Toward a Smoother Transition

On its face, the Bush administration's new plan to speed the transition to Iraqi sovereignty makes sense. It puts primary responsibility for building a new Iraq where it has always belonged -- with the Iraqi people.

But I worry that this new strategy, like the last one, has too much wishful thinking and too little hard analysis about what could go wrong.

So under the banner of "no more surprises," here's a skeptical look at some problems the new U.S. plan could encounter -- along with a few suggestions about how to avoid trouble.

First, the United States needs a new military deployment in Iraq to fit its political strategy. The Americans need fewer heavy armored units patrolling Iraqi cities; they need more mobile units that can intervene quickly to assist Iraqi security forces.

The solution isn't more U.S. troops but wiser use of the numbers that are deployed. Too often the current U.S. force is providing targets to the insurgents without offering security to Iraqis. That has it backward. A differently configured force could get the balance right.

Second, the Bush administration is being too optimistic about the readiness of the Iraqi security forces that, in theory, will begin to take over from coalition troops next year.

On paper, there will soon be about 150,000 Iraqis in the new police, army and civil defense forces. But I've seen these units training at bases around Iraq, and I agree with the American officers and NCOs doing the training that it will be many, many months before they are really ready. Jordan has offered to retrain Iraqi army officers, starting in January, and about 30,000 Iraqi police. That will help, but it's not enough.

"There is no way the Iraqis will be ready by next summer," says one top Arab official. To bolster the still-fragile Iraqi units, the Pentagon will need to embed Special Forces and other advisers that can provide instant liaison with mobile U.S. backup troops.

Third, the political transition process is unwieldy, and it has some of the same weaknesses as the existing Governing Council.

The official text released over the weekend describes a complex, Rube Goldberg device to select the Transitional National Assembly that will assume sovereignty by June 30, 2004. Organizing Committees will be formed in each of Iraq's 18 governorates; each of these committees will have five members appointed by the Governing Council in Baghdad, five members appointed by local Provincial Councils and one each from local councils of the five largest cities. Each Organizing Committee will then select a Governorate Selection Caucus of local notables, which in turn will select the new assembly.

To me, this sounds like a formula for confusion and deadlock. And I haven't even mentioned all the political feuds that are buried in the numbingly complex selection process. The best hope for making it work are the personal relationships U.S. commanders have built with local tribal, civic and religious leaders.

Fourth, the new plan ducks the divisive political question that has bedeviled the Bush administration since Baghdad fell in April -- namely, what role will be played by exile leader Ahmed Chalabi. Both Chalabi and his enemies claim to like the plan -- which makes me nervous.

Chalabi is a brave and dedicated man who, for all his abrasiveness, has probably done more than anyone to create a free Iraq. The problem is that he has much more influence in Washington than in Baghdad. It's unrealistic to expect him to become the unifying figure his supporters would like; but until his role is clarified, the new plan will be afflicted by the same infighting and paralysis as the old.

Fifth, the beleaguered occupation chief, L. Paul Bremer, needs to sustain his principal political success to date, which has been to maintain the support of Ayatollah Ali Sistani and other Shiite religious leaders. Sistani's reported agreement to give up his demand for elections and a new constitution before the handover of sovereignty will make the new plan viable, if it's for real. But in maneuvers with the Shiites, the administration is risking its crucial base of support.

Finally, the United States should recognize that many Iraqis will prepare for the transition by arming militias to protect their religious and tribal groups. Last weekend's announcement confirms what they have wanted and feared: a rapid end to American occupation. If there is a power vacuum, it will be filled by the militias, not by budding Iraqi democrats.

Iraqis know that a quick American military pullout is a recipe for civil war. It's right to give the Iraqis more political power; it would be tragically wrong to abandon them militarily.

davidignatius@washpost.com