed the American and other foreign advisers who remain in some ministries, he said. These advisers have largely left such ministries as education and housing, but remain in others, such as defense and interior.

Finally, Chalabi suggested, Allawi and Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari should make sure that they, not the United States, determine Iraqi foreign policy.

Iraq has a long history of Arab nationalism and support for Palestinians against Israel, dating from before Hussein's Baath Party took over in 1968. As a result, its foreign policy, if tradition and popular sentiment are followed, could end up being adversarial with that of the Bush administration.