World: NATO

The prime ministers of seven new NATO member nations are being welcomed to the White House by President Bush today. The leaders of Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, expand the alliance to 26 countries.

Robert E. Hunter, NATO ambassador under President Clinton and Senior Advisor at the RAND Corporation, will be online to discuss the expansion of NATO and today's White House ceremony.

Submit your questions and comments before or during today's discussion.

Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.

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Amb. Robert E. Hunter: This afternoon, President Bush welcomed 7 new countries to NATO -- bringing the total to 26. That is 10 new countries from Central Europe and the former Soviet Union in the last five years. Clearly, NATO will be different; but just how different is the critical question. Much is already known -- for instance, that all members have the same rights and responsibilities, that all will join the integrated command structure, Allied Command Operations, that all will be covered by Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which commits all allies to come to the defense of any any that is attacked, and that all must now also look beyond Europe -- "out of area" in NATO jargon -- to new challenges as far afield as Afghanistan and Iraq. As before, US engagement and leadership are critical; as before, the US needs to sustain its involvement on a bipartisan basis.

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Lyme, Conn.: What are your thoughts on concerns that expansion of NATO may make it more difficult for NATO to reach a consensus on how to act? Since some military actions require quick decisions, how well will NATO be able to balance consulting its member nations while making responsive actions?

Amb. Robert E. Hunter: It may seem that the larger NATO becomes -- as of today, it has 26 members, only 5 years ago it had only 16 -- the harder it will become to take decisions, which, as the questioner knows, are always taken by consensus: indeed, NATO never takes a formal vote. But what seems obvious may not be so. In the first place, the new members are deeply devoted to the same principles as the existing members -- in particular to preserving and extending security in Europe. Furthermore, NATO has always been most effective when there is vigorous debate about it should do -- and not do -- against a background of knowledge both that having an alliance that works is critical to all and that, when it has taken a decision, NATO has never failed in what it has set out to do. Thus, with 16 members or 26, the task is the same: for all the allies to become convinced that a particular counse of action is important; and for their to be effective leadership -- and particularly American leadership. This leadership -- and a reputation for probity, good judgment, and commitment to allied security -- remains vital to the alliance; and this administration like those before it must husband that resource. If it does so -- in particular to move beyond the crisis of the last year, then the number of allies will not be that important.

At the same time, NATO must increasingly be able to act speedily, especially of there are crises, or even with "routing" efforts like the current NATO engagement in Afghanistan. This is not a matter of "how many" allies, however, but of the methods and procedures the alliance follows to get decisions made quickly. To this end, the new Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk is crafting new means of achieving "decision superiority" for NATO, and all the allies are working toward that end. But one thing is clear: one of the key elements of NATO is its consensus rule, which stimulates all the allies to take critical matters seriously, and to work together to preserve the alliance for all the tasks ahead.

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washingtonpost.com: Would a coordinated EU foreign and defense policy replace NATO for many European nations and thus render the alliance irrelevant?

Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Wouldn't it be wonderful if the EU had a foreign and security policy that would lead Europeans to take full responsibility for European security, and let the US just go home?! But that is not likely to happen, at least not for many years. The Europeans are not yet so organized that they can "do security" by themselves, and they do not have the tools needed, as are found in the NATO integrated command structure and more than half a century of working together, a precious asset that is not easily duplicated. But the EU is beginning to do more -- in Macedonia, for instance, and later this year to take over full responsibility for security from NATO in Bosnia.

America is still needed in Europe -- and that means NATO is still needed -- in terms of the great historic imponderables, including insurance that the 20th century, the worst century ever for war and human suffering, is well and truly in the past; and working to ensure that the future of Russia will not again lead to a fundamental rupture in arrangements for European security. In addition, the European Union does not have the capacity -- and is unlikely anytime soon to gain the capacity -- to act beyond Europe, as NATO is doing in Afghanistan and is likely to do in Iraq. Thus the European Security and Defense Policy (an adjunct of the Common Foreign and Security Policy) can be a useful complement to NATO, but the EU will not replace NATO, and certainly not US power and engagement, at least for many years to come.

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washingtonpost.com: Will Russia ever join NATO?

Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Russia in NATO? In theory, yes. Indeed, officially, NATO membership is open to any member of the OSCE that is "ready and willing to shoulder the responsibilities of NATO membership." But for Russia to join would require major changes in that country, including assurance that democracy is well rooted; and it would require Russia to meet all the other aspects of NATO membership, measured also in terms of its relations with other countries.

More important, would the rest of the alliance be prepared to extend to Russia guarantees of all its borders against external armed attack -- for example, some day against China? If the Western nations were so disposed, it is very likely that they would work out this business with Russia by other means; and, indeed, they would want to do all that is possible so that this eventuality did not come to pass.

At heart, if the security situation in Eurasia reached the point where Russia could be considered for membership in NATO to be a serious proposition, things would probably be so positive that NATO would not any longer be needed!

Because of all of these argument, Russia has not suggested joining NATO, and no one in the West has proposed it. Instead, there is now a NATO-Russia Council, which seeks to treat Russia like an equal, to bring it into NATO deliberations when its interests are truly engaged, to build cooperation, including in areas like peacekeeping and -- in time -- security for the Middle East, and to extend security truly in a "Europe whole and free." But Russia does not have to be in NATO to be part of NATO -- and the test will be how all these countries work together to build security across Eurasia.

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Cumberland, Md.: While it is nice to have new members in NATO -- it is doubtful if they can carry their weight militarily or even spend the money on defense that is required to upgrade their out-of-date equipement. I question the value of accepting new members in NATO who are militarily underpowered. Your comments please?

Amb. Robert E. Hunter: When we set out to take in new NATO members a decade ago, I invented a slogan to put this point: a country to join NATO would have to be a "produce and not just a consumer of security." Now, that does not mean being able to mount a defense like that of the Cold War. None of these new countries, or any of the "old" NATO allies (with the possible exception of Turkey, on the Iraqi border) faces an external military threat. What we need from the new countries is that they democratize their military forces, that they adopt NATO standards in equipment and practice, that they take part in Allied Command Operations (however little), that they be able to coordinate their activities, their equipment, and their training with NATO -- and that the continue efforts to deepen democracy and market economies, and continue their renunciation of claims against neighbors. At the same time, there is an interest in having these countries make some contribution to the newer tasks, including doing what they can to counter terrorism (and that can including police work, intelligence, and border control within their own countries) and to join, in however limited a way, in common decisions NATO takes to be engaged in places like Afghnistan and Iraq. This is part of a total security concept: and the amount of money spent on military forces is not the key point -- indeed, NATO does not want Central European countries to spend so much money that they may retard the development of their economies.

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Little Rock, Ark.: Will or should NATO ever get increasingly involved in the Iraqi conflict like it has in the Balkans?

Amb. Robert E. Hunter: I predict that, within a year, NATO will have taken over responsibility for much if not all external military engagement in Iraq, under a UN mandate. This is a logical extension of what NATO has already done successfully in the Balkans (neither Bosnia or Kosovo is yet successful politically and economically but, except for the recent violence in Kosovo, neither has experienced the conflict of the pre-NATO period), and is beginning to do in Afghanistan. The US is reaching the point of acknowledging that we would like help in Iraq -- in military deployments, in reconstruction, in development of post-Saddam politics -- and that many of the allied countries have capabilities that can be of significan benefit. What is required is that we be willing to share influence and decision-making as well as responsibility and burdens: something that may seem obvious, but which official Washington has not yet been prepared to do.

At heart, whether or not we should have gone to war in Iraq, it is over. The old security system has been shattered. Both we and the Europeans have a vital interest -- vital self-interests -- in putting something viable in its place. And how better to do that, from the point of view of all concerned, than through NATO?

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washingtonpost.com: How has perceived unilateralism affected the United States' leadership role in NATO?

Amb. Robert E. Hunter: NATO is now slowly emerging from the worst crisis in its history, occasioned in major part because the United States, along with Britain, chose to presecute a war in Iraq without adequate reason to do so, and certainly without being able to bring along the NATO allies as a whole. Even if the US could be argued to have had no choice, the way we went about it gratuitously weakened our reputation for probity, cooperation, consultation, and sound judgement. But the Alliance is, in the end, about what countries either do or do not do together in their common interests -- and common values -- for the future. And if wiser heads prevail, on both sides of the Atlantic -- and there is evidence this is beginning to happen -- then the Western alliance can regain must of its former strength. And the US can gain much of its former leadership: but that must be on the basis of looking to others for counsel rather than obedience; seeking to build cooperation and common understanding rather than an assertion of "our way or the highway." The latter method has been tried and found wanting. We know now that we have to have allies and partners to shape the world to our (and their) liking; and if we act on that insight, we can regain the highground that was so woefully lost last year. In sum, the US disposes of great incipient power, unrivalled, perhaps, in history; but to change that incipient power into lasting influence, we must create institutions, attitudes, practices, and policies that work for us....because they also work for others.

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Washington, D.C.: If there is no threat to these new members, why is NATO installing air defense over the Baltics, thus to treat Russia as the enemy? While Putin has much more important things to do, like growing the Russian economy, and the level-headed Russians I talk to don't get too excited over the Baltics (though they think this "Article 5 protection" emboldens the Baltics on the language question), it merely encourages the unreformed Russian military to keep trumpeting the threat from the West and the need to keep their old formations. So is this air defense gesture really necessary?

Amb. Robert E. Hunter: You put your finger on a key problem. On the one hand, countries have to be able to do at least a minium to guarantee the sanctity of their borders and their air space. As NATO members, there at least needs to be some means for what is called "air policing" -- hence, the four F-16s (and some limited other equipments) that will be deployed in Lithuania: these are no threat to Russia, and cannot be so represented. Indeed, nothing that has been done in any of the new allied states, or that anyone contemplates doing, can pose such a treat or honestly be represented as doing so. But on the other hand, it is also important that, with the expansion of NATO, Russia not be pushed away or even have a sense is it being pushed away. That is one reason Lithuania has worked out arrangements with Russia (and Belarus) for the movement of people to/from Kaliningrad, a part of Russia now separated from it by NATO territory. That is why NATO is pressing Latvia to treat is major Russian minority with dignity. It is why NATO and Russia have created the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels, in which Russia is equal with the now 26 NATO allies. And it is why NATO has sought to engage Russia in peacekeeping (as in Bosnia and Kosovo), and has a raft of common activities (see the NATO website for a list). But this must all be done deftly; there has since NATO began its venture of playing a lead role in crafting a "Europe whole and free," it has had to be sure that it advaces the legitimate security interests both of Central European states and of Russia; and it must continue to do this. (This is particular true with regard to any bases and permenent deployments in former Warsaw Pact territory: in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATO included a unilateral statement that imposed a number of limitations on what it would do in this regard. It is not violating the letter of these pledges; but it must be careful, as well, to honor the spirit).

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Kansas City, Mo.: For some time, I have heard a Russian point-of-view that the US made commitments at the end of the Cold War to limit NATO enlargement. Michael Mandelbaum has referred to such commitments in his opposition to NATO expansion. I've heard other policymakers and scholars say that no such commitments were made, and that NATO is free to enlarge. Apparently the US would also be free to restructure its military deployments, away from Germany and to "New Europe."

What's the right story here?

Amb. Robert E. Hunter: No such commitments were made. When I was US ambassador to NATO in the 1990s, we researched the case thoroughly, to be sure that we were honoring all pledges made. At the same time, NATO enlargement has not taken place in a vacuum, as though Russia has no importance. Quite the contrary: it is engaged in the NATO-Russia Council, in NATO peacekeeping (at one point in both Bosnia and Kosovo), in exercises, and even now moving in the direction of "interoperability" with NATO equipment.

The US redeployments easterward are ostensibly to have different kinds of bases -- some just for runways and storage of supplies -- that would make deployments farther east, for instance to Middle East crisis regions, easier. This is still being debated. And it needs to be undertaken with several points in mind: military efficiency and cost are only one factor. We also have to reassure the Germans and others in West Europe that we are not shifting our focus decisively away from Europe; and we have to assure the Russians that we are not taking advantage of their weakness. In fact, nothing the US is thinking of doing could pose a threat to Russia, but it is critical that whatever is done be done in full "transparence" -- indeed in consultations -- with Russia, which does, indeed, share many of the US and allied objectives with regard to countering terrorism and limiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

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Alexandria, Va.: Are there other countries that wish to join NATO? Now that the Cold War is behind us what is the rational for joining the group?

Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Secretary countries in the Balkans want to join NATO -- Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, and Albania -- and all may do so. Their reasoning is the same as that of the countries that have already joined: to "bring history to an end," in the sense of being the playthings of the Great Powers; to have an association with the EU (with tends to follow) and with the US; to have an added incentive domestically to put down deep democrtic roots; and to gain -- they believe -- the benefits in terms of foreign investment and confidence that can come with NATO membership. In addition, Ukraine has expressed an interest in joining NATO -- in its case to become mroe certain of its relationship with Russia, as well as to gain economic benefits. Georgia has said it will apply for membership and Azerbaijan is moving in that direction. But beyond the Balkans and perhasp Ukraine (leading aside, for some time, Belarua and Moldova), one has to ask just how big NATO can become and still retain a sense of common purpose, and also a willingness of each of its members to give security guarantees -- and NATO's security guarantees must always be real -- to farflung states. The Caucasus is a long way away from NATO-Europe, strategically and politically; most allies would be reluctant to take on the burdens of potentially having to defense Georgia; and they would not want to do so regarding Azerbaijan while it is still at war with Armenia: and yet, these are precisely reasons these two countries are interested in NATO -- and Azerbaijan also speaks both of Russia and Iran in terms of its concerns, something that most if not all the European NATO allies shy away from getting involved in. So -- NATO is a successful venture; but it must not be seen as the be-all and end-all for everyone. The farther from Europe, the more there needs to be creativity about something else -- e.g., a new security system, crafted on 21st century lines, for at least major parts of what is being called the "Greater Middle East."

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Warsaw, Poland: What role will NATO play in the war against terrorism?

Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Counter-terrorism is most about non-military activities -- as Secretary of Defense and others have said. It is about intelligence, policy work, border control, etc., etc. -- most of which are activities carried out by other institutions and relationships, both singly and in groups. There is also the task of trying to "dry up the sea within which the terrorist fish swim," which, if anything, is the task of institutions like the European Union (in a new strategic partnership with the US). Militarily, there is work to do, of course, and most of that is in the realm of either special forces or of the kind of "reconstruction" and "stabilization" work that is being done in Afghanistan and Iraq (which becamse a terrorism problem only after the war). This is not about high intensity warfare, except in rare circumstances (such as the anti-Taliban period after 9/11).
Thus NATO has already assumed command of ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force, and it is developing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Indeed, if NATO gets more deeply engaged in Afghanisan to do what is needed so that it will cease being a base for the export of terrorism (if "cease" can be achieved, which is a daunting task), then this could become the most ambitous task the Alliance has undertaken since the end of the Cold War. Similarly, NATO is likely to take over major responsibilities in Iraq, which have their own counter-terrorism aspects.

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Cumberland, Md.: NATO is more and more becoming relatively useless as a military alliance for the U.S.
Too many members, including France and Germany, are unwilling to spend the money for up-to-date military hardware. These countries cannot keep up with the US on the battlefield -- Should we not compel them to assume peacekeeping duties and take over from the U.S. in the Balkans?

Amb. Robert E. Hunter: We have to be careful about reading too much into what we read in the newspapers, especially at a time when there has been so much bad blood across the Atlantic.

As we look down the road, it is not clear that there is a signficant range of possibilities where the "big batallions" will be needed, at least in terms of Allied engagement militarily. What is needed, clearly, is special forces, in particular for counter-terrorism; the kinds of stabilization forces that are now going into Afghanistan and Iraq; and the ability of allied forces to be able to fight together -- which means truly compatible C4ISR -- an abbreviation for command, control, communications, computors, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. It will also mean a sharing of high technology so that allies can field these equipments that can work together (here, the US has been especially laggard in easing restrictions in the flow of high technology -- we can't have it both ways!).

This does mean more capabilities by many of the Europeans; but less in terms of major power projection at the high end of combat than in the ability to get appropriate forces to a theater, quickly (air and sea lift) and to keep them there for a period of time (logisitics and support). The EU has been creating a Rapid Reaction Force, one of whose virtues is that it simulates some of the governments to spend money on defense, in order to promote European unity, that they might not otherwise spend. And NATO is developing a NATO Response Force, which will be able to deploy forces in as little as 5 days and keep them deployed for a signficant period of time.

Note also that one country we have been criticizing -- France -- has been engaged in NATO's major activities: it has more resources committed to the NATO Response Force than any other European ally; it is sending more officers to Allied Command Operations and Allied Command Transformation; and it has about 250 special forces fighting in Afganistan, under US command! And before NATO took over command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afganistan, the Germans (and the Dutch) had the command.

Yes, the allies can do more -- and will also be doing more in Macedonia (an EU operation) and later this year in Bosnia (taking over from NATO). And most if not all will be willing to engage with the US, Britain, etc., in Iraq, as a NATO operation, if we are prepared to have an appropriate UN resolution (which would also lead Spain to keep its troops there, as the new prime minister has made clear) -- which means our being prepared to share some of the decision-making and influence as well as the responsibility and the burdens (understanding, of course, that we would still be the "800-pound gorilla" in terms of influence.)

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Tallahassee, Fla.: ".....in major part because the United States, along with Britain, chose to presecute a war in Iraq without adequate reason to do so..."

I must say I am a bit shocked by your comment here. Especially since the 911 commission has been grilling everyone on the cost of inaction against the Taliban. Why do you think these new member countries, that lived under supression for so long, joined the coalition and supported the war in Iraq? Or would you, like Senator Kerry, just say they were bribed or coerced?

Amb. Robert E. Hunter: "Cost of inaction against the Taliban." Yes. But it is not clear that a war in Iraq helped against the Taliban, or al Qaeda, or terrorism, or what was done to us on 9/11.

Be that as it may, we are in Iraq, and the Middle East, for the next generation. No matter who is president will have to face that fact. And the Europeans, too. This is our engagement for as far ahead as we can see. But we must not in the process lose sight of what we as Americans are most concerned about: terrorism here, against our people, and potentially being visited here, again. That is the priority, and going into Iraq did little to advance that cause.

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Virginia: What must a country do to be offered NATO membership?

Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Be a democracy with firm roots. Be committed to a market economy (success upfront not required: that can be aided by belonging to NATO). Renunciation of any claims against neighbors (note the achievement of Hungary and Romania). Reform (including democratization) of the military. Adaptation to NATO methods and standards. And geographic relevance (i.e., not so far distant that existing allies will be reluctant to provide the security guarantee of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty).

It is a tribute to NATO's past, its future, and the role of American leadership and engagement that so many countries want to join this alliance -- of both interests and values.

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Falls Church, Va.: Is there a list of countries that have especially close ties with NATO, so that they can be more easily included in intra-NATO agreements and exercises? Are NATO standards pushed to non-NATO countries (for example, Australia or Sweden)?

Amb. Robert E. Hunter: Sweden (and Finland) yes -- indeed, they could join anytime they wanted to, as meeting every conceivable criterion (including being "producers and not just consumers of security.") Australia (etc.), no: can one see that it would give a commitment to fight for countries in Europe? (It did do so in WWI and WWII, along with New Zealand, but more was involved than geopolitics).

For NATO to have relevance, in terms of members being willing freely to make the commitment under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, to mutual self-defense, there has to be a solid basis for doing so and meaning it. Geography is at least one element of that. Some other form of engagement that includes Australia (etc)? Fine, and a number exist.....

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Amb. Robert E. Hunter: In sum: what we are seeing, today, in taking in 7 more countries to NATO, is a further step in fulfilling the potential -- and the promise -- of a "Europe whole and free" -- the first time in all of European history when there has been a chance of creating a security system from which all countries in "Europe" (and that includes the US and Canada) can benefit and which will penalize none. NATO is many elements, and all are critical. As devised in the 1990s -- and I was honored to have the chance to play a role -- NATO crafted a coherent strategy, consisting of several parts:
o the US as a permanent "European power"
o preservation of the integrated military command structure;
o continued support for the "European Civil Space" and the end of the "German problem"
o enlargement to Central Europe
o Partnership for Peace, to get countries ready for membership and provide security and involvement for those who do not join
o Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
o NATO-Russia Council
o NATO-Ukraine Commission
o NATO-ESDP relationship (European Union)
o new command structures
o Bosnia-Kosovo-Afghanistan-Iraq.

"something for everyone." But requiring robust common action, no "something for nothing." And firmly dependent on US leadership, commitment, and wisdom.

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