Outlook: Taiwan and Chinese, U.S. Relations

Ordinarily, one might expect the United States to applaud the news that the elected leader of a self-governing island of 23 million people was planning a national referendum. But when the president of Taiwan recently said he intended to hold a referendum on sovereignty, the United States didn't applaud -- and it shouldn't. In an article in Sunday's Outlook section, Where Taiwan Support Stops, authors Michael Swaine and Minxin Pei argue that this is a case where the Bush administration needs to balance the advancement of core American values with U.S. national interests.

The topic of Taiwan will probably be near the top of the agenda Tuesday when President Bush meets Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, who in a recent interview with The Post vowed to "pay any price" to keep Taiwan from declaring formal independence and asked that the Bush administration be "crystal clear" in its opposition to the idea.

Minxin Pei, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was online Monday, Dec. 8 at 1 p.m. ET, to discuss Taiwan and the visit by the Chinese premier.

Editor's Note: Washingtonpost.com moderators retain editorial control over Live Online discussions and choose the most relevant questions for guests and hosts; guests and hosts can decline to answer questions.

________________________________________________

Mt. Lebanon, Pa.: So is there going to be a plebiscite on a permanently free and Independent Taiwan or is this just typical, campaign bilgewater?

Does anyone in Taiwan seriously want to reunite with the homeland or is this just the nostalgia by old folks for the good old days?

Finally, aside from the nations astride the Straight of Formosa and publicly-funded think-tanks in the beltway, does anyone really care about the unification of China?

In the universal scheme of things, the re-joining of 20-something million folks with 1,400-something million folks is not that big of deal.

Thanks much.

Minxin Pei: The situation with respect to holding a referendum on any substantive issues on Taiwan remains fluid. At the moment, Taiwan's leaders have not declared that they would hold a plesbiscite on independence (or reunification). Instead, the referendum proposed by Taiwan's president, Chen Shui-bian, will focus on two very narrow issues: asking China to withdraw its missiles that target Taiwan and to renounce the use of force. Most observers believe that Chen is using the referendum issue to win more votes in a very tough re-election campaign. But if such a referendum goes forward, it will most likely raise tensions in the Taiwan Strait, both in the short term and for the long run. In the short term, Chen's referendum campaign could incite popular anti-China sentiments and, should he win, give him a mandate for pressing for new moves intended to solidify his gains in redefining Taiwan's international legal status. In the long run, such a referendum will be a precedent, opening doors for perhaps more controversial proposals to be subjected to a referendum.

As for the people in Taiwan, opinion polls show that only about 10 percent of the people want to reunify with the mainland right and that 20 percent of the people want to seek immediate formal independence from China. The majority of the people -- 70-80 percent -- prefer the status quo.

You have raised an interesting issue about why should anyone care about Taiwan's reunification with China. Indeed, opinion polls in China show that reunification is not a high priority for the average Chinese. But the real problem here is not reunification, but the maintenance of a very fragile status quo.

_______________________

Monterey, Calif.: In the context of Chinese history, the Taiwan issue really can be seen as the awkward non-resolution of their civil war from the late 1940s. When China was a more purely Communist country (60's, 70's) the U.S. always sided with Taiwan as the more western, free nation, and framed China's claims to the island as ominous.

Now, as mainland China has moved dramatically to become integrated with world markets and more open as a culture -- and has thus far moved gingerly in Hong Kong -- this argument has lost some of it's weight.

I find myself wondering if in fact U.S. policy would be better off simply agreeing that Taiwan and the PRC should resolve this matter between themselves. That, in fact, it is an "internal issue" after all.

To what degree, if any, is this approach being considered? What would be the biggest obstacle to it succeeding?

Minxin Pei: The U.S. policy on Taiwan is a very carefully balanced one. Indeed, its focus is primarily on maintaining stability and peace and insisting on a peaceful resolution of the dispute between mainland China and Taiwan. However, it does not regard the dispute and how it is resolved as an "internal matter" because the U.S. has moral obligations to the people in Taiwan and finds any use of force in resolving this "legacy problem" unacceptable. That's why the U.S. has a so-called "one-China policy" (which allows the U.S. to have formal diplomatic ties with the mainland but maintain unofficial relations with Taiwan) but also provides a form of security guarantee to Taiwan (although this guarantee is quite ambiguous).

_______________________

Woodbridge Va.: Your column appears to support the long-held principle (such as it may be) of strategic ambiguity, where the nebulous status of Taiwan is maintained indefinitely. Certainly, some of Chen's recent actions upset the ambiguousness which has kept the peace for this long. However, China is also upsetting the balance by building up offensive military capacity aimed at the island of Taiwan. Does Taiwan's leadership take the military threat seriously enough? Shouldn't they be doing more to beef up Taiwan's defenses? Clearly, the PRC is not restraining its military in the interest of preserving the peaceful status quo.

Also, would it be productive for the U.S. to make a statement that makes explicit that reunification of Taiwan with the mainland must be on terms that are acceptable to the people of Taiwan without coercion?

Minxin Pei: Whether Taiwan's leadership is doing enough to address the military threat from across the Taiwan Strait is a matter of debate. A recent Post article reports that the progress on this front in Taiwan is not as rapid as many in the U.S. have hoped. Many fear that Taiwan may be counting too much on America's implicit security guarantee and not doing enough to strengthen its military capabilities.

In the last few years, both under President Clinton and President Bush, the Defense Department has significantly expanded military ties with Taiwan and provided many hi-tech weapon systems. There is no question that the U.S. is doing its part to address the military imbalance that is supposed to appear between the mainland and Taiwan in the next few years.

As for American strategic clarity on the use of coercion by China, Washington's position is quite clear: it will not accept it. President Clinton dispatched two carrier battle groups in March 1996 to the Taiwan Straits to underscore America's policy. On the issue of reunification, the U.S. does not take an explicit position. It does not support independence or reunification. It simply insists on peaceful resolution in either direction.

_______________________

Beijing, China: You write: "China's leaders oppose both referendums; one would focus antagonism toward China and the other could close off the possibility of reunification."

I don't see how a referendum on a new constitution, or asking China to move its missiles, or asking China to renounce the use of force, would "close off the possibility of reunification." Isn't it possible that moving missiles or renouncing the use of force might make it more palatable for Taiwan to reunify with China?

Also, is focusing antagonism toward China so awful that China must resort to force? Or that the United States should step in and try to stop it? Should Washington step in then and discourage other activities in Taiwan that focus antagonism toward China?

Minxin Pei: Obviously, these two referenda are very different. I have addressed the issue of why even a referendum on missile withdrawal or a pledge of not using force may be de-stabilizing. So let me deal with the issue of a new constitution passed by a referendum. According to international legal experts, sovereignty and constitution are closely connected. If that's the case, the current constitution of Taiwan (ROC) was passed in 1947 on the mainland and this constitution extends to Taiwan (which was part of ROC at the time). In other words, the old constitution still binds both sides through this residual legal tie (the sovereignty of Taiwan is derived from that constitution). But if the current constitution is replaced by a new one, then this tie will be effectively cut (because the old constitution will cease to exist). In other words, the sovereignty of Taiwan will be derived solely from the popular will of the people living on the island. If the new constitution is enacted through a high-profile public referendum, it will give it an appearance of greater legitimacy -- and generate more shocking value as far as China is concerned. To some degree, one may argue that passing a new constitution in such a manner is the functional equivalent to an open declaration of independence, which China is fiercely opposed.

_______________________

Washington, DC: Do you think Taiwan President Chen actually seeks formal independence for Taiwan, or is he just trying to get re-elected? Does a second Chen administration necessarily mean war?

Minxin Pei: Apparently, his short-term goal is to get re-elected. Because his record in economic management is quite weak, playing the "China card" is a logical strategy. But the steps he has taken in this re-election campaign are going to create more risks for conflict with the mainland. Even though many believe that Chen will unlikely seek formal independence (mainly because of firm US opposition and threat of war from China), one should not dismiss that Chen will take additional steps to underscore Taiwan's separate identity from China. Because of the high level of distrust between the mainland and Taiwan, Beijing will view these steps with suspicion and may over-react. Similarly, Chen may miscalculate as well, by taking a step he thinks that does not cross an imaginary red line but in effect does.

So if Chen wins a second term, tensions are going to rise. Although it does not necessarily mean war, we are in for a long period of uncertainty and tensions.

_______________________

Washington, D.C.: What's wrong with China annexing Taiwan? People expected doom and gloom in '97 when Hong Kong returned to China, and since then, it hasn't been too too bad.

Minxin Pei: I think we should let people in Taiwan decide whether they want to be absorbed by China today. Most "experts" who have studied this issue agree that American interest today is not to support either reunification or independence, but to maintain the status quo. This policy is, by the way, also preferred by the majority of the people on Taiwan. The status quo benefits everyone -- it maintains peace, stability and prosperity. Taiwan and the mainland can trade quite freely. Democracy can thrive on Taiwan. Of course, if China should one day become a prosperous democracy, perhaps the people in Taiwan may want to reunify with China. But that's way into the future.

_______________________

Arlington, Va.: Ni Hao. since when does our foreign policy depend on what Beijing likes? I mean, there would have been no Taiwan Relations Act if we wanted their OK. I think the current regime is much better than Zhao Ziyang but that doesn't put them in charge of our government, at least not yet. Shei-Shei.

Minxin Pei: American foreign policy depends on, first and foremost, whether it strikes a good balance between promoting American values and strategic interests. No American policy-maker can afford to implement an agenda that ignores this balance. In the case of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), it's an excellent example of striking this difficult but necessary balance. The U.S. has an official one-China policy but, at the same time, provides Taiwan support in defense. Without such delicate balancing, there would have been no diplomatic ties between the U.S. and China. And Taiwan would probably have fared far worse.

_______________________

Taiwan: Hi,
This message comes from Taiwan, and I just want to say that if "war" can solve the problem of Taiwan's sovereignty and then I accept to use force against China. Strictly speaking, my political stance belong to Hawk. In fact, a large number of Taiwanese don't want to unify with China, but they oppose seeking formal independence because they fear it could start a war. But now, more and more people like me don't care this issue any more. They want to renounce the relationship with One China. War is not a real problem but American attitude and policy to Taiwan.

Dennis Ts'ai
a PhD student of Diplomacy Dept. in National Chengchi University and the Presidential Office fellows of R.O.C.

Minxin Pei: Such sentiments are very dangerous. In fact, an increasing number of people on the mainland may feel the same way. If this trend continues on both sides, that would be a great tragedy. As I have said, re-unification is not a high priority for most people in China, but they feel very strongly about the issue of Taiwan that they firmly oppose the idea of independence. So let's hope that political leaders will not allow their policies to be driven by radical sentiments. As for the U.S., its policy is to prevent armed conflicts in the Taiwan Straits, both through diplomacy and military deterrence.

_______________________

Pittsburgh, Pa.: Taiwan's Chen is clearly an irresponsible and selfish politician who intends to drag the U.S. into war with China for his personal gain. The Bush administration should give him a stern and unambiguous public warning so he and his followers would get the message loud and clear. Thus, Chen is the one who disturbs the peace and provokes the unnecessary conflicts, hence Taiwan shall be on its own to face any consequences. To further strengthen the message, the U.S. should also assert temporary military, economic, and diplomatic sanctions on Taiwan.

On a side note, the idea of holding a referendum so to persuade China to remove missiles or recognize Taiwan as an independent state is utterly idiotic. It is just as ridiculous as if China held a referendum in the likewise fashion claiming that Taiwan should under China's control.

Minxin Pei: President Chen may run several risks even with his watered-down proposals on holding referenda on the election day (3/20/04). Even though he may gain votes as a result, he will find that his credibility with Washington may suffer. The Bush administration has a firm policy against "provocation by either side" of the Taiwan Straits. The U.S. government is also opposed to any "unilateral change" of the status quo. In the past, President Chen has repeatedly promised not to do certain things that would upset the status quo. The U.S. government takes these pledges very seriously. So if Chen keeps surprising Washington with political moves intended for domestic gains, he could undermine his own credibility in the U.S.

_______________________