Kerry Dots Deliberation With Decision

The boat, said Sandusky, was loaded with fuel and ammunition. If the guerrilla had hit his target, "we would have gone up like a Roman candle," Sandusky said. "If John hadn't made that decision, we would all be dead."

Kerry was quiet on the boat afterward, Sandusky said, introspective in his berth that night. "He was sad. He had killed a guy."

That day, and others like it, led to what Kerry described as the most difficult decision in his life: to demonstrate against the war he had just fought in. "It was difficult because of my feelings about the service and my friends who had died," Kerry said. He paused, searching: "But I thought it would save lives."

Keep Channels Open

In the political realm, no life-and-death decision has haunted Kerry more than his October 2002 Senate vote in favor of a resolution authorizing Bush's use of force in Iraq. Those who worked with him called the decision "agonizing."

Richard C. Holbrooke, one of the many foreign policy experts Kerry consulted, said three things made it difficult: "One, he knows that war is hell from firsthand experience. Two, he didn't know if you could trust Bush to pursue war as a last resort. Three, he was starting a presidential campaign and knew where a bulk of the primary voters would be."

Typically, before making a decision, Kerry solicits many opinions. His staff installed a long cord on his phone so he could pace while he listens. Some sources are obvious, such as Clinton's former national security adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger. Some are not.

"I'm out of a windsurfing shop in Boston, but he asks my opinion," said Marvin Nicholson, Kerry's driver.

Reaching out has been part of Kerry's philosophy since he was a young man. In a letter to a college roommate dated Oct. 15, 1968, Kerry wrote that President Lyndon B. Johnson was out of touch: "One of the most crucial things for good leadership once you reach the high echelon is to keep a channel open to the very roots of the country. . . . The leader needs some method of drawing from advice beyond his colleagues and the influential men who write columns."

Before the vote on Iraq, Kerry followed his own advice. "I felt as if I ought to make that decision as if I were president. I wanted it to be defensible, and not just a Senate vote."

According to aides, Kerry called Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, met with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, spoke with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. He scoured Bush's speeches on the subject, watching C-SPAN reruns at midnight. Aides recalled Kerry scribbling the president's words on a legal pad, underlining "global coalition" and "last resort."

A few days before the vote, Kerry set up a meeting in New York with representatives of the U.N. Security Council. Every country was represented, aides said. The participants talked for more than an hour. The meeting convinced Kerry, aides said, that with deft diplomacy the administration could either build a broad coalition or isolate war opponents France, Russia and Germany.

As the deadline approached, recalled Jim Jordan, Kerry's former campaign manager: "The conversation with him was almost all about principle -- war and peace. It was simply removed from politics. It felt more important and fundamental."

A vote for the use of force, arguably, would help Kerry in the general election with swing voters, but would hurt him with left-leaning primary voters. His staff was divided about which vote was politically wise. When Kerry pushed the speed-dial button on his phone marked "Cameron," he found that his brother was conflicted as well.

"I said, politically it was a no-win situation," Cameron said. "My head said vote for it; my heart said vote against it." His sister urged him to vote no, his friends lobbied him to vote no, his office received 20,000 e-mails in one week against U.S. military action.