Transcript: Senate Foreign Relations

So it’s a mixed picture.

What we believe is very important is that we think we know how to improve the picture in places like Mosul from good to excellent and in places like Fallujah from terrible to hopefully at least moderate.

NELSON: How did they perform in Ramadi?

WOLFOWITZ: Probably not very well.

NELSON: They melted away.

WOLFOWITZ: And in some cases they helped the enemy. That’s one of our problems.

NELSON: Mr. Secretary Armitage, you know my...

(CROSSTALK)

WOLFOWITZ: Senator Nelson, if I might say, so everyone understands, Fallujah and Ramadi have been, since the beginning, the most difficult parts of the country with the most seriously embedded elements of the old regimes there fighting us.

NELSON: Mr. Secretary, you know my personal affection and respect for you. I want to pick up on the question that Senator Dodd was asking and follow that.

The media has reported that Secretary Powell expressed concern about the prison abuses to Secretary Rumsfeld. Would you pick up on that and tell us what you know?

ARMITAGE: I don’t think my job is to exactly say what Secretary Powell said to any of his Cabinet colleagues. However, since he himself has said that when he was informed of these by Mr. Kellenberg with the ICRC and laterally actually received a report though CPA in February, he raised these, with all of the principals, not just Secretary Rumsfeld, as well as with the president.

NELSON: And that was when?

ARMITAGE: February.

NELSON: Let me ask you, regarding Iran, Iran has been making some noise regarding the U.S. present specifically fighting the Shiites; what have we communicated to and with Iran on this subject?

ARMITAGE: I think yesterday or the day before they made some very strong noises about this, opposed to any violence to any Shia. This was the loudest noise that they’ve made recently.

We have communicated to them in no uncertain terms that the solution to the question of Muqtada al-Sadr is one that doesn’t need their active involvement in any way.

We’ve also said that we are watching their activities in the south, particularly provision of money to certain clerics to try to win favor, and we view it with disfavor, and they would be judged by their actions in the south.

NELSON: Would you feel comfortable in this setting, or a closed setting, of sharing with us some of the specific communications and how it’s been received by Iran?

ARMITAGE: We normally, except for the recent event where the Iranians came to Baghdad and had a very business-like discussion with the British and our representative about the question of Muqtada al- Sadr -- we normally communicate through the Swiss. And I’d be glad to come up and show you the tone and tenor.

NELSON: And would you also at that time -- and I would welcome that -- also talk to us about: To what degree are we getting through to Iran that they should be stopping their nuclear program?

ARMITAGE: I’d be glad to discuss that now.

We, along with our European friends, we have been skeptical from the beginning about their willingness to stop the nuclear program.

Our European friends have been somewhat less skeptical. But in recent months, given the difficulty that the IAEA has had in getting Iran to do what they said they’d do, ratify the additional protocol and throw open to inspection those things which need to be thrown open for inspection, I’d say there is a gathering feeling in Europe that they’re hiding and they’re holding something out.

NELSON: You are going to be getting a letter that Senator Ensign and I are now circulating for signatures on this subject. It’s addressed to the president, but I’m sure that you all will weigh on it. And this is something that I would like to follow up in detail perhaps in a closed session. The concern of the interest of the United States being threatened by a nuclear Iran, of course, is enormous.

Could you tell us something about, Mr. Secretary, the corruption in the ministries in Iraq?

ARMITAGE: There is a lot of speculation in the very free Iraqi press about this. Anyone who is seen participating in the Governing Council is, at one time or another as far as I can see, accused of these matters.

There are some investigations, which are ongoing, which I would prefer not to mention here, and would refer you to I.G.s and others.

But I think there is a lot of speculation that makes it seem that it’s a lot higher than it is.

Having said that, there is no question people, some people have used their positions to enrich themselves, or people around them have used their position to enrich themselves without necessarily reference to the principal.

NELSON: Either you or Secretary Wolfowitz, would you care to comment about the cutting off of the payments to Mr. Chalabi?

WOLFOWITZ: That was a decision that was made in light of the process of transferring sovereignty to the Iraqi people. We felt it was no longer appropriate for us to continue funding in that fashion.

There has been some very valuable intelligence that’s been gathered through that process that’s been very important for our forces, but we will seek to obtain that in the future through normal intelligence channels.

NELSON: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

LUGAR: Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

Senator Corzine?

CORZINE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the hearings you’re having. I think the topics on the table are absolutely essential for us to explore. I have to say I’m a little out of sync with some of my colleagues. I think there is a basic question that I think needs answering: Are we ready for anything that looks like a credible transfer of sovereignty on June 30th?

I don’t understand how we can be so bent on it when we don’t know -- we’re told that sovereignty would include the ability of the Iraqis to formulate foreign policy and diplomatic relationships, and then I wonder how they’re going to deal with the Iranians post-June 30th.

CORZINE: I don’t understand what it means to transfer sovereignty when the command and control of prisons is not yet identified, if I heard a response to Senator Hagel’s questions earlier on and questions about contracting of projects, which at least Secretary Armitage’s comment said would be under the control of the chief of mission would assume the ultimate authority for all the projects and contracts as of July 1.

ARMITAGE: U.S.-appropriated money, sir.

CORZINE: Right.

Well, are the Iraqis going to be able to make that distinction and understanding with regard to how that operates either with regard to contractors or major projects that are going on?

I think a failed transfer runs grave risks for the long-run potential of success of providing a stable and democratic Iraq over a period of time. And it may be good politics to make sure that we no longer have "occupying power" after our name. But if it is the public regime or if it is ineffectual, it may end up setting a framework for failure in the long-term.

So I’m really troubled by it. And I make that more as a statement. I do have serious questions about how they formulate foreign policy and diplomatic representation in conjunction with how you’re going to deal with the Iranians if they get in.

ARMITAGE: Thank you, Senator Corzine. I followed very closely your very excellent questions to my colleague, Marc Grossman, and these are clearly a follow-on to that. So you’ve had these concerns for some time.

You’re dead right, as far as I can see. An ineffectual or a faulty transition would be a disaster for us. A puppet would even be worse.

The TAL annex, which is to be written, is going to contain -- and it will be written by Iraqis -- the duties and the responsibilities of this caretaker government until January of 2005.

It is not an elected government, which has been remarked upon by all concerned, including Ayatollah Sistani. And as it’s not the truly representative government, it has to be somewhat careful and circumscribed in what it actually does.

Ambassador Brahimi envisions that this government will run the operations day to day.

What does this mean in foreign policy? They’ll send out diplomatic communications. They could, in theory, establish relations with Iran over time. I’m sure they will. All the other neighbors have relationships with Iran.

They make their own autonomous judgments. They run their budgets. They take their money from the oil and they distribute it to meet their budget needs.

So in everything, I think, except the ability to make long-range lasting agreements, which tie the hands of a democratically government, they will have full sovereignty.

ARMITAGE: Now, that’s not Rich Armitage’s view. This is Mr. Brahimi’s view. This, I believe, is the view of the leading Iraqis who want to be sovereign but don’t want to have the binding agreements in the long-run signed by somebody who is going to be there for seven months.

CORZINE: Well, it may not be treaties and long-run policies, but it is the opening for dialogue that might be contradictory to establishing security and stability on the ground in Southern Iraq as we were just commenting on in another dialogue.

I just think my point really gets at, that this transfer of sovereignty doesn’t feel to this senator as flushed out in detail in a way that the American people, or at least I could convey to the people that I represent, that it has been challenged.

And I don’t know whether there are any contingency plans if it doesn’t work. You know, is there serious thinking about what happens if a lot of these questions, which are reasonable for indefinite answers, at this point, although we are only 44 days from this so- called transfer, are we dealing with contingencies if this comes unwound?

ARMITAGE: I would run the risk of being seen in your eyes as a wiseguy I’d say. I’d prefer to look at this somewhat like people prefer to look at the music of Wagner; it’s better than it sounds.

It may be better than it sounds, particularly if the people in Iraq buy it. That’s what’s important...

CORZINE: I couldn’t agree more.

ARMITAGE: ... and if the leading lights in Iraq and the intellectuals and the academics, if they see it as a way forward, which dramatically makes the points that we’re not occupiers, we’re liberators, and as soon as they stand on their feet, we’ll remove ourselves, as soon as they can provide for their own security.

Regarding team, or plan B, I guess, is what we often hear, there have been a lot of speculations about what a team B might be, an expanded Iraqi Governing Council, the existing members and bring in some more to be a caretaker government.

Each of these and the words of our former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hugh Shelton, have a lot of hair on them. This has got the least hair on it.

And I think we really need to try to see this thing through, particularly as we’ve got such a distinguished and able diplomat in Lakhdar Brahimi backed up by the United Nations.

CORZINE: May I switch gears? I think I have time for another question.

Yesterday there was an article in the L.A. Times about a remarkable deal in Fallujah. The Fallujah Brigade now controls the city. We had a comment that I’d love to hear about, whether you all agree with or don’t. You know you can’t believe everything in the papers. Fallujah is for all intents and purposes a rebel town complete with banners proclaiming a great victory and insurgents integrated into the new Fallujah Brigade.

And as we know, we haven’t accomplished bringing to justice those responsible for the killing of the contractors. Is this a model? I read in the testimony, indeed, dialogue and cooperation with the Iraqi leaders about situations in Fallujah and Najaf, it’s been essential in moving toward resolution in both places.

Is this a model that we think is working? Is this something that we can look forward to, to be implemented in how we integrate militia into future security arrangements in the Iraqi forces?

WOLFOWITZ: I think it’s too soon to tell. And the Marines on the ground would tell you it’s too soon to tell. And one hears reports like the one you descried and one hears some more positive reports, for example, what General Latif was doing, just in the last two days.

It will not be acceptable for Fallujah to become again a sanctuary for enemy fighters, and there are a number of red lines that the Marines have laid down, and we’ll have to see how that brigade performs.

If I could go back to the question you asked Secretary Armitage, I think it would help the American people a lot if you explain that July 1st is just the first step in the process.

And one of the most important steps is the one Senator Biden correctly identified, which is elections; that’s going to be one of the keys.

I think it also helps if you think of the risk of, I don’t mean this at all condescending, but when you’re teaching a youngster to ride a bicycle, you don’t keep your hand on the seat the whole time.

WOLFOWITZ: At some point, you have to take it off.

In fact, the Iraqis have been assuming a great deal of responsibility already. I think 11 ministries are under Iraqi direction. There are very talented Iraqis. Their foreign minister is a very impressive man -- the current foreign minister. I don’t know if he will continue in that job.

At some point -- and sooner rather than later -- it’s important for them to make their decisions. It’s important for them to feel it’s their country. I agree with what I think was the thrust of Senator Biden’s comments, that that will make the situation safer for our forces while they are there and make it possible for us to leave sooner rather than later.

I think it might also help the American people to realize that we’ve been in a similarly uncertain process in Afghanistan since December of 2001 when a virtually unknown man named Hamid Karzai was selected by the same ambassador, Lakhdar Brahimi, to lead the Afghan transitional administration.

And it’s been successful, I think remarkably successful, because that wasn’t the end of the process, it was the start of a process, and a process that has led to a successful constitution for Afghanistan, a process that will lead to elections in Afghanistan.

But let’s be clear. I mean, democracy...

CORZINE: Also been very flexible with respect to a timetable, too. There have been lots slippages and movements and changes.

WOLFOWITZ: And we need to be prepared to call audibles (ph), as Secretary Armitage said. But we also -- the purpose of all of this is not to meet any timetable of ours. It’s to develop confidence on the part of the Iraqis that we’re not there to take over their country, we’re not there to seize their oil. We will stay while they need us, but they need to step up and take responsibility. And when they do so, they will make some decisions that we don’t like.

You know, we have a terrific ally in South Korea, a democratic ally, that has its own views about security on the Peninsula, it’s own views about how to deal with North Korea. We’re much better off for having that democratic ally than having some American puppet that does exactly what we say.

CORZINE: I would concur with the analysis with regard to Korea. I think it took, what, 50 years? 30 years? It took a very, very long time.

WOLFOWITZ: We’re very much in the walking stage. But you’ve got to walk at some point.

LUGAR: Thank you very much, Senator Corzine.

Senator Biden and I have just a couple of questions each, and then we will conclude the hearing.

Let me ask this basic question: Many scholars who have appeared before our committee have talked about the whole proposition of whether Iraqis feel like they want to be Iraqis as opposed to Kurds or Sunnis or Shiites or members of Arab tribes. And this becomes a crucial question at the point that sovereignty passes and as we turn over more authority, as we will be doing, to Iraq.

What is your own basic assumption about the nationhood status, as opposed to the worst case scenario? And that is that the Kurds or the Sunnis or others do not find the arrangement satisfactory, either in the interim period or in the constitutional formulation, and as a result want a carve-out or want separatism or want their own situation and are prepared to fight about it and to create, if not a civil war, at least elements of instability, purely by their desire to not be co- opted,

ARMITAGE: This possibility certainly exists. And we’re very alert to it. And during the whole discussion of federalism, we were alert to it. And federalism, which devolves power to more local communities, but one that’s based not on ethnicity, but on location, is where we went.

I think we’re somewhat heartened that thus far, even in the face of someone who’s vowed intention was to bring about civil war, Zarqawi, that we haven’t had it. And even in very troubled places, where the Sunnis had displaced the Kurds in various cities and taken their lands under Saddam Hussein’s rule, the violence that one would expect to occur after that has been somewhat lessened, partially because IOM and others have been in there working hard, but partially I think because most Iraqis are willing to give it a ride and see where it goes.

WOLFOWITZ: Senator Lugar, actually it was the same day that we were in the al-Rashid Hotel when it was attacked; that evening, we had dinner with Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, the head of SCIRI organization, the younger brother of Abdel Bakr Hakim, who was brutally assassinated in Najaf last August.

WOLFOWITZ: This was late October. And I said to him that I thought there was a lot that Iraqis might profitably learn from our constitution about the rule of law, separation of powers and so forth.

But I thought that they have two problems that are uniquely Iraqi, that we probably couldn’t help them much on. One was the issue that you’re alluding to, of regional separation. And the other, I said, was the role of religion.

And I was frankly surprised when he showed enormous knowledge of our constitution. He said, "No, I think your constitution is the answer to one and a half of our two problems."

And he proceeded to explain that the answer in his view, to maintain the unity of Iraq, is what they call regional federalism, federalism that is based not on a Kurdish bloc and a Sunni bloc and a Shia bloc, but rather much more local autonomy.

And I do think a key part of holding that country together is to convince Iraqis that it’s not going to be held together in the old- fashioned way, it’s not going to be held together by a brutal central rule from Baghdad, that people will have a great deal of local autonomy.

And I think the second part is to convince them that nonetheless, there are real benefits to being Iraqis, that there are real benefits that flow from that relationship.

And a Kurdish friend of mine who’s a prominent leader in the PUK said some time ago, "There’s no reason why I, as an Iraqi Kurd, shouldn’t be able to be a leader of this country." I think the challenge is going to make sure that those sort of possibilities are open, and it doesn’t become the monopoly of a single group, whether it’s the 65 percent Shia majority or the old Sunni Baathist minority or any other single group.

LUGAR: Well, it’s a very important conclusion. And I think all of our hopes are, as you say, that the Iraqis will continue to counsel with us. In other words, in this separation and the polls that have been given, that they don’t really care for us, that they want us out of there, I hope at least in this respect, that there is some consultation. Because for the benefit of us, that is we want a stable, whole Iraq, and we think that they will, too.

But this ultimately, as you’ve suggested, they’re going after the side (ph), and there’s a lot of debate still to go on within the country.

Let’s take the other side of this; that we don’t have civil war, but in fact there is a sense of being in Iraq, that compromises are made, a degree of federalism or whatever is achieved, for a while, as the army is vetted, as the people come back, as the arms come to them from whatever source, there are external dangers to this country.

One of the reasons for our security forces has been to make sure that no one else intruded. Or we tried to do this, whether it be terrorists from Syria or Iran.

But let’s say that leaving aside terrorists, that other countries, surrounding countries, because they don’t like the way things worked out in Iraq, decided to intrude, either formally or informally, covertly or overtly.

At some point, the security situation takes on then a very different view. It’s not simply the chasing down of insurgents in cities in Iraq, but then becomes a question of Iraq as an area that becomes an incubator for terrorism or a no man’s land.

What sort of thought have you given to this? In other words, sort of pinning down the worst scenario case, how does Iraq remain Iraq, at least as we’re concerned, as opposed to someone else’s playground or a source of invasion or incorporation of others?

We’ve been through this many times, discussing the Kurds. But they’re not the only situation that has thought of a greater expansion that doesn’t know the boundaries, or doesn’t respect them in the same way that we do. What kind of planning efforts or thoughts on the security side come to this issue?

WOLFOWITZ: I guess I would try to summarize it a bit simply. I think with the danger of external invasion, this new Iraq can count on international guarantees of a kind that may not have been available in the past, and that certainly doesn’t need a 400,000-man army. I shouldn’t say "doesn’t" -- hopefully there can be arrangements that avoid having to have a 400,000-man army to protect it from its neighbors.

With respect to what you talked about as sort of covert influences from outside, which is one of the problems we’re dealing with today, most of those ultimately have to take the shape of an internal security threat of some kind.

And I think what we’re counting on is Iraqis develop the capacity to provide for their own internal security, very few of them I think want to see Syria influencing things or Turkey influencing things or Iran influencing things, and certainly not doing it at the point of a gun.

LUGAR: But we trust they will have the ability to repel that, I suspect -- that’s axiomatic -- make sure it doesn’t happen.

I’m just curious, in the U.N. resolution that we’re attempting to work with, should there perhaps be some clause that indicates the international community would come to the rescue of Iraq, in the event there was external effort, really, to terminate this country or to invade it?

In other words, you’ve mentioned the international community will not look kindly on this. Well that’s quite true. But isn’t this the time to formalize what the international community is prepared to do about that?

And by that, I mean the whole community, not just the United States.

ARMITAGE: I think my initial impression of that idea, Mr. Chairman, is that somewhere in the preparatory paragraphs of the U.N. Security Council resolution could express views about territorial integrity and all that, and the need to respect it and how we’d view disfavor against that.

But in the operative paragraphs, I think you’d find it very difficult to keep the Security Council on board to some ironclad, "We will do X if Y happens."

ARMITAGE: I think that would actually complicate matters if we put that in one of the operative paragraphs.

LUGAR: Well, I agree, it would. I’m just concerned about the fact that we have already had great difficulty with the Security Council in terms of responsibility beyond our own. And clearly if we are to attempt to move on to Iraqi sovereignty and a lesser United States role and others have not stepped forward despite all the invitations, it would be well to discuss this in advance.

ARMITAGE: No, indeed, it will be. I have no doubts that your comments will be viewed with great interest.

I would note, Mr. Chairman, that on Iraq particularly, we’ve had three 15-0 votes in the Security Council since our one failure prior to the war. So there’s a great deal of comity of views out there on the need to get it right.

LUGAR: Well, that is reassuring.

WOLFOWITZ: Mr. Chairman, it strikes me that what you’re suggesting certainly should be the goal going forward. I’m not saying tactically. I can’t judge whether this next resolution will bear that load or not. But, it seems to me, putting that idea forward and moving toward it over time is certainly something that we ought to be trying to accomplish.

LUGAR: Perhaps Ambassador Negroponte in both of his hats, as it turns out, might offer this counsel during the course of his work at the U.N. prior to going to Baghdad.

WOLFOWITZ: By the way, I might add, we’re very lucky to have him.

LUGAR: I agree.

Senator Biden?

BIDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, there’s been -- I’ve been impressed with this hearing more than any other that we’ve had or other committees have had at the more willingness to acknowledge things that we miscalculated. And I think that gives the American people some confidence, because obviously everybody knows things aren’t going as initially planned. And it’s an oversimplification, but up to now there has been basically: Steady as we go, we’re doing great, things are OK. It’s like I said to the secretary, I think it’s like that Calypso song that was poplar years ago, "Don’t Worry, Be Happy," you know, I mean, everything’s fine. And you guys today more than any time that I recall hearing in the last several months have said: Well, you know, we need some changes, we miscalculated. For example, you said, Secretary Wolfowitz, you certainly are there, we’re going to be there longer and with more forces than we thought initially and so on.

And I say that as a compliment. That’s not a backhanded criticism. I want to emphasize, I think it leads people to say: OK, you know, these guys get it, they acknowledge they know there’s got to be some changes.

But what I don’t get a sense of, because we didn’t get to specific specifics, and maybe it exists, is, for lack of a better phrase, there seems to be a little bit of a lack of imagination right now about doing what I hope we all agree needs to be done. We got to sort of change the mindset here of the American people about the possibilities of success; the Iraqi people about the genuineness of us wanting to hand it over to them in an orderly way so they can succeed; about the region looking at our motives; about the Europeans and the Asians, how they think of us.

And I understand we can make a legal case that existing U.N. resolutions give us essentially a status-of-forces agreement already, authorize us to do a number of things.

BIDEN: But what I’d like to touch on for just a few minutes here is the use of the resolution, the purpose of the resolution, not only substantively, but diplomatically in the much larger sense. What do we want to communicate, not just factually accomplish, but strategically in the diplomatic sense, accomplish?

And it seems to me that one of the things that would be very important is to get a new U.N. resolution that specifically authorized a multinational force and, if possible, assuming we could do the preparatory work, under a command that was no specifically U.S. command, but in fact U.S. command. I can only think of one outfit: NATO.

It would seem to me it would be useful if we were able to in that U.N. resolution be able to get named, essentially, a referee, so the only major figure with whom there was any discussion was not the Iraqi acting government and Mr. Negroponte, so there’s somebody else in there, not just generically, but somebody.

It would seem to me to communicate this notion -- based on, Secretary Wolfowitz, your comments about my comments about elections being sort of the grail we’re holding out there to be accomplished -- that the more, sort of, detail we can put into the resolution, the longer political legs in terms of what is my basic premise, which is that it’s just simply in raw street terms it’s going to be hard for these guys to be seen to cooperate with us in order to get it right because of the nature of -- 1,000 reasons, culturally, all the way from there to the specific incidences at Abu Ghraib prison and everything in between.

And here’s my point, and here’s the question. In order to get those bigger pieces done -- or what I consider, maybe it’s the wrong adjective -- but these things done in a resolution, it seems to me there is a practical need at various levels to give up some of the total control of the political situation and the political future of Iraq.

That’s why I’ve been toying with this thing. I’ve been banging it around. I know State is banging around other concepts. I suspect Defense is, as well. I know Dr. Rice said she was about -- what do you call it? -- an international support group, a board of directors, a contact group.

But in order to do any of that, when I speak to these leaders whether or not they’re foreign ministers or our European friends and friends in the region or heads of state that I’ve had the opportunity to speak to, they all basically come back with one thing: Well, we want a piece of the action, meaning the political decision -- actually sit down and be able to -- a little bit like, General, when you go to the MAC you sit there and you actually work out. I forget the literal military term. You actually work out a document that specifies what you’re about to undertake as NATO.

I mean, it’s not generic. It’s very specific. I mean, you know, you don’t fly spec everything, but it’s very specific.

That same kind of interchange, whomever I speak with, whether it’s the Brits, the Germans, the Russians, the Belgians -- well, I haven’t spoken to the Russians, I take that back -- the French, the Italians, the Jordanians, the Egyptians, they all are looking for a chance to sit at that table and actually bang out with us, "OK, here’s the deal. This is the political game plan. These are the steps. These are the objectives," as opposed to being asked to sign onto a well thought out, arguably, plan that we’ve come up with that sets election dates, transition dates, you know and so on.

And so, for example, I was told before I came in one of the secretaries indicated that we’ve already turned over de facto sovereignty to seven, 10, 12 Iraqi ministries.

(UNKNOWN): Eleven.

BIDEN: Eleven.

And so for the voters -- our citizens who are listening to this by that it’s kind of like turning over the Commerce Department to control of the Iraqis, turning over the HHS to whatever. I mean, we’ve done that with 11 of the 25 or so ministries, correct?

(UNKNOWN): Yes, sir.

BIDEN: I think it would have been a pretty good idea if we had sat down with some of these other folks and said, "How do we want to do this?" this sort of international board of directors.

I’m not trying to make this rocket science here. But somehow we got to get other folks in to get our face off of it.

And so on July 1 or shortly thereafter, I don’t want it to be an American-led occupation force. I want it to be a something-led, other than American-led occupation force (inaudible) because we’re going to be the only ones to have the troops there. Even if NATO comes on, we’re talking a handful in relative terms 3,000, 4,000, 5,000, 6,000 folks over several months.

And I don’t trust blue helmets going in. I don’t want to go through another Bosnia at the front end again.

And so, I can’t come up with anything other than NATO. But I’m convinced if we don’t come up with that, it ain’t going to work if it’s just us. And so that’s why I think we need some specific mention of some entity where there’s some political power, if you will, shared in the military occupation force.

Am I making any sense? Not: Do you agree? But you understand where I’m trying to get at?

ARMITAGE: Yes.

BIDEN: What are you thinking about along those lines?

ARMITAGE: Well, I’m listening to you very carefully. And some of the things you mention, we’ve discussed and other have discussed, such as the P-5 plus the neighbors, as a contact group, for openers.

One of the difficulties we’ve had is Lakhdar Brahimi is working night and day to fashion this interim government. And he’s not able to turn his attention to that.

We’ve had discussions with him. Iraqis have had discussions with him. This is even more important.

Or maybe he wanted P-5, plus neighbors, plus E.U. We recently had discussions with the E.U. on this.

So I’m not sure that any of us are off the page. We’re all on the same page. Whether we’re going fast enough or imagine it’s isn’t enough, I don’t know.

We’ve had discussions with de Hoop Scheffer at NATO about this. And I would characterize him as very interested, the secretary general, in this matter. Not ready to take it on. Doesn’t think the body is ready yet. But we don’t let him...

BIDEN: Here’s where I am. I apologize. I’ll finish this in a second. A high-ranking -- a high-ranking by definition, a foreign minister is high-ranking -- a foreign minister, one of our major NATO allies was here in recent weeks.

BIDEN: We had a private meeting with him, and I raised NATO.

ARMITAGE: I’ll do the investigative work and figure out who this was.

BIDEN: I don’t want to -- you know, I mean, it’s pretty obvious, but I don’t want to -- and told me how, "No, no, NATO, we can’t do that." And on the way out I said, "By the way, if the president of the United States gets on a plane and went to your capital and said, ’Mr. Leader of this country, I want this,’ could he say no?" He said, "Don’t do that."

The truth is the president, quote, figuratively speaking, gets -- the only person to do this now is the president. Every single solitary person from four stars to undersecretaries to secretaries can’t do it. They’re going to get the answer.

WOLFOWITZ: Not even deputy secretaries.

BIDEN: Deputy secretaries can’t even do it, and you are an incredibly competent person. You can’t do it because they don’t want to do this, they don’t want to wear the jacket, they don’t want to get into the deal, but they know they’re going to have to get into the deal.

And so, does the Defense Department support the notion of literally creating a contact group that actually oversaw the political transition? Would you support that at Defense? Have you talked about it?

WOLFOWITZ: It’s a general -- let me put it this way.

BIDEN: No, it’s very specific.

WOLFOWITZ: I certainly agree with the spirit of what you’re suggesting, and we have been eager to get a larger NATO role. We’d love to see a larger NATO role.

I appreciate what you said earlier on, that it may only generate 3,000 or 4,000 additional troops, but that it’s symbolically important.

I think it is important, by the way, on that point for people to be realistic. I don’t think anybody is going to want to put a lot of troops into Iraq until...

BIDEN: Absolutely not.

WOLFOWITZ: ... the killing stops. It’s that we’re stuck.

BIDEN: Absolutely.

WOLFOWITZ: We and the Iraqis are stuck.

But I think the symbolism is important. I think, especially at this stage, we ought to be careful about deciding ourselves who’s an appropriate contact group. The Iraqis have a lot to say about it. I’m not sure they want...

BIDEN: No. As you know, in the beginning, I said I would include the Iraqis in determining who that should be. I don’t want to...

WOLFOWITZ: I think the spirit of it, we agree and one of the reasons -- we agree very strongly that anything that puts U.S. troops in the background instead of the foreground, that reduces the appearance that we’re there as an occupying power, that reduces the appearance that we’re there unilaterally, I think improves our chances for success.

BIDEN: OK. Well, I’ll conclude...

(CROSSTALK)

WOLFOWITZ: Let me just say, I mean, more than 30 countries are there with us, and those are the countries...

BIDEN: No, I know.

WOLFOWITZ: ... that really I think need to get pride of place in anything we do.

(CROSSTALK)

BIDEN: Look, I don’t give a damn about anybody else’s pride or place anymore.

BIDEN: The only pride I’m worried about right now is the Iraqi pride, because unless we figure out how to somewhat satisfy the Iraqi pride, we’re all in deep, deep, deep, deep, deep, deep trouble.

And so what I mean by Iraqi pride, which is a way for me to conclude, Mr. Chairman, is that the new president, the new prime minister, the new vice president, they ain’t going to want to hang out with you. They’re not going to want to hang out with you.

You need to give them an excuse. You need to give them a straw man. You need to give them something for them to say: Something’s changed here.

You’re still going to have the same 140,000 American troops there. They’re still going to be your guys, General. And it’s still going to be their job.

But you go to have an excuse. You got to have an excuse. Take it from a plain, old politician who got elected to this place when I was 29. I may not know much, but I know politics. You got to give them an excuse. No kidding. I’m not joking about this.

And so what happens here is, I think we think too much -- to use a trite phrase these days -- too much "inside the box" here.

For example, if I could wave a wand, I’d find a NATO general who’s not an American who headed up the force in Iraq. He still has Jonesy looking over him. Jones still runs the show. He’s still the supreme allied commander. I’d want to see somebody in a bright, different colored uniform standing there.

I don’t care what country he’s from. Because you got to give these guys an excuse, fellows. If you don’t, if you don’t, I respectfully suggest this is not going to work.

And you got to give the countries who know they have to be involved -- it’s a little, you know what it’s like? It’s a little bit like when God forbid a woman feels a lump in her chest, in her breast, she knows, God, the best thing to do is immediately go to the doctor, immediately get it checked out.

Or a guy’s having trouble, and he thinks it may be prostate cancer, he knows he should immediately get it checked out.

But what do we do? Human beings go: Ah, that’s OK, it’s all right. Because, if you go, you’re afraid of the answer you might get. That’s human nature.

Well, you know, that’s where most of our friends are -- our European powers. They know they got to get in the game. But they’re going to do everything to not go to the doctor. And the doc has to show up at the house and say, "You need the exam."

The doc -- his name is Bush. He’s the doc. He’s got to show up on the door step. He’s got to say, "Look, we need this. You need this. I’m willing to deal -- not on the essentials. I’m willing to lay out and be part of a negotiation of how we move from here. But this is the deal."

Because, for example, the question when we talk about Iraqi forces: Can Iraqi forces opt out of an operation? I don’t worry about that. Because I have no faith in their forces anyway.

I worry whether they can opt us out. Can a new Iraqi government say, "Woah, boys, no, no, no, no, no, no; no Fallujah, no this, no that"? It’s a different question. We won’t get into that now.

But the point I’m making is the president has to be the doctor here, fellows. Because each of these countries know they can’t afford us to lose, and I strongly recommend, for what it’s worth, that you better figure out -- you guys, I don’t mean you particularly -- the administration better get together in a game plan, specifically, not generically, specifically how we’re going to get other people in.

BIDEN: And I have great respect for the troops that are there, Paul, from the 29 or 30 other countries. I really do. But come home with me, nobody knows they’re there. Come with me back to Missouri where I was last week. Nobody knows they’re there. When they leave, they don’t even know they left.

And so we’ve got to get some of the big dogs in the pen even if they just hang out, don’t do anything, just hang out, because you’ve got to change the face of this. Anyway, I appreciate your time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And with your permission, gentlemen, I may just drop you, not even for the record, but I’d like to importune you on the telephone about some specifics that we haven’t had a chance to get to here.

ARMITAGE: Look forward to it.

BIDEN: Thank you very much.

LUGAR: Thank you very much, Senator Biden. I agree with your earlier comment that the participation of the committee members today, the interesting questions that were asked, and important responses that we had furthered all of our understanding. And we appreciate your time and your patience.

But I think this was a good example of congressional oversight. And it will continue tomorrow. We look forward to another hearing on Iraq with people outside of our government who may offer us some constructive advice. We thank you. And the hearing is adjourned.

ARMITAGE: Thank you.

WOLFOWITZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

END