Other problems followed. In the spring of 2000, technicians discovered a weakness in the system for controlling the roll, pitch and yaw of the booster, and they struggled with a redesign. They also found heat damage in a metal line that piped hot gases to the rocket's thrusters. The line had to be re-engineered.
Still another setback resulted when the writing of computer code used to guide the kill vehicle turned out to be more cumbersome than expected. That added more weeks to the schedule.
By then, Kadish and other senior MDA officials had lost confidence in Boeing's management team. The company shook up its missile defense group, replacing the executive in charge and others. But problems continued into 2001 -- among them, poor bonding in adhesives for some booster components.
A test launch in August 2001 succeeded, but a second test in December 2001 flopped. Immediately after launch, the rocket tumbled end over end, spewing gas and fire out its front end as well as its rear. An investigation showed that the dome of the motor had been cracked when the booster was moved to the launch site.
With the booster program by then 161/27 years behind schedule, Pentagon officials approved a plan to re-bid the project. To increase the chance of getting an effective booster, they decided in early 2002 to authorize two separate development efforts based on two different designs.
One contract went to Orbital Sciences Corp., which had a good record supplying NASA and the Pentagon with small rockets, target missiles and lightweight satellites. Orbital's proposal promised a faster, cheaper booster. But the company had never built a large, three-stage missile -- the kind the Pentagon was seeking for the missile defense system.
The second contract went to continue Boeing's design -- but not with Boeing in charge. The project was taken over by Lockheed Martin, which had more experience building boosters and had already supplied boosters for early flight tests.
"It's not unheard of, but it is unusual," said Lockheed's Doug Graham, recalling the decision to have his company take on the task of completing Boeing's design.
Said Jim Evatt, a Boeing senior vice president: "We did run into normal developmental and technical issues on our booster. But if Lockheed had not wanted to build it, we would have continued with the program."
Lockheed made some changes in Boeing's design. It added a cold-gas attitude-control system to reduce the booster's tendency to roll after launch. It also integrated an avionics package into the booster, doing away with the glue pads that had attached the package to the dome and were prone to come loose. Additionally, the company reconfigured the booster's flight computer.
But Lockheed officials put off other desired improvements, intent on meeting the Pentagon's deadline. The transition from Boeing had already taken 15 months, about half a year longer than expected.
"There were other things they wanted to do, but, quite frankly, cost and schedule wouldn't allow them," said Col. Damian Bianca, manager of the interceptor program for the MDA.
By last fall, program officials were still hopeful the booster could be ready for deployment this year. Then disaster struck.
A couple of fluke explosions occurred at a propellant-mixing complex in San Jose belonging to Pratt & Whitney's Chemical Systems Division, supplier of the upper-stage motors for Lockheed's booster. The second blast, in September 2003 -- triggered when a contractor mistakenly cut a pressurized line -- killed the man and caused Pratt & Whitney to suspend mixing operations.
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