RUMSFELD: Thank you.
HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.
And, yes, Army modularity is in probably one of the areas we need to look at because that is, to some large degree, a predictable thing.
But certainly this is a major issue for us, but one that attends, I think, to wartime circumstances.
The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor?
TAYLOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Secretary and General Myers, for being here.
Mr. Secretary, I've listened with great interest to your remarks that the system works. As someone who represents the state of Mississippi, a state that has now lost four National Guardsmen in the past 12 days, I'll counter by saying your system doesn't work fast enough.
The first was with the body armor. You recall the initial story was that only the active duty force needed the best body armor, that the guardsmen and reservists didn't need it because they were not on the front line.
It didn't take the bad guys very long to figure out that there was no front line. If you shot a guardsman you probably killed him. If you hit a hit a guy in the 82nd he probably lived.
That took way too long to fix.
The second problem was with the armored Humvees. I know for a fact, speaking to my colleague Mr. Simmons (ph), that you were delivered a letter a year ago October, October of '03, on the need for armoring all of the Humvees.
TAYLOR: I know that our chairman brought it to your attention about a year ago January. I brought it to your attention a year ago January. And yet it took a Tennessee National Guardsman last December to remind you that the problem wasn't getting fixed.
As a matter of curiosity, I went to Rock Island arsenal two days after that conversation. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, there were three blue collar workers working in this enormous facility: two cutting steel, one welding. I was told that the capacity for Rock Island was 1,000 a week and yet they were only making 200 a week.
Now, there are several things along the way that they're told didn't happen. The suppliers had put them back on the list and the question becomes, “Why isn't the secretary calling the suppliers and make them aware of this? “
That there are issues with funding, that they didn't know that the money was coming. My goodness, they didn't know the money was coming? We sure allocated it.
And then I'll follow it up with the third mistake, the jammers.
There is the technology to prevent the detonation of most improvised explosive devices. It exists and we've allocated money for it. And yet that number remains classified, Mr. Secretary, not because the insurgents don't know how few are protected, but because I'm of the opinion the American people would be appalled if they knew how few are protected.
I contrast that, Mr. Secretary, with a tape I wish I could've shown today of the Water Palace in Iraq. First time I went a year ago September, the place looked like it had been bombed. When I went back in January it once again looks like a palace. Our nation has spent about $12 million restoring that palace.
My question is, if there's a sense of urgency to repair palaces, why can't we get that sense of urgency on armoring vehicles? Why can't we get that sense of urgency on buying improvised explosive device jammers? Why can't we have that sense of urgency when it comes to the average G.I. on the street?
And, Mr. Secretary, again, you are the secretary of defense. I applaud the chairman for sending one of his staffers to actually make the phone calls to the steel mills and tell them the importance that those materials were going to armor Humvees and save kids' lives.
Why weren't you doing that? Why weren't you calling Rock Island and saying, “Guys, if you can make 1,000 a week, why don't you make 1,000 a week? We can't solve this problem too quickly “?
And in the case of the jammers, I still think you have way too few, as I just got off the phone with our adjutant general from Mississippi.
TAYLOR: Yes, the convoy is protected, but when you send a response team out on short notice, chances are they are not protected.
And those Mississippians who died in the past two weeks did not have one day of training with jammers for improvised explosive devices before they got in-theater, neither at Camp Shelby in Mississippi or at the national training center.
And the answer that I was given was, “Well, we can't train with them because we don't have enough of them. “ Well, heck, if you don't have enough of them, buy them. Tell us what the bill is, we'll pay it.
Mr. Secretary, I very much would appreciate a response to that.
RUMSFELD: As you can see on the chart that I presented earlier on up-armed Humvees...
TAYLOR: Mr. Secretary, that took a year. Where is the sense of urgency?
RUMSFELD: Could I finish my answer, please?
TAYLOR: Certainly.
RUMSFELD: You just said that it took a Tennessee guardsman in December of '04 for the Department of Defense to do something. If you look where December of '04 is, the department had been working aggressively well before anyone raised it in that meeting.
So your statement is not correct.
TAYLOR: No, Mr. Secretary, you were working aggressively and for some unexplained reason in the fall of '04, you went from doing a thousand a week down to a couple of hundred a week, and the need was not fulfilled yet. My question is why?
RUMSFELD: If you look at the chart, it shows what the total up- armored Humvees in Iraq were during that period. And it began very aggressively shortly after the need arose when the commander on the ground saw the use of the improvised devices to the extent they were being used. And the ramp-up began very aggressively during that period.
I would say what all of us here know: There isn't a life that's lost over there that isn't heartbreaking and deeply felt by all of the people in the Department of Defense.
And I think, however, to suggest that there has been anything other than a department-wide effort would not be an accurate representation.
The same thing is true with respect to body armor.
Do you want to mention the Rock Island arsenal issue?
MYERS: My understanding is, Congressman Taylor, that the Army talked to you yesterday about the Rock Island. I don't know if it satisfied your question or not.
MYERS: It's new to me. I have the answer they provided, which is that Rock Island is one of seven sites and they were transitioning between Humvee kits to truck kits -- and fuel trucks, I think, to be specific.
So other than that -- I have a chart. Can you put the chart up?
TAYLOR: If I may, did either of you gentlemen tour the Rock Island arsenal...
MYERS: I haven't toured it, no.
TAYLOR: ... in your jobs?
MYERS: Let me put up the chart, please, on total number of armored vehicles. Because we often talk about the up-armored Humvee. Put the one that has the total number of armored vehicles, it's...
HUNTER: General Myers, I appreciate the...
MYERS: Put it right there -- right there. Put that chart right there, you've got a hand on it. Right hand. Yes. Put that up there on the chart.
HUNTER: General Myers, I understand the importance of this question, but I want to remind my colleagues and my panel...
MYERS: Yes, sir. I'm just going to finish this, sir.
HUNTER: ... that we've taken five minutes. So if you can wrap it pretty quickly.
MYERS: Ten seconds. Let me just show you in 10 seconds that, if you look at the total number of vehicles in Iraq, over 35,000, 28,000 today are armored.
As the secretary said, with a few exceptions that we can explain to you off-line, nobody off installations in Iraq without being in some armor protection. And then by summer of '03, all the level three, which is the lowest level, will be replaced by level two armor protection.
So this has been an imperative and one that's received a lot of attention here in the last year and a half as the requirements continue to grow, by the way. They didn't start out at 35,000. They've grown over time.
TAYLOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
HUNTER: OK. I thank you.
And I just say to my colleague: I know this is an important area and I look forward to continuing to work this with him. And maybe we can ask questions at the end of this thing.
MYERS: Very important area.
HUNTER: Let me go to the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton.
SAXTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General, thank you for the great job that you've been doing and we all appreciate it.
And, Secretary Jonas, thank you for joining the team. I know what a tough job you have, because I know your predecessor very well. And I think we wore him out, so we don't want to wear you out.
(LAUGHTER)
JONAS: Thank you, sir.
SAXTON: I have a C-17 question I'd like to ask, but I've got to say first -- and I have a little different view of the Humvee situation and the body armor situation than some of my colleagues do.
When we got ready to go to Operation Iraqi Freedom, we had a set of expectations about what we were going to face. Some of them came true and some of them were quite different than what we anticipated.
And I've got to say that, had I been in your position, making decisions about how to up-armor, how to get it done quickly, how to produce body armor faster, and all the things that we had to do to meet the threat that was so different than what may have been anticipated by us or those who were making plans for these kind of eventualities -- this is a set of tough decisions that had to be made about how to move forward quickly.
And, quite frankly, while everything that we did wasn't perfect, I think we did a remarkable job in providing the materiel and the armor for our soldiers. All of us had the same set of goals and we got there.
Maybe some people would have been able to do it differently, but I'm glad that we were able to progress as quickly as we could.
SAXTON: Let me ask my C-17 question if I may.
Whatever the fight is like, we've got to get there. And the quicker we get there, as we all know from history, the better off our fighters are, the better off our planners are and the more chance we have of success.
We're going to finish our C-17 by -- I've forgotten exactly what the year is. I guess in '08 we'll get the last airplane off the line. And we've got to make a decision about whether to go forward.
Part of that decision, of course, is being considered by the mobility requirement study that's due to come out in a few months. But, General Myers, if I could just get your opinion as to, as to where we are with regard to this subject and what your thoughts are about moving forward.
MYERS: First of all, as you said, the C-17 has proven to be a terrific asset, particularly given the distances that this country's had to move people and material. It's been invaluable.
As you mentioned, we have the mobility, capability study that we'll complete in March and we have the quadrennial defense review. And between those two vehicles, I think we'll have a chance to determine what the overall mobility requirement is, not just C-17s, not just inter-theater airlift, but intra-theater airlift as well, the role that shipping plays and other modes of transportation. So it'll be a comprehensive study.
I think when that is finished we'll know what to recommend in terms of the final number of C-17s. But I don't think anybody right now without those studies being completed are ready to make a prediction.
SAXTON: Thank you very much.
HUNTER: Mr. Boren (ph)?
MEEHAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, General Myers.
I want to reiterate Mr. Skelton's concern about the administration's failure to lay out a concrete strategy to achieve these objectives that've been outlined. And I think we all agree with them. And also to win the peace in Iraq.
MEEHAN: It's been nearly two years since we invaded Iraq and removed Saddam Hussein from power, but our troops are clearly facing a more resilient enemy.
There are sections of Iraq that have plunged into violence and chaos. And I think as members of this committee we must ask ourselves how can we help put the United States on a path toward self- sufficiency and begin to bring our troops home in a way that advances our strategic interests? And what is the responsibility in Congress shape Iraq policy? Is it simply writing a check or is it to debate this policy?
I think the answer begins by verifying to the American people and the Iraqi people that we don't intend to maintain a permanent military presence in Iraq. And I'm worried, Mr. Secretary, that the supplemental budget request sends a mixed signal to the Iraqi people about our long-term intentions in Iraq.
The Defense Department has asked for $560 billion for military construction projects to be available to be spent in Iraq through fiscal year 2009.
Last week, Secretary Harvey testified before the committee that the United States has no intention of keeping a military presence in Iraq. But I wonder what kind of a signal we're sending to the Iraqi people and to the American taxpayers if we're spending hundreds of millions on military construction projects.
And I'm curious whether the Iraqi government has approved this construction. And recognize that we just had an election but there has been an Iraqi government in place.
Is there an agreement to turn over these bases to the Iraqis now that they are in the process of having elected government in place?
And what kind of basing agreements are we seeking next year and then the year after that, I guess, going right to fiscal 2009? Have we entered into negotiating any kind of basing agreements with either the prior Iraqi government or the new Iraqi government? And how are we going to work out some of these concerns logistically?
RUMSFELD: Well, Congressman, you have it correct that the United States has a public policy of wanting to be there as long as we're needed and not one day longer.
The investments that are being proposed in the supplemental, as I recall, are for facilities that will be somewhat safer for our forces while they're there. Some are for hospitals, some are to improve air fields and some are to improve billeting. But I don't believe any of it could be characterized as permanent, and I would not want it to be so characterized.
With respect to the negotiations and discussions with the Iraqi government, we consult very closely with them. Our forces do and our embassy now does. And they are certainly aware of what it is we're doing.
RUMSFELD: Precisely what would happen to facilities when we depart I think is something to be discussed and managed as we go forward.
One of the things we're going to have to do this year, between now and when the constitution is completed and the permanent government is elected in December, is to begin that process of inventorying all of those questions, like status of forces agreements, bases. We want to move all of the Iraqi prisoners of war over to the Iraqis so that they're the ones taking care of them; turn over the detention centers to them, for example.
And these are all things that are being worked on now with the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the Iraqi government.
However, the Iraqi situation is in, kind of, a mid period right now. The current government exists and has all authority until the transitional authority is seated -- the people that were just elected -- and then they, of course, select the prime minister, the president, the deputy presidents.
And then they will only be there during the period when the constitution's being developed, and then they will be replaced in January with a permanent government.
So our discussions and negotiations with respect to those issues are unlikely to be taking place in this interregnum but very likely will start shortly with the new government once it's announced in two, three, four weeks -- whatever it may be.
MEEHAN: And you couldn't comment specifically on what kind of basing agreements we're going to seek. We'll just have to...
RUMSFELD: I can't.
MEEHAN: And the other quick comment I'd make: You can't help but go to Iraq and see the concrete being poured and not get a sense that we intend a little more of a permanent presence.
And that's why I think it's important for the Congress to stay on top of this and to work with the administration.
HUNTER: Let me tell the gentleman, Mr. Reyes is making cut-off signs here for you, Mr. Meehan.
Well, your head is turned there.
But we've got a lot of folks we've got to get to, and if you can maybe ask any follow-up questions in writing, that would be appreciated.
Appreciate the gentleman.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. McHugh?
MCHUGH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, welcome.
Secretary Jonas, welcome. We look forward to working with you and wish you all the best, of course, in your new position.
MCHUGH: General Myers, you mentioned in your written statement that you are supported of improving survivor death benefits for the military.
I think that's probably a sentiment that is shared by most, if not all, the people in this room and far beyond the doors of this chamber. Secretary Chu has joined you. (inaudible) has testified that, while the Department of Defense is supportive, he's indicated that that should only be related to combat-related deaths. The vice chiefs have broadened their support and said for all deaths with respect to -- regardless of the circumstances.
I was curious to what your position is on that. Only combat- related death and illnesses or a broader-based death benefit?
MYERS: My personal opinion is that it probably should be more broadly based. And part of that is based on, you know, what you think is right. There also may be some legal issues with specifying a certain group and we have to look into those.
So I think that whole issue of survivor benefits needs a very good scrub by the Congress and by the department to work together to come up with a package that is appropriate for our men and women in service.
MCHUGH: Thank you.
Mr. Secretary the supplemental contains money. I commend the president for that. The language focuses, if I'm reading it correctly, that benefit on combat-related death and illnesses, but there appears to be some flexibility for you to expand that.
Now, obviously, expansion costs money; we all understand that. But I was just curious if you've had a chance to flesh out in your mind how you think that benefit should be applied.
RUMSFELD: My recollection is that there's $400 million in the budget supp. And that it's a matter that's under discussion between the executive branch and the legislative branch in the House and the Senate. And whatever comes out from that process clearly we'll find funds to fund. We just have to.
MCHUGH: But you yourself have not taken a position?
RUMSFELD: As a presidential appointee, I tend to support the president. And my guess is that he and the executive branch will be in discussions with the Senate and the House on the subject and end up with an agreement that's -- it certainly needs to be raised.
RUMSFELD: It certainly has to be appropriate for the families that have lost loved ones. And, needless to say, I'm very much in support of that.
MCHUGH: OK, gentlemen, thank you.
General Myers also talks in his written statement about the challenge of reserve recruiting and indicated that five of the six reserve components did not achieve their recruiting goals through January of this year. And it's going to be a tough year through 2005 -- I think we all understand that -- for recruiting.
But the statement goes on to say that in meeting the challenge a variety of things are being done, including increasing the number of recruiters and restructuring enlistment bonuses.
But if you look at the budget data, there is some growth in spending for active Army, active Air Force, the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. But I would describe those ladders, and particularly for the Army Reserve, as flat or reduced. In fact, the Army Reserve would receive a decrease from $90 million down to $88 million.
I guess we can make a question out of this, but really my intent is to express a concern that I have in previous years that there's a lag time, as you know, General and Mr. Secretary, between the time you dedicate those recruiting dollars and you actually reap the benefit. And I think we've got to do a lot better job in maintaining a higher level and a more consistent level in the recruiting and retention field.
There is a tendency that, when the numbers are good, we cut the allocations. I understand we have needs elsewhere. And we eventually pay the price. And I don't think this is a time we want to do that.
So if you want to treat that as a question, fine. It was really an unpaid...
MYERS: I think you focused, in the last part of your question, on the component that we're most worried about, and that would be the Army Reserve.
And we just need to -- that's something the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the secretary, his staff, Dr. Chu, we worry about this all the time. One of our big issues, of course, is looking around corners at people's intentions and it's hard to predict that. So we've got to lead it as much as we can.
And we'll review the budget figures, but that's how we're going to mitigate that, with more recruiters and retention bonuses and so forth.
HUNTER: I appreciate the gentleman.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes?
REYES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Secretary and General, thank you for being here with us this morning.
I have a question for each one of you, but the first one, Mr. Secretary, deals with what I think fits under the category of where the system does not work. And it concerns the U.S. pilots that filed a lawsuit -- as this was reported in the L.A. Times on the 15th of this month, where they filed a lawsuit against Iraq for compensation.
REYES: They won their case, were awarded and now the administration is taking a position that this should be dismissed.
The irony -- there are a couple of ironies. One of them is that some of these pilots were tortured in the same Abu Ghraib prison where prisoners were abused by our troops.
And the article quotes that, Mr. Secretary, you're in favor of awarding compensation to Iraqi prisoners who were abused by U.S. military at this prison and at the same time our own pilots that have won a court case are now being denied the same kind of compensation.
I was wondering, do you have any comment on that?
RUMSFELD: Congressman, I don't. It's a matter that the Department of Justice handles for the United States government, not something the Department of Defense does.
REYES: All right. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General Myers, when we're talking about the plan for providing Iraqi forces and their capabilities to be self-sufficient, it is my understanding that right now the U.S. provides all combat support and combat service support to the Iraqis.
So my question is, given the charts that you've provided us here this morning, when do you think that the Iraqis will be self- sufficient to provide for themselves, both in combat support and combat service support on their own? When will they be able to stand on their own completely? And is there a plan to have them do that?
MYERS: Absolutely.
As was pointed out by General Petraeus and General Casey, and by General Luck when he came back with his observations, clearly one of the things that has to happen is that before those capabilities are developed in the Iraqi forces, we've got to support them with what we call the enablers, to help them with command and control, to help them in communications, to help them with intelligence and their processes and logistics support, as you mentioned.
MYERS: But over time, they've got to become self-reliant. So that's one of the pieces that General Petraeus is working and General Casey are working. They have to be self-reliant and be able to take care of themselves.
And so that's part of the planning that's going forward.
As you know, or may know, the Iraqi air force now flies three C- 130s. And all our training for them is to ensure they have the capability to continue training their own pilots, their own flight engineers, their own load masters, and that the logistics systems that support those aircraft -- that they can maintain those.
As the secretary said earlier in his opening statement -- or later on in a question -- this is a country that has resources and they can do that. Our job is to help them organize so they can take care of those kinds of assets.
So you're absolutely right. And I don't have a time frame when they're going to be totally self-sufficient across the board. It's part of an ongoing process, a lot of which rests with the Iraqi government.
REYES: But at the current level that -- after a couple of years and the fact that they've got a couple -- or three C-130s that are being flown by the Iraqis themselves, that's a far cry from being able to provide their own combat support and their own combat service support.
Is that included in the supplemental budget request? I've only seen and have read a draft of the request, but is that part of the plan that's in there for the Iraqi security forces?
MYERS: Yes, part of the plan is to develop the combat service support that supports the forces out front. That's absolutely part of the plan and part of what we're going to help the Iraqis do.
How much funding we put toward that and how much the Iraqis put toward that -- we would hope that the Iraqi government would put a lot of resource to it. And in the meantime, we'll help provide those enablers that enable them to go do what they need to do.
REYES: Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Everett?
EVERETT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, first of all, let me thank the chairman for adhering to the five-minute rule.
I was interested in the comments that you made on increased compensation to survivors of those that are killed when they're on military duty. I have a bill in the House which mirrors the bill of Senator Sessions over in the Senate.
EVERETT: And I too think that a difference in geography here does matter, that when you're under fire and you're in combat zones that that should have some special consideration. I wouldn't ask you to comment on that and I'd be just pleased to work -- our bill, I think, has some 70 sponsors, or thereabout, cosponsors -- with you through this process.
General Myers, the defenders of our nation or our space assets is, I think, underestimated and also underappreciated. Could you please describe, just briefly, in an unclassified manner, how we're to protect and defend those critical assets from emerging threats?
MYERS: Well, when you talk about space systems and defense you've got to think about three segments: the ground segment, how you protect the security of the ground segment; the uplinks; and then, of course, the on-orbit segment.
And one of the first things you have to do is to know when you're under attack. And it's been one of those issues with space systems, so that's sometimes very hard to determine if, in fact, you're under attack.
I think it was a Hughes satellite back in the '90s that went down. It had a lot of the pagers on it in this country and around the world and it wasn't known for quite some time after analysis what actually happened.
And that's what we face today. And so as we put new systems up, every new system that we develop is built with the idea in mind, OK, how can we provide warning that we're actually under attack. That's, obviously, the first thing you have to think about. And so we're doing that.
But space systems, by virtue of where they are and the ambiguity sometimes in malfunctions, whether it's a weather-related phenomenon or actually somebody bringing it under attack, has to be designed into the whole system.
The ground segment's a little bit easier in that we can provide the same kind of physical security that we provide to other fixed locations.
MYERS: And of course the up and down links are a challenge because they are susceptible to jamming.
I would say another important piece of that, so we understand it well, is that the intelligence to know what threats are out there to our systems has to be well developed.
When I was commander of the U.S. Space Command, that was one of the areas that I thought could be enhanced, that we needed more intel focus on threats to our space segment. Absolutely.
EVERETT: Obviously, General, you're always doing an outstanding job out there, but are we considering hardening our assets?
MYERS: Yes, absolutely. That was what I was alluding to I think, and we probably can't go much further in this.
But we've got to look -- warning is part of it. Hardening is part of it. And for all these space systems, those will all be considered and, as it usually comes down to, it will come down to a risk equation. And we'll balance risk versus cost and then try to determine what it is we specifically want to do to a given system.
EVERETT: And, I understand, we are looking at using reversible methods in denying adversaries certain ways to get to our assets.
MYERS: There are several concepts of operations that can mitigate the impact of having large fixed assets in space and their vulnerability. And I think we probably ought to stop there in this audience.
EVERETT: Let me comment on RNEP just a moment, which is under jurisdiction of my subcommittee.
I'm not taking a position on outside groups advising our proliferation or those issues.
Mr. Secretary, what I would like to have a clear understanding -- because we passed this in subcommittee, we passed it in the full committee, we've narrowly passed it on the floor and then we lost it in the appropriation process by the one vote.
Could you please tell me, directly, if there is a military need for this robust nuclear earth penetrator?
RUMSFELD: That's an a -- I guess our time is almost out, again.
It is a question that's difficult to answer, because sometimes they say “military requirement, “ and that's a formal process.
There was no military requirement for a military aircraft, for example. There was no military requirement for unmanned aerial vehicles until they came along.
So what I believe there is a need for the study, which is what we're talking about here, not a weapon. We're talking about taking existing weapons and doing a study to see if they can be reduced in their power, their lethality, to a level that's lower than the current weapons are, so that they might have the ability to penetrate the earth in a way that could help protect the United States of America.
I think that it is clearly in our country's interest to do the study.
Do you want to comment on whether there's a, quote, “military requirement “?
MYERS: You bet.
Our combatant commander that is charged by this nation to worry about countering the kind of targets, deeply buried targets, certainly thinks there's need for this study and General Cartwright has said such.
MYERS: I think that. I think the Joint Chiefs think that. And so the study is that. It's not a commitment to go forward with a system. It's just...
(CROSSTALK)
EVERETT: Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
HUNTER: I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder?
SNYDER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, Ms. Jonas, for being here today. We appreciate you. We want you to succeed in everything that you do.
General Myers, you had mentioned a while ago, I think it was you that mentioned the matrix room. And I've heard of “Matrix “ the movie; I've never heard of matrix the room. And, I mean, what is this room?
And if there's information in there, why can't that be transferred over here so that we could actually see it and make this matrix room for the day so we can find out what we're doing?
What is this room? Is it open to the press? Can we take constituents over there? Is it classified? What is the matrix room...
MYERS: A lot of that is classified. Some of it is not classified. It's a room where we track our progress against the objectives and tasks that I had on that board.
