Transcript: Senate Foreign Relations

We would be desirous of engaging NATO in greater talks, particularly about providing headquarters, perhaps where the Polish division has been, something of that nature. But I think, in candor, it’s a little premature.

A new U.N. Security Council resolution could possibly encourage some of the South Asian nations to step up a little more, and that would certainly be a target of opportunity.

HAGEL: What about Middle Eastern countries?

ARMITAGE: I think it’s unlikely. We’ve had discussions recently with King Abdullah, and I went around through the Gulf. We didn’t specifically ask for forces, but there’s a lot of neuralgia that exists in Iraq revolving around the neighbors. I think it might be a little premature.

HAGEL: Thank you.

WOLFOWITZ: Senator, I might add that we’ve been asking NATO for help, actually going back to December 2002. I did when I did in Brussels, and specifically said even those countries that may not support the war could contribute afterwards to reconstruction.

But, as Secretary Armitage said, their capacity is, unfortunately, declined substantially over the last 10 years. And even in Afghanistan, where NATO has an important role and has made a lot of commitments, they’re having some trouble meeting some of their commitments, even in Afghanistan.

HAGEL: Thank you.

Let me take that point, Mr. Secretary, and ask about the reports, which I understand are accurate, that we will be moving 3,600 American troops from Korea into a brigade, the 2nd Division, into Iraq. Was that planned?

WOLFOWITZ: Let me put it this way. We had been discussing for some time with our Asian colleagues, with the Congress, the whole restructuring of the U.S. global footprint.

We have already made some adjustments to our posture in Korea, in both directions. We have moved troops off of the DMZ, where frankly, they were performing nothing except, kind of, a useless, and indeed I would say counterproductive, trip-wire function.

We are investing a great deal in our capability to reinforce Korea to the tune of, I believe the number is over $10 billion of various force improvements. But it was concluded over a year ago, that it was long overdue to reduce the strain on our Army that comes from having these continuous one-year unaccompanied tours in Korea.

So we had planned on some reductions. We need an extra brigade in Iraq, and in fact the brigade in Korea is ideally suited for that.

HAGEL: My understanding is that this will mean that for this brigade moving to Iraq from Korea is an additional 12-month commitment, in addition to the unaccompanied 12-month commitment they have just finished. Is that right?

WOLFOWITZ: Do you know, General Sharp?

SHARP: It will be a 12-month commitment, sir. As you know, we rotate troops into Korea on a continuous basis. So about half of them will have been in Korea already six months. So some of the tours will be short -- will be 12 months, others will go up to a maximum of 23 months.

WOLFOWITZ: Thank you.

HAGEL: So this was discussed with the Congress, this possibility of moving a combat brigade from Korea into Iraq. Isn’t that what you just said, Mr. Secretary?

WOLFOWITZ: With the leadership of the committees, yes.

HAGEL: So Senator Warner, Senator Levin were consulted on this and they knew about it.

WOLFOWITZ: Either they or their staffs were, yes.

HAGEL: They or their staffs knew about it?

WOLFOWITZ: I had been told that, yes, sir. And I consulted with several senators.

HAGEL: Thank you.

Secretary Wolfowitz, how will prisoners, detainees, be handled after the transition of government in Iraq?

ARMITAGE: May I...

HAGEL: Secretary Armitage?

ARMITAGE: Right now, two classes.

ARMITAGE: There are POWs; there are criminals.

Criminals are handled right now by Iraqis. The management, as I understand it, of the military prisons are both the U.S. military working with the ministry of justice. And after the turnover, it is my understanding that we want as rapidly as possible to put those into the hands of Iraqis.

HAGEL: "As rapidly as possible," do we have any idea what that means?

ARMITAGE: I don’t have that, sir.

HAGEL: Does anybody?

WOLFOWITZ: I don’t.

HAGEL: It’s a fairly significant issue, as we all know. It’s been a little attention brought to this issue the last two weeks. I would have thought that this government would put some time into this, especially what we’ve just been through the last two weeks.

Can someone get back to the committee with some plan?

WOLFOWITZ: We absolutely will. I agree with you on the importance of it, Senator.

HAGEL: Thank you.

Secretary Wolfowitz, Secretary Armitage, you know about the latest Washington Post stories regarding polls.

Now, I don’t subscribe completely to polls, but just for everyone’s quick review here, last week, The Washington Post reported on a recent poll conducted by the CPA: 80 percent of Iraqis lacked confidence in the CPA, 82 percent disapproved of the United States and allied militaries in Iraq. Furthermore, 45 percent of those polled in Baghdad, 67 percent polled in Basra said they backed Muqtada Sadr. This was before the prison abuse issue. Then there was a subsequent poll taken as well.

How concerned are you with these numbers? Do you believe these numbers? Mr. Secretary?

WOLFOWITZ: I think we are concerned about them, and in fact, the reason why we have wanted to move toward Iraqi self-government is so that Iraqis feel that it’s their people who are running their country, it’s their security forces that are dealing with their country.

As you say, it’s hard to know the reliability of polling data, especially in a country where people are, to put it mildly, not used to telling the truth to anyone. Although it is striking how some of these polls do seem to show important things. One of them is a poll that I’ve seen that shows very rapidly declining approval of our forces, but pretty steady confidence in Iraqi security forces.

I think it says that we’re on the right track in moving as rapidly as we can to Iraqi self-government and Iraqi self-defense. We don’t have an infinite amount of time however.

HAGEL: Thank you.

Secretary Armitage?

ARMITAGE: As Paul, very concerned about it.

ARMITAGE: I would note, though, usually if you look at the question a little more closely and see how we’d like you out of here but not now, our forces who are operating around Najaf as they’ve, anaconda-like, closed in a bit on Muqtada al-Sadr, have found the people coming out thanking them for these activities.

So we’re very concerned. But I think it’s a more complicated picture than that poll would represent.

HAGEL: Let me ask you both this: Do you believe a rising sense of nationalism in Iraq, if that’s happening, is a result mainly of a target of the United States or an anti-American sense as much as anything else that may be occurring?

ARMITAGE: My understanding of Iraq historically is they’ve always had a good sense of their self -- themselves -- and their place in the region, in the world at one time as the center for science and alphabets and things of that nature. So I don’t think it’s a direct result of this.

The reputation of being Arab...

(CROSSTALK)

HAGEL: ... Americanism. You don’t think it’s an anti- Americanism?

ARMITAGE: No, I don’t. I think it’s the reputation in the Arab world has been of a very scratchy, tough people historically.

HAGEL: Thank you.

Secretary Wolfowitz?

WOLFOWITZ: I would agree with that, and I think overwhelming numbers of them are nonetheless -- whatever their feelings about our staying in Iraq -- grateful that we helped them to remove a terrible dictator.

HAGEL: Let me ask a question about sovereignty which you have both noted -- a couple of pieces.

One, what is the role -- what will be the role -- of the Department of Defense come July 1st?

And the second part of that is: What in fact, and I see your charts here, but what in fact is the power of this new government yet to be determined, undefined, we don’t know who they are, as to security?

I see in the Washington Post this morning the good friend of the Defense Department, Ahmed Chalabi, who is a Iraqi Governing Council member, says Iraqi government must have exclusive and complete control over the army and all security services of Iraq come July 1st.

So if you would both handle each of those parts.

Secretary Armitage? Thank you.

ARMITAGE: Yes, Senator, thank you.

Iraqi forces will work for an Iraqi general who -- in the army, the military -- who will work for the ministry of defense. They will work in partnership -- partnership -- with coalition forces under, in the unity of command theory, a U.S. general.

The real question that you’re asking is: Can they opt out of an operation if they don’t want to or something of that nature? And the answer to that has to be yes. But if I may, this is not very unusual to us.

If you can think back to a fellow you all know by the name of Wes Clark; he in Kosovo when told the Russians were heading for the Kosovo airport, he told his British counterpart who worked for him to go stop them. The British said, "No, I think I’ll check with headquarters for guidance on that issue." And he didn’t do it.

So there will be a lot of management -- sort of alliance, coalition, partnership management as we go forward. But they are sovereign and they will be in charge of their forces.

HAGEL: Thank you.

Secretary Wolfowitz?

WOLFOWITZ: I agree exactly with what Rich just said.

HAGEL: OK, well that makes it easy. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman?

LUGAR: Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.

We welcome now the distinguished ranking member of the committee and are grateful that he has surmounted the obstacles presented to him this morning.

BIDEN: This is a hearing on funding for Amtrak, isn’t it?

(LAUGHTER)

All the trains out of New York, Mr. Chairman, today, were exceedingly late and I do apologize because this is a very important hearing and I appreciate you calling it and our witnesses being here.

May I have permission to make my opening statement then save my questions until the next round so I do not...

LUGAR: Please proceed.

BIDEN: ... you know, use my time for a statement at this point?

And I apologize, gentlemen, for not hearing your statements -- you as well, General.

BIDEN: From my point of view, notwithstanding the meeting last week with the president, which I truly appreciated, I don’t think things are going all that well in Iraq notwithstanding that our people have performed miracles, opening schools and hospitals and restoring some oil production and setting up local councils.

But these successes, I think, have been dwarfed by two towering deficits that the administration created: a security deficit and a legitimacy deficit.

And the result, I think we’re losing support, as Senator Hagel suggested, although I’m not associating him with my remarks -- I don’t want to get him in trouble. But we’re losing the support of the Iraqi people.

And what I hope will -- you probably already started, but when I get around to questioning -- have an opportunity -- I’d like to know what our strategy is to erase those deficits, the deficit in security and legitimacy because I think both are needed to be erased in order to build a successful plan. The success, in my judgment, make sure -- and this is what I told the president -- in my judgment would be a stable Iraq, secure within its borders with a representative government that doesn’t threaten its neighbors or threaten us.

I’m convinced that we can defeat the insurgent forces. But while military superiority is essential, I don’t think -- quite frankly, I don’t think you all do either -- it’s enough. We also need an effective political strategy.

And based on a very brief briefing I got from my staff and the opening statements, although I’m sure they were necessarily truncated, my chief concern is I’m not sure we have one, and secondly -- my second concern is we appear to have lost the Iraqi people.

As Senator Hagel said, 82 percent of the Iraqi people oppose our presence, although some pockets, they very much want us to stay. They’re in a conundrum as the president said in the different context. He could understand why they chafed at occupation. They know they have to have these forces in order to prevent a civil war from occurring, but they don’t like the forces being there.

And only 23 percent support the Iraqi Governing Council. At the same time, as Senator Hagel pointed out, Sadr gets alarmingly high marks at least in two major cities.

And these numbers suggest that -- I would suggest these numbers would be worse if this poll had been taken after the debacle at the prison.

BIDEN: So my question is how do we reverse this downward dynamic?

I think we have to go back to first principles. First is, and I’m sure we agree, we can’t want freedom for the Iraqi people more than the Iraqi people want it. And that’s what the silent majority seeks in Iraq, I believe: freedom. I believe the polls all show, as well, that they neither want an Iranian-style theocracy, nor do they want another strongman.

But after being brutalized for three decades, they’ve learned to keep their heads down -- that middle, that 65 to 80 percent of the people that’s that high.

It seems to me we have to create the conditions and encourage them to raise their heads. The Iraqi people must have more security and more security in their daily lives. And they must believe that there’s a legitimate plan to return sovereignty to them and that it makes sense.

Second, it seems to me, we have to square the circle between their need for significant international support for years to come, both political, economic and security, and their growing frustration with U.S. occupation or any occupation for that matter.

And I think that requires investing our European and Arab allies more heavily in Iraq today and working with them to prepare Iraqis to take back their country tomorrow.

As it stands, the Iraqis are going to wake up on July 1st of the so-called transfer -- and I’m not belittling that, this transfer of some form of some sovereignty -- to a group of people who they don’t know.

There’s going to be no single national figure. There’s going to be no George Washington. There is no Madison. There is no Benjamin Franklin that’s part of this. I don’t mean in terms of their thinking, even in terms of their recognition.

And so, they’re going to wake up and the bulk of the Iraqi people are not going to know the bulk of the people in this new government, although I believe it will be viewed regionally as more legitimate.

They’re going to see 140,000 troops, Americans with American patches on their shoulders still patrolling the streets, and a new super ambassador who they’re going to wonder, I suspect, is going to be the one pulling the strings, and a cast, as I said, of unelected and relatively unknown political figures.

That’s not in any way to denigrate the capacity or the legitimacy of those who will be chosen.

And it seems to me we have to change that dynamic. And in order to do that, the president has to articulate a single overarching goal that everybody can kind of understand.

And I think this presents a significant opportunity for the president to state a goal that everyone can sort of rally around, and a rationale.

BIDEN: And the goal should be that our job, the international community’s job, is to hold successful elections in November of 2005. We want a civil election and not a civil war in December of 2005.

And I believe these elections should be the rallying point within Iraq, and quite frankly outside of Iraq, to build security and legitimacy. I think it’s a rationale for European leaders who know they have a great stake in success or failure in Iraq to be able to justify to their people why they’re there, with an implied end date to it; not a literal end date, an implied end date.

I believe it provides a rationale as well for Arab leaders to join in the effort.

I also believe that it provides a rationale for the interim Iraqi government to be able to speak to, to have interlocutors, to actually cooperate with this new military force, this old military force hopefully with a new face.

Because I asked the president in our meeting, I said, "Mr. President, we’re all just plain old politicians. Imagine if you’re about to be appointed to an interim government and you want to be a permanent, or at least an elected official running that country 13 months from now, or 16 months from now, and 82 percent of the people say, ’I hate the outfit that you’re dealing with.’ What are you going to do?"

I’m just a plain old politician, Mr. Secretary. You ain’t going to talk to him. You’re not going to be seen as cooperating with them. It will guarantee your defeat.

Now, this is the only thing I probably do know more than all you guys, just plain old politics.

And so, we have to provide them a rationale. Why are they going to be cooperating with, no matter what the face is, essentially a U.S.-led -- not essentially, a U.S.-led and dominant U.S. presence?

And I think this election process as a rationale for our staying cannot be repeated enough in my view.

And I also think it would be a strategy that the American people could understand and could understand that there’s an end date, not a definite date, not a date to say, "We’re out of here by such and such," but there is a strategy that is able to be articulated that the American people are smart -- and they are -- can understand.

Because we are also -- we issued a report here after the report done by the former controller by the Defense Department coming back last year saying the window of opportunity is closing in Iraq, meaning the Iraqi people. We wrote a report, the three of us, that basically said the window of opportunity in America is closing -- in America is closing.

And, fellows, we’re all about the same generation. Once the folks decide this ain’t going to work, I don’t care how brilliant any of us are, I don’t care how wonderful any plan we have is, it ain’t going to work without the informed consent of the American people.

And so I think the president has an opportunity, and only the president can lead in this regard. And I would respectfully suggest the first order of business should be to form a contact group that would give those whose help we are seeking a seat at the table on the political decision. This includes the major powers in Europe. It includes the Security Council, not as a Security Council. And it includes our Arab allies who have a great deal to lose, and the incoming Iraqi government.

And I respectfully suggest that the president suggest publicly that he should literally call a summit of those folks. Get in the damn plane. Go to Europe. Pick a venue.

BIDEN: Meet -- and meet with the G-8 in a little bit. Meet. Meet. Find out what’s the deal, how do we get them involved?

Secondly, the enormous logistical security requirements for elections are going to require a surge of security forces. It required that in Bosnia. It required that in Kosovo. It even, in a sense, required that in Afghanistan; and we’re not quite doing it the same way, but it required it.

And the president should seek, I believe, agreement for NATO to take over multi-national security forces under U.S. command. I know, fellows, you know, we go back a long way, Mr. Secretary, about 30 years -- you a staffer and me essentially a staffer. A 29-year old United States senator is equivalent of being a staffer, only staffers know more, in this days. And notice I said "those days."

But the point is we know there’s never been a single serious plan NATO has initiated that we haven’t carried over to Brussels. Never. Never. So as that old song goes, "What’s the plan, Stan?" We ought to show up.

Now I have met with a lot of your former colleagues. I’ve met with a total now of seven five-stars -- four-stars I should say -- who -- and I meet with them regularly in conferences, every single one of them reflecting various points of view in the military believe if the president says, "This is the deal I want," sits down, hammers it out at the NAC, authorizes you to hammer it out at the NAC, we can get a NATO-led mission. It’s only going to be 3,000, maybe 7,000 forces over the next several months, but a NATO-led mission. That’s an important symbolic and substantive change, in my view.

And so I believe that the president should ensure this new U.N. resolution you all talked about authorizes a NATO-led security force, supports the Brahimi plan for a caretaker government and elections, endorses a senior rep to be Iraq’s primary international primary referee in what is going to be serious disputes between July 1 and January -- the end of January of ’05 when these elections are -- when we’re supposed to get to the next stage.

And I really believe, notwithstanding the elections -- it will make it harder now the election in India, but I believe if this were to occur we might find participation for countries such as Pakistan, Morocco, India -- and maybe even India, though I don’t know now in terms of what’s recently happened.

And once named, the incoming government should be invited to participate in drafting this resolution, in my humble opinion.

BIDEN: Iraq should see its members, not new ambassadors -- and I have great respect, don’t anybody in the press translate this as a knock on Negroponte; it’s not -- but I don’t want to see Negroponte’s face, I don’t want to see General Kimmitt -- who’s a great American -- I don’t want to see their face ever again on Iraqi television. Let’s see Iraqis faces speaking the language without an accent on television.

And I think we have to spare no effort to help the Iraqis feel an effective security force.

I notice you said, Secretary Wolfowitz, that the Iraqi forces are -- they’re gaining some confidence. I hope we take advantage of reminding, even though it’s water under the bridge since then, but I don’t know why we don’t have a massive effort to train Iraqis using the offers that were originally offered by the French and the Germans and others, give them a way to buy in. American-trained -- we’re already doing it in Jordan -- American-trained -- Arab forces training the Iraqis because I think you’re right, this is an essential, overwhelming need.

And I think we have to spare, as I said, no effort to help the Iraqis field this force. And we should be inviting European and American-trained Arab officers to participate in that training beyond what we’ve done.

And last thing and I’ll end. The president, I think, also has to make a gesture as dramatic and consequential as the symbolic damage done when in fact the prison scandal broke.

And I believe, Mr. Chairman, that I think we should be -- and I know you’ve heard me say this before -- I believe the president should find and go to both these secretaries and say, "Find me the remaining 100 or 200 most qualified men and women we have in the government that have any background in quasi-military police work." Go vet every one of the 8,000 prisoners. Release every damn one that’s not a security risk if there’s a doubt.

BIDEN: Be seen to be releasing them. Sit down with the interim government. Ask them what plan for permission -- because we want to ask their permission -- to bulldoze down that damn prison. Bulldoze it to the ground. That will cause us big problems finding room for 2,000 people somewhere.

And ask them, what do they want for this symbol of tyranny? Do they want a new institution of their choice on that spot? The biggest school, a university, a hospital, what do they want? I think our gestures have to be as grand as the damage done.

And I think we should state clearly that we’re willing to bring American forces home, once Iraqis and you have (ph) can handle their own security and there’s a legitimate government.

So, folks, despite the fact I am very, very concerned about the state of affairs, I still think, quote, "this is winnable." But I do think it is not staying the course. It is changing the course, in order to be able to stay to be successful.

I apologize to my colleagues for not being here in time to make that at the beginning, and I’ll hold my questions until the end, and I thank you, appreciate you listening.

LUGAR: Thank you, Senator Biden.

Senator Chafee?

CHAFEE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, gentlemen.

Despite some of the progress we are making there and some of the positive signs, some of the generals on the ground have expressed great concern.

In particular, an Army general who is posted in western Iraq, when asked whether he believes the United States is losing there, he said, "I think strategically we are." And an Army colonel who is based in Baghdad said, "Unless we ensure that we have coherency in our policy, we will lose strategically." And he went on to say, "We don’t understand the war we’re in."

And then a senior general went on to say, "I do not believe we have a clearly defined war strategy, end state and exit strategy before we commenced our invasion. And that," he said, "it is doubtful we can go on much longer like this. The American people may not stand for it, and they should not."

So maybe somewhere in between what you’re portraying and what they’re portraying is the truth. But nonetheless, there’s cause for alarm, which I certainly here from my constituents back in Rhode Island.

But what I’d like to ask is that, just yesterday, King Abdullah of Jordan was asked a question, "Do you see a link between the war in Iraq and the Palestinian-Israeli peace process?"

And he answered, "They, sort of, feed off each other."

The core issue in the hearts of everybody in the Middle East is the Israeli-Palestinian one. The core issue. They feed off one another, they are related.

And what I’d like to go back to is what the president said on February 28th of ’03, in a speech before the American Enterprise Institute. Where he said, "Success in Iraq could also begin a new stage for Middle Eastern peace, and set in progress towards a truly democratic Palestinian state."

And he went on to say, "America will seize every opportunity in pursuit of peace. And the end of the present regime in Iraq would create such an opportunity." He said it: the end of the present regime in Iraq would create this opportunity.

CHAFEE: And then Secretary Wolfowitz, I’ll also say I gave you a shot in May of ’03 right after the end of the war when things were going very, very well. And I asked at a hearing, from the transcript, "It seems to me that we have thrown a rock into the pool that is the Middle East. And just for the sake of my question, if all goes well in restoring order in Iraq, what is our strategic vision of the ripples now going out from that rock we have thrown into the pool? What is the strategic vision in the Middle East now?"

And you answered, "A clean piece of canvas." You said, "I would say several things. I think some of them hopefully will happen even perhaps before some of the other results are achieved inside Iraq. I think one of the ripples is a positive impact on the Arab-Israeli peace process.

"And clearly we need it. We need to move that process forward. I think we have credibility, enormous credibility, not that we did not have it before. We have it more than we did before." Those are your words from May of ’03 when things were going well.

And so my question is why the paralysis? If this is so important, by your own words, why the paralysis on this important issue, as King Abdullah said, "a core issue"?

ARMITAGE: Perhaps I should...

WOLFOWITZ: Let me ask...

CHAFEE: I’ll ask Secretary Wolfowitz since I quoted him, if I could.

WOLFOWITZ: OK, but I’m going to turn to my colleague from the State Department on this issue of what you call paralysis.

But I would say this. I think that in fact part of our problem, as those quotes made clear, I think success in Iraq will have these effects. We are not at success, to put it mildly, and we need to get there. I agree very strongly with what both the chairman and Senator Biden said on that point.

I think if we go back to last year when there was a bit of euphoria, I believe, and a sense that we really were getting success, I know I heard from Arab democrats that there was some sense of exhilaration in the Arab world about the prospects of change.

And I don’t claim to be expert enough to say it’s cause and effect. But I think the meeting in Sharm Al Sheikh, we saw some signs of the Egyptians and the Saudis stepping up to responsibilities to support the peace process.

And again, I can’t say it’s cause and effect but I don’t think it’s helped the peace process that the enemy in Iraq has proved as resilient as it has.

And let’s be clear. That enemy includes Saddam Hussein, who was out there funding attacks on coalition forces right up until he was captured in December.

WOLFOWITZ: It includes number six on the black list, Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, who is still at large and still funding attacks on American and coalition forces with money that he salted away in banks in neighboring countries.

It includes the former killers, as I mentioned in my opening statement, from the so-called M-14 branch of the Iraqi Intelligence, the so-called Anti-Terrorism branch. George Orwell would have used that phrase: anti-terrorism meant that they specialized in killings, hijackings, assassinations and bombings.

Those people are still out there. They’re still -- they’re killing people, killing Iraqis, killing Americans. Their goal is to prevent exactly that process that, I agree with Senator Biden, we need to move forward...

CHAFEE: If I could just go back, if I could, in talking about the paralysis -- and there’ve been so many opportunities after Aqaba. In June there was the long, seven-week cease-fire. Abu Mazen came here to the Foreign Relations Committee and begged -- and he met with the president -- begged us to help him on the settlements, the wall, the prisoners held without charges.

"Please empower me with my people." And he went back empty- handed. These are the missed opportunities.

When the Geneva Accords came in October of last year there was a cold shoulder given to those.

I believe this is what’s hurting us in Iraq; not taking the opportunities, even as the president said, taking the opportunities that are presented to us and energizing our adversaries in Iraq.

ARMITAGE: Senator, may I? One, there are others who would say that what happened to Abu Mazen was that we held him too close and thus burned him. And he became...

CHAFEE: He wouldn’t say that. He wouldn’t say that.

ARMITAGE: Several of those who served with him when he was prime minister would say that, and gave us advice to be somewhat cautious.

You’re right, we had a seven week hudna, or cease-fire. The difficulty with a cease-fire is the Palestinian Authority can have a cease-fire, but if they won’t control Hamas then it’s for naught. And they’re not controlling Hamas. They’re not even trying to.

We thought we were on the verge of something in this very frustrating, almost "Perils of Pauline," Middle East saga of a search for peace, with the Sharon plan for disengaging from Gaza. Where 80 percent of the people of Israel, by opinion polls, appear to be for it, but Likud was not for it and hence he was unsuccessful.

We thought it was rather noteworthy, for the first time since 1967, to have 21 Gaza settlements and four West Bank settlements turned over to the Palestinians. We were quite bullish on this. And now we’re disappointed.

But Mr. Sharon is making some other refinements or modifications to his plan. He will be eventually showing us that. We have not seen it, to my knowledge, yet.

Secretary Powell met at the Dead Sea with Abu Ala. Dr. Rice met with Abu Ala in Berlin. And so there’s -- it’s, kind of, like a duck on the water: Doesn’t appear to be moving very much, but underneath there’s a lot of churning going on. And we’re doing a lot of it. Some of the Palestinians are doing it. Certainly our Israeli allies are.

CHAFEE: I’d just like to go further and say there’s a lot of churning going on, but in the meantime the days are slipping by, the months are slipping by, the tide is turning and, if you believe what King Abdullah says, and he’s geographically located, as he says, in between Iraq and a hard place, and he says this is the core issue.

And my constituents just see paralysis on this issue. And maybe you could level with us. Is it an election issue, that certain base that you got to be careful of?

CHAFEE: What’s the truth?

ARMITAGE: The affection of the president for Israel and for that democracy has nothing to do with elections. It has to do with his view of Israel as one of the great democracies in the world, perhaps the most pure democracy.

However, it was our president who was the only one whose spoken up about a vision of two states living side by side. He’s held that vision for two years now. He’s not shying away from it. And, hence, he has encouraged Secretary Powell to meet with Abu Ala and Dr. Rice to meet with him as well.

It’s frustrating for us, as well as for you and your constituents, but it’s most frustrating for the Palestinians who are having their houses bulldozed and for those 11 or 12 IDF soldiers who were killed last week.

CHAFEE: Well, I’ll conclude just by saying every visitor that I get said only the Americans can push this forward. I hear it every time -- only the Americans. And sadly, we are not exercising that power

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LUGAR: Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

Senator Boxer?

BOXER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I know how hard you are working and I know that the burdens that you bear are very heavy.

But I have to say I was very disappointed in your opening statements, to be honest with you. Listening to you, one would never know what is happening in America, how people are so distraught over this. And I think if you look at the faces of my colleagues, I’ve never seen us quite look this way. It’s not partisanship.

And I didn’t get, as Senator Biden pointed out, where are you changing course? I don’t hear it.

And if there’s one thing I want to say is to agree with my ranking member here that this is the moment to do it if ever there was a moment.

Now, the essence of our country has taken an enormous hit in the world to the point where American business people, Mr. Secretary, are telling me and telling us that they’ve never seen such a negative view of America in many, many, many years.

As they put it -- one put it, one very successful businessman, the American brand is being pummelled.

Now, some of it, I believe, is due to a go-it-alone policy that’s been perceived as arrogant, and I won’t go through it all, but we’ve seen it over and over.

And then there’s the prison scandal, which has really seared the soul of America.

Now, some of the things that we saw, we have seen even worse by the terrorists, but our strength is that we’re not like them and they repel us because they have no respect for human rights.

BOXER: But all of us who have seen the original photos and then moving pictures, frankly, of torture -- I need to ask you, Secretary Wolfowitz, in Newsday yesterday Pentagon officials adamantly denied charges in a New Yorker magazine article that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and other key officials had approved a plan to expand from Afghanistan to Iraq a secret interrogation program that included rough treatment and sexual humiliation.

Do you stand by that? Do you deny as a Pentagon spokesman...

WOLFOWITZ: Senator Boxer, we are trying to find out what, if any, possible truth could have led to that story. I’m aware of nothing that would substantiate that.

BOXER: So you don’t deny it? You’re saying you’re still looking into it?

WOLFOWITZ: No, I -- we stand by our denials. When something comes out like that and people claim that they have sources inside that reveals something, you have to try to find out.

BOXER: OK.

So do you agree with Pentagon officials who basically said that those charges are wrong, that there was never a plan that was approved to expand from Afghanistan to Iraq a secret interrogation program that included rough treatment and sexual humiliation?

WOLFOWITZ: To the best of our knowledge, yes, Senator.

BOXER: OK.