Lawyer for State Dept. Disputed Detainee Memo

"In previous conflicts, the United States has dealt with tens of thousands of detainees without repudiating its obligations under the Conventions," wrote Taft, who was the Defense Department's general counsel from 1981 to 1984. "I have no doubt we can do so here."

Bush nonetheless embraced the Justice Department's viewpoint and decided that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to combatants in Afghanistan. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell protested and persuaded Bush to reconsider; Powell and Myers presented their views at a meeting with Bush, also attended by senior Justice and Defense officials.

Alberto R. Gonzales, the White House counsel, subsequently advised Bush in a memo that Powell was wrong and the Justice Department's analysis was "definitive." Gonzales said terrorist attacks "require a new approach in our actions toward captured terrorists," and noted that terrorists had never respected the Geneva Conventions' human rights protections.

On Feb. 7, 2002, Bush signed an order asserting his right to suspend the Geneva Conventions protections for Taliban suspects -- contrary to Taft's advice -- but saying he had decided not to do so at that time. Bush also declared that all Taliban militia were "unlawful combatants," and ineligible for tribunals.

One result of the rancorous debate, according to participants, was that Yoo, Attorney General John D. Ashcroft and senior civilians at the Pentagon no longer sought to include the State Department or the Joint Staff in deliberations about the precise protections afforded to detainees by the Geneva Conventions.

For example, the officials said, a 50-page Justice Department memo in August 2002 about the meaning of various anti-torture laws and treaties was not discussed or shared with the Joint Chiefs or the State Department. It was drafted by Justice for the CIA and sent directly to the White House.

The memo contended that only physically punishing acts of "an extreme nature" would constitute criminal violations, and that acts that were merely cruel, inhuman or degrading might not be subject to prosecution. It asserted that those committing torture without the intent to cause lasting harm might be immune from criminal sanctions.

"I'm confident that people would have raised questions" had they known about the memo, a knowledgeable official said. Senior officials repudiated portions of the memo on Tuesday, saying it contained "unnecessary" and "overbroad" arguments that were being reevaluated.

Major dissent about the administration's interrogation practices next arose in late 2002 and early 2003, when military interrogators at Guantanamo Bay complained to superior officers that techniques they were asked to use were abusive. That provoked an extended Defense Department review, during which military lawyers for each of the services forcefully expressed their concerns, officials said.

"We had raised them verbally. We've raised them at the action officer level. Ultimately, some memos were, in fact, signed laying out some considerations that we believe were very important in the process," said a senior military lawyer who briefed reporters last month with the Pentagon's approval.

The lawyer chose his words carefully: "By the time the final draft . . . [on interrogation methods] was completed, those considerations had all been carefully evaluated."

He said the military lawyers were comfortable with the outcome "from a legal standpoint," but did not mention the policy concerns the memos had raised.