Over 60 Days, Troops Suppressed an Uprising

Several said Sadr's militia appeared to be led by highly competent commanders, even though most fighters seemed poorly trained. Concentric circles of defenses were built around the leadership's refuges, weapons depots and other strategic sites. The closer U.S. troops moved to command centers or ammunition stockpiles, the more adept the resistance became.

As he rolled toward the mosque, Taylor had the "primary sight" blown out of his tank. The field hospital began treating more arm and leg wounds -- a sign that snipers knew the limits of body armor and had the skill to take advantage of it.

"The enemy started to change," Bishop said.

The Cemetery, Najaf: May 14-24

Since mid-April, Lt. Col. Pat White's soldiers of the 37th Armored Regiment's 2nd Battalion had fought nightly against an estimated 2,500 militiamen in this southern city.

The militants fought from minarets and the plumes of palm trees, a favorite sniper perch. The U.S. tactics were almost as rudimentary: Columns of unarmored Humvees patrolled the city, sector by sector, as lures for "enemy contact."

White told his company commanders: "Draw them out, kill as many as you can, and don't stop until you have."

For weeks, Sadr's foot soldiers had used the impenetrable acres of Najaf's cemetery, the largest in the Islamic world, as a staging area. Just blocks away is the Shrine of Imam Ali, the holiest place in Shiite Islam. As the battle loomed, both sites were designated by U.S. commanders as "exclusion zones" for their troops.

Soldiers said the rules of engagement around the zones allowed them to fire into the areas only if they could see an attacker, a nearly impossible standard given the cover provided. Dempsey said the zones were recommended by Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the head of the U.S. forces in Iraq, and drawn up in consultation with local commanders.

U.S. officers knew that damaging the shrines would inflame opinion in Iraq and worldwide against the Americans. The British, the firmest U.S. partner in Iraq, were already angered by what they saw as provocative U.S. military tactics in the holy cities.

"One private first class with one tank round could have unhinged this whole thing," Dempsey said.

U.S. soldiers said the zones awarded a tactical advantage to Sadr's men, who used them as refuges. Operating near the Shrine of Imam Ali, U.S. patrols came under steady fire that they did not return. Each night, mortars fell on their camp -- 495 in all -- fired from a mosque complex in Kufa, a few miles to the east, also protected by an exclusion zone.

"Our soldiers were getting hurt in the same places every day because of these zones," said Spec. Christopher Stinespring, 30, of Arthurdale, W.Va. "There was nothing we could do."

On May 14, Lt. Colin Cremin, the executive officer of "Aggressor" Company, arrayed tanks on the cemetery's edge and immediately came under fire.

"There were hundreds of them in there, and they had positions everywhere, popping up among these catacombs," said Lt. Michael Watson, a platoon leader from Bentleyville, Pa. "They were intelligent about their positions. They had to know our [rules of engagement] in regards to the holy sites."

As Watson's men pursued the fighters on foot, a grenade arced over the cemetery wall and exploded beneath a Humvee. After the loss of one Humvee a week earlier, sparking a celebration by Sadr's men, the soldiers refused to surrender this one. The resulting firefight turned into a six-hour defense of a burning car.