John J. Devine

The 9/11 commission served a very useful purpose in laying out the events and circumstances surrounding this horrific terrorist attack. Unfortunately and unintentionally, its recommendations regarding the intelligence community -- and specifically the CIA -- are potentially destructive.

Because of the deep emotions about 9/11, the commission's findings are being treated as almost sacrosanct. Yet we should not allow ourselves to be stampeded into adopting these recommendations for short-term political expediency. We can't afford it. The security risks associated with dismantling the CIA are just too great, and this is the likely end result of the commission's principal recommendations.

The creation of a national intelligence director (NID) and the removal of the counterterrorism mission from the CIA would leave the agency a demoralized shell. This would very likely not only lead to a major exodus of talented personnel, but to a failure to attract America's best and brightest, who are needed more than ever. This surely is not the commission's intent. The establishment of a national intelligence director and the national counterterrorism center (NCTC) would add a cumbersome bureaucracy without improving performance on the core issue -- the collection of very hard to obtain intelligence on the plans and intentions of terrorists. Without this information, all the restructuring in the world won't help. Nor would it add to the capacity to attack and destroy these groups before they attack us again. A counterterrorism center that reports to the new national intelligence director and is not under the CIA director's full control could only lead to confusion and internecine feuding. Moreover, separating operational planning and execution, as proposed in the report, would inevitably lead to unrealistic planning and lukewarm execution.

There is no argument that the intelligence process should be consolidated and streamlined but this could and should be done within the existing CIA structure. Counterintuitive as it may seem in the aftermath of the commission and the Senate intelligence committee reports, the CIA needs to be strengthened. It needs a major infusion of resources and talent in order to get the job done. Just how under-resourced it has been is only now becoming clear, even to those of us who have worked in the intelligence business for most of our lives. Its overseas component alone should be several times larger than it is today. Surely, the problems that have recently been identified need to be corrected, but not this way. Why create a new position similar to the director of central intelligence (DCI)? It is redundant. Instead the DCI should be given the broad authority to direct the priorities and budgets of the other agencies in the intelligence community. Likewise, why create a NCTC when we are well along in the process of creating a multi-agency terrorism center called the Terrorist Threat Integration Center? The TTIC is the right road map for the future and should operate under the full control of the DCI.

Embedded in the commission's recommendations are other very problematic suggestions, such as removing the CIA's paramilitary responsibility for covert action and transferring it to the Pentagon. This will not work. Let's ask ourselves whether the Soviets would have been driven out of Afghanistan or the Taliban toppled if we had to do this without the CIA's covert paramilitary capability. This transfer would greatly reduce the speed with which we can act and would surely lead to diplomatic, legal and political problems in the countries where we try to exercise this capability. No matter how you slice it, this activity is covert and if it is left to the Pentagon, the Defense Department would have to undergo the same Congressional oversight that the CIA does today. This is something that the Pentagon has not rushed to embrace in the past.

The Sept. 11 commission also addresses the "need to share" and the "need to know" principles. While the emphasis, and rightfully so, is now on how to broaden the information sharing among all relevant government entities, we should not lose sight of the importance of protecting sources. Access to certain sensitive data must be limited to only those who need the data to get their jobs done. The cost of losing a communication system or a person who has penetrated a hard intelligence target can be incalculable in dollar, intelligence and human terms. Before broadening the information flow, we must weigh this risk.

It is also worth remembering where the staff would come from to support the new national intelligence director. It would come from the CIA and other intelligence agencies, further reducing their workforces. In addition, whole new staffs would have to be created in all the agencies to respond to the NID and to provide the necessary tailored data. The amount of unnecessary bureaucratic paperwork and oversight should not be underestimated. After all, the NID would not produce any intelligence. His or her office would only be a consumer.

The politicization of information threatens to corrupt policy choices and violates intelligence tradecraft. The CIA's value rests on the integrity of its reporting. Resisting all forms of politicization is central to effective analysis and collection. It is a question of the agency's culture, not its structure. Historically this resistance has engendered problems between the president and the DCI -- as it should. It is the job of the agency to provide the president with impartial intelligence so that he can make policy decisions for our country.

John J. Devine, former CIA associate director of operations, spent 32 years with the agency. He served as both acting and associate director of operations from 1993 to 1995. Earlier, he headed the agency's counter-narcotics center and its Afghan task force during the Soviet war in Afghanistan.