Reconstruction of the badly battered city of Fallujah now poses a major test of the Baghdad government's ability to deliver people and resources. But last week, senior U.S. Marine officers overseeing the rebuilding effort privately voiced frustration over the absence of officials from Baghdad and public works technicians to help restore power and water, assist in food and fuel distribution and set up a new police force.
Senior U.S. officers point to Najaf as a model for reconstituting cities that have been the target of U.S. military offensives against insurgents. Since the battle freeing it of Sadr's forces, the city has remained calm and shown both political leadership and economic development.
"That's what the campaign plan is all about, focusing all elements of power," said Maj. Gen. Steve Sergeant, the chief strategist and planner for the military command.
But Fallujah suffered considerably more damage than Najaf and lacks the local governing structure to step in and take charge of the recovery.
"Fallujah is going to be harder than Najaf," said William Taylor, the U.S. Embassy officer in charge of reconstruction efforts.
Reconstruction activity in Iraq has doubled from 469 projects, worth a total of $1.3 billion, in August to 1,034 projects valued at $3 billion. A series of new projects is underway in the cities and neighborhoods that were the target of U.S. assaults over the past few months: Najaf has 207 projects worth a total of $30 million, Samarra has 75 worth $10 million and Baghdad's Sadr City neighborhood has 152 worth $209 million.
But many of the projects are proceeding slowly, hampered by insurgent violence and bureaucratic obstacles. U.S. military commanders have privately expressed concern about a lack of visible progress and warned that it was fueling public discontent and stoking the insurgency. They have proposed a total of $2.25 billion in small, local projects that would create jobs quickly.
Projects Large and Small
Casey said he was sympathetic to the requests and has sought some money from the Iraqi government. But he also is trying to ensure completion of some of the major infrastructure projects -- power plants, sewage treatment facilities, water purification stations -- that were part of the original reconstruction plan.
"It's not either-or," he said. "You have to do both. You need large projects to drive longer-range development, and you need smaller ones to benefit the community and put people to work."
One of the bits of polling data that several officers cited as giving them some encouragement shows that a majority of Iraqis expect to be better off next year. But other survey results indicate that many Iraqis remain uncommitted to the move toward a new, democratic government. Public confidence in the interim government peaked last summer.
In Baghdad, Sunni support for "armed national opposition" was 40 percent in a November poll taken for the U.S. military, up from 35 percent in September. More Sunnis expressed support for the insurgents than confidence in the Iraqi government, which drew only 35 percent support in November. Approval of attacks on U.S. forces was also up, from 46 percent in September to 51 percent in November.
Under the circumstances, the internal assessment done for Casey has recommended changing one of the U.S. military's original aims, which was to bring Iraqis around to a more "positive" perception of U.S. troops. With hindsight, that objective now appears too ambitious, the assessment concluded, adding that "popular tolerance" would be a more "realistic aim."
"It's not about winning the hearts and minds," Casey said. "It's about giving the Iraqis an opportunity that they can pick up."
