9/11 Commission Testimony of Thomas Pickard and J. Cofer Black

We only knew what we knew. The intelligence we had lead us to these 70 individuals and we worked on them as best we could.

As I said in my statement, it's a give-and-take between Cofer and myself back and forth as to picking up bits and pieces of information. Those 70 in the United States, they were partly a result of FBI investigations, but credit has to be given very greatly to the CIA for giving us the information and for the other members of the intelligence community that they provided us with information to direct us to look at these individuals.

Otherwise, we're operating in a vacuum where we don't know who to be on. We cannot, by any stretch, target any persons of a particular faith just because they belong to a faith. We're trying to identify people who are al Qaeda operatives who might give either some kind of support, whether it's financial or otherwise, to these individuals.

As far as those 70 cases, two of them were indicted and convicted on the East Africa bombing, not for actions they took here in the United States, but for what actions they took outside the United States. But both of them were U.S. citizens.

We have another individual who was convicted of another criminal matter outside of terrorism.

We also determined that some of these individuals who foreign intelligence and CIA identified to us, they left the United States, and we made the hand-off to the CIA to, Can you get with your foreign counterparts and watch these people? We think they are of interest, but they did not do anything here in the United States that would cause us alarm.

We had a number of them picked up on immigration charges, because they had extended their visas.

I could ask the FBI to provide you with a detailed listing. And I'd like to also caution that the number 70 is somewhat inaccurate.

LEHMAN: But to take you up on your mention of the prohibitions on investigating religious institutions, the Levi restrictions and so forth, that...

PICKARD: Educational institutions too.

LEHMAN: So you were not able to target schools, mosques and other sanctuaries?

PICKARD: No, we were not.

LEHMAN: As you know, very shortly after the September 11th attack, some of the commercial databases like Axion, ICSO (ph), ChoicePoint, so forth were queried and nearly all of the 19 hijackers were very prominently covered, with addresses, credit cards, locations, et cetera. Why did not the FBI make use of those commercial databases before 9/11?

PICKARD: We were prohibited from utilizing a lot of those commercial databases by statutes and things like that. That was one of the benefits of the Patriot Act, as I understand it. I have not read the act, and I'm not an attorney, and don't want to start practicing.

LEHMAN: Mr. Black, Mr. Clarke prominently and other -- in fact, numerous other witnesses have alluded to the fact that in their belief, the director of operations in CIA, going back to the traumas of the post-Watergate era, had a deeply entrenched culture opposed to covert operations and certainly opposed to targeting individuals like Osama bin Laden for killing, to the point where one of our witnesses, under oath, told us that one of your senior associates in the agency had said that he would resign rather than carrying out an order that would target Osama.

Without going into any classified information, did you believe that you had the authority to go after Osama personally as opposed to in a capture operation?

BLACK: Again, I will try and meet your needs in this, but I would really prefer to do much of this in a closed session.

The constant theme from the first of these MONs in this series were very explicit and that the objective which was agreed to, everyone in the Central Intelligence Agency and all of our lawyers are unanimous, as reflected by the statements of the director of central intelligence and the deputy director of operations, it was capture was the objective.

LEHMAN: Thank you. That's a good answer.

It leads to another question, which is the division of responsibilities for covert action between the Defense Department and the CIA, the Title 10, Title 50 distinctions.

From all of the testimony we've gathered and the evidence, this clearly was a point of disagreement and dysfunction, with fingers being pointed on each side at the other for not doing what they should be doing or not having the capabilities that they should have.

BLACK: I'm all -- as an American, I'm all for what works. I think the record of the Central Intelligence Agency responding after 9/11, having the plans, surging into Afghanistan, setting it up for the warriors to win that battle with low loss of life in a way that I think was highly efficient, as stated by the president of the United States, I think, is an example of where the two can work together effectively.

I personally believe they can work together far more effectively. Anything that you can do to cement this relationship so it's even closer, particularly with the U.S. Army's Special Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency, I personally believe that's our future.

In fact, in Afghanistan, when you see these personnel together, the civilians and the military are indistinguishable, and they all bring particular skills to the battlefield. So I think that's an area of great growth. And we have a lot of commonality. And it should be encouraged.

LEHMAN: Thank you.

I have one final question for both of you.

First, Mr. Pickard, we've spent a lot of time on the Cole, and you have addressed it very well, and all of the benefits that have come out of the several hundred agents that were sent over there and the intelligence yield, although it certainly didn't interfere with 9/11, but it certainly has expanded our understanding of al Qaeda since.

And we're having a hard time reconciling where everybody immediately throughout the community the day after said, It's Osama and it's al Qaeda who did it. Yet there was not a willingness to go on record and formally say that until months and months after the fact.

Could you -- which many people have said was why we didn't retaliate and why we did not get any benefits from a deterrent attack of al Qaeda capabilities in Afghanistan.

Could you both comment on that?

First, Mr. Pickard.

PICKARD: Yes, I would like to comment on it. When the attacks happened in the African embassy bombings, I was actually in charge of the FBI that day because Director Freeh was out of town.

I dispatched our Washington field office, because our standard operating procedure was, if we didn't have any indication that a particular group was assigned to it, our Washington field office would be dispatched to any bombings in Europe, the Middle East or Africa.

When the Cole happened, we had learned a lot from the East Africa bombings, and as a result almost immediately we lit up that it's got to be al Qaeda.

In addition, after about three or four days there, the first agents on the scene, based upon the planning and preparation that they observed in their limited investigation to date, we were confident and we reported back to the attorney general that we firmly believed it was al Qaeda. But our caveat was we could not take that to a court of law and bring an indictment. We needed further investigation and things like that.

That's what happened in January. We were at the stage then, working with the Southern District of New York, that we could start to talk about specifically indicting al Qaeda for the USS Cole.

LEHMAN: Thank you.

Mr. Black?

BLACK: I think it's very important to be accurate in these things. You want to provide your customer with the best information you have. Professional instinct is good.

In the wake of the Cole, we were able to pretty quickly determine that al Qaeda-associated people were involved in this. And I think by January we made what we described as the intelligence case.

And the intelligence case, distinct from the law enforcement case -- CIA doing the intelligence case. And what we came up with, yes -- as I recall, yes, these are al Qaeda-associated people that conducted this operation.

Now, were I working for you, I would say, you know, It looks pretty good that -- pretty early on -- this is al Qaeda, you know. Well, that's great. This is based primarily on the little information I have access to professional experience.

We collected more intelligence around the world. We went about it globally, comprehensively. You know, our confidence went up. But by January the intelligence case was pretty positive, but we were still looking for that positive link to Osama bin Laden command and control.

We actually did get that, I might point out, but that was something like a year, a year and a half later. So we could say absolutely this is proof positive of the intelligence case.

Indications early on? Yes. But separate and distinct from the law enforcement case which would be of such a quality that you could take into a U.S. court of law.

LEHMAN: Thank you both for your frankness.

KEAN: Congressman Roemer?

ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome to both of you to the 9/11 commission.

You have both playfully insulted lawyers in the last 10 or 15 minutes. I'm not a lawyer. I don't care. You've got six lawyers following me in the questions. You might want to say something nice in the next 10 or 15 minutes. Just a little bit of advice to you for the next few minutes.

I have a question for both of you to just go at maybe one of the problems. I asked Director Freeh, Mr. Pickard, earlier about the active informant who had engaged two of the 19 hijackers. And he said, quite frankly, the FBI should have done better. Let me give you a case and get your response from it.

You have said in your remarks that that was the most serious chatter, in the summer of 2001. When we have talked to some of the people that should have heard this serious chatter and your communication with them, leading into spring and summer, when a big event was going to happen, an experienced terrorism supervisor in the Washington office, six blocks from headquarters -- six blocks away -- says he was not aware of any heightened terrorist threat. His squad took no special action leading up to 9/11.

A supervisor in the Miami field office, a special agent in charge, said, this was inside-the-Beltway kind of thing, never heard of that chatter until after 9/11. What happened?

I can't account for the SAC in Miami as to whether he was actually on the call, but whoever was in charge of the office that day was on that call, because I did not get on it until they were all on it. During that call, I reiterated the issue of the threat level and also to make sure they were at their maximum effort on that.

Do you recall your precise words that you recently told the 9/11 commission on that conversation? Your words to the 9/11 commission were evidence response teams ready. Evidence response -- that's reactive. That's not proactive, saying here's the threat. Here's what you need to do about it. You're saying if we get hit, have the evidence response teams ready. That's what you told the 9/11 commission staff.

PICKARD: I had a very brief conversation with them about that. I was surprised at the brevity of it.

ROEMER: Well, it sounds like it was pretty brief to the field offices, as well. Response, not active threat.

PICKARD: But I also had -- I spoke to each of the 56 SACs during the month of July, between July 9th and July 31st, each of them individually. I had them on the phone, secure conference call, with the assistant directors from Counterterrorism, Dale Watson; Counterintelligence, Neil Gallagher; and the assistant director of the Criminal Division, Reuben Garcia.

I don't know why the SAC in Miami did not get it. I spoke to him...

ROEMER: Six blocks away.

PICKARD: ... on July 18th.

ROEMER: Your supervisor six blocks away didn't get it.

PICKARD: I spoke to the SACs. They should have been working that information down. So that...

ROEMER: Could you have done a better job, or are you just saying, I don't know why they didn't hear it ? Did you task them again after the 19th?

PICKARD: I don't understand why they didn't hear it. I spoke to each of them individually, as I said, and in addition I had the communications out to them. I don't know what more I could have done. Some people, I don't understand whether they can't recall it or not. But if you talk to -- for example I know the staff, the New York office agents, they got it. They were always on top of it. And many of the other agents that I spoke to over the last week...

ROEMER: As you read in the staff statement, when we tasked out to the field if all those offices were on high alert and doing their maximum effort, I think we got nine out of 10 back saying they weren't at maximum effort, they weren't at war footing.

Mr. Black, let me ask you: Your folks did a very professional job following people into Kuala Lumpur -- to a meeting of known, suspected thugs, terrorists, murderers. Then, after the meeting of a couple days in Kuala Lumpur, they leave -- three of them leave -- and go to Bangkok. You failed to follow to follow those three people.

What happened? Where did we let down the guard here from Kuala Lumpur to Bangkok that then let two of these hijackers into the United States?

BLACK: The activity covering these people in Kuala Lumpur was pretty comprehensive. We were concerned about their actions. We were able to conduct photography.

ROEMER: I said you did a good job...

(CROSSTALK)

BLACK: ... later, so that worked out pretty well.

What happened was that when the targets departed Kuala Lumpur and went to Bangkok, that the advisory information, the alert to the people down range in Bangkok did not arrive in time to put coverage upon the targets upon arrival. Got there late.

The targets went out into the community. And working with our friends locally, as a priority operational activity, we tried to find these people. So we were looking for them in the interim.

And there the next sign of life that we identified of these targets, unfortunately, was looking at, I think, airport departure cards, something like that, some physical evidence that they had departed. And then that information was reported, cable traffic, which is another part of the story.

ROEMER: So a couple months later, you find out that they've departed Bangkok and are in the United States.

BLACK: That's correct. With looking, you know, with these things, having a good partnership with our friends, looking to try and find these people, we were able to find evidence of them.

Bangkok, I'm sure you've been there, it's a big town. We found evidence that they had departed. And this information was communicated. That took place in March. So they had come and they had gone, with us being able to know that, until we came up with the departure cards. And that was the status of it. ROEMER: Mr. Pickard, what's important for me to try to understand, as well, is in your role at the number two position at the FBI and acting director, I'm interested in knowing what you were telling the highest government officials, briefing them about the threat leading into the spring and the summer of 2001. Did you ever have the opportunity to brief the president of the United States on counterterrorism issues?

Did you ever ask to do that?

PICKARD: No, I did not.

ROEMER: Did you ever brief the vice president of the United States on counterterrorism?

PICKARD: Yes, I did.

ROEMER: How many times did you brief the vice president?

PICKARD: I recall one time that he came over to FBI headquarters on March 16. I believe he came another time, but I was not present. I did not personally do the briefing. Director Freeh and Assistant Director Watson did them.

ROEMER: And did you brief the vice president on an al Qaeda presence in the United States?

PICKARD: Yes.

ROEMER: And what was his reaction?

PICKARD: He was surprised that al Qaeda was here in the United States, as was the attorney general. We told them we had coverage on them. And as I explained earlier, we also have Hamas, Hezbollah, many other terrorist groups. We also have intelligence agents from foreign countries here in the United States.

With the laws and regulations we have, we try to utilize anything we can to thwart their efforts. But if they haven't crossed a line, if they haven't done something illegal, we don't have an opportunity to do anything with them.

ROEMER: Did the vice president task you with any kind of undertaking to do something about the al Qaeda presence?

PICKARD: Not that I recall.

ROEMER: He didn't ask you to arrest them? Didn't ask you to -- how...

PICKARD: The vice president didn't.

ROEMER: The vice president...

PICKARD: He had very few comments.

ROEMER: And are you sure that that was the vice president's reaction, according to what you said to the 9/11 commission staff?

PICKARD: I think you're referring to what the attorney general said.

ROEMER: No, I know what I'm going to ask you about what the attorney general said.

PICKARD: I recall the point about the computer systems at the FBI. I don't recall the other two.

ROEMER: So he did say two or three things to you.

PICKARD: Right.

ROEMER: Did he follow up with you in the spring and summer when the warning was getting bigger and bigger about the al Qaeda presence...

PICKARD: I believe he had another meeting with Director Freeh, but I was not at it.

ROEMER: In the spring or the summer?