This narrower approach is dictated by two considerations, according to U.S. military officers, who spoke of the arrangement as a kind of test run. One is a shortage of U.S. military police. The second is concern on the part of Iraqi authorities that pairing U.S. troops with police could undercut Iraqi sovereignty in ways that military-to-military training does not.
The expanded U.S. training effort, due to get underway by April, is projected to involve more than 3,000 U.S. troops this year. The bulk will be drawn from forces already in Iraq, U.S. officers said. But a request has gone to the Pentagon for 1,000 or more additional troops to augment the effort later in the year.
NATO also is playing a part, managing a smaller, related mission focused in three areas: assisting Iraqi officials at the Ministry of Defense, military headquarters and operations centers; reviving military academies and war colleges in Iraq; and training Iraqis outside the country.
By arranging for greater numbers of U.S. troops to operate more closely with Iraqi units, the new effort risks leaving the assistance teams more vulnerable to attack outside the heavily fortified U.S. bases where they have lived. The National Guard and police are acknowledged to have been infiltrated by insurgents, compounding the threat for U.S. soldiers who would work with such units.
Several senior U.S. officers said security measures are being developed to deal with the heightened danger, including expanding the assistance teams with some combat troops and placing quick-response forces nearby for emergencies.
"Any place we've got these teams, we're going to be monitoring very closely," Vines said.
The elections have given U.S. commanders here a sense of momentum. At the same time, they acknowledge being in a period of some vulnerability as U.S. forces continue to churn through a major rotation that is not due to end until next month.
The last major U.S. troop rotation occurred a year ago, when commanders, as now, were feeling upbeat after a milestone event -- the capture of ousted president Saddam Hussein in December 2003. But within several months, U.S. forces were embroiled in simultaneous Shiite and Sunni uprisings and confronting a burgeoning insurgency.
U.S. military officers say there was a decline in the quality of U.S. intelligence on the insurgency last spring as a result of the turnover of forces. To prevent similar slippage this time, the 18th Airborne Corps' intelligence unit arranged for a longer handover period with its counterpart in the departing 3rd Corps. Additionally, more than 60 intelligence analysts from other military centers were brought in last summer and will help bridge this period.
By the middle of the year, if Iraqi security forces are showing greater ability to confront insurgents, U.S. commanders here say they may consider recommending a reduction in U.S. troops. They expect that political pressure will build this year on Iraq's transitional government to arrange for lower U.S. force levels, if not a definitive timetable for complete withdrawal.
U.S. military and diplomatic authorities in Baghdad argue firmly against setting a timetable now. They say it would play to the advantage of the insurgency. One official likened it to "a timed surrender." Another warned that it would become "an imprisoning device."
"No one knows how far we'll get" with the new military assistance effort, the second official said. "That's one fundamental reason we don't do timelines."
Vines emphasized that cutting the level of U.S. forces was "not the ultimate objective." Echoing U.S. policy, he said any decision to withdraw would have "to be based on conditions." Then he added, "But I am very confident the conditions will be such that the numbers will be lower" by year's end.
