9/11 Commission Testimony of Thomas Pickard and J. Cofer Black

PICKARD: In the spring. Director Freeh left -- retired from the FBI about June 22nd.

ROEMER: Well, I'd certainly like to follow up with you a bit more on that particular topic as you recollect those three items.

Did you brief the national security adviser to the president, Dr. Rice, on counterterrorism?

PICKARD: Shortly after Dr. Rice came in, Director Freeh and I went up and met with her and Steve Hadley, and briefed her on both counterintelligence and counterterrorism issues.

ROEMER: And how specific were you on counterterrorism issues? Did you generally brief her on counterterrorism? Was it specifically on al Qaeda and bin Laden?

PICKARD: It wasn't specifically on them. It was the whole counterintelligence and counterterrorism program at the FBI.

ROEMER: And this is in February 2001?

PICKARD: I believe it was January 26th.

ROEMER: January 26th is one of the meetings. I believe you also briefed her in February on Khobar Towers.

PICKARD: That's correct.

ROEMER: So you had two?

PICKARD: Yes. At least two.

ROEMER: And did bin Laden come up in the second briefing?

PICKARD: No, it didn't.

ROEMER: OK. You're sure.

PICKARD: Yes. It was specifically on Khobar Towers because we were running toward the end of the statute of limitations on it, which was June 25th.

ROEMER: OK.

Well, again, I'd like to talk to you about that in terms of your comments to the staff.

Did you brief the attorney general on terrorism?

PICKARD: Yes, I did.

ROEMER: And what -- how many times did you brief him on terrorism?

PICKARD: After Director Freeh left the FBI, the attorney general had me come in on June 22nd to meet with him and he appointed me as the acting director of the FBI.

ROEMER: So what would you guess, Mr. Pickard? How many times did you brief...

PICKARD: At least three times.

ROEMER: Three times.

And what were the attorney general's priorities with respect to terrorism? Was it a top tier priority for the attorney general?

PICKARD: It was a top tier for the FBI. The attorney general on May 10th issued budget guidance for us and I did not see that as a top item on his agenda.

ROEMER: Did you take that to the attorney general that you were concerned that that was not a top item for him? And is this the $58 million that you're concerned about?

PICKARD: No, that was later. This was the budget guidance that came out on May 10th.

During the summer of 2001, the FBI submitted what I believe was our 2003 budget proposal. That proposal came back and the additional funds that we were looking for on counterterrorism were denied. I spoke to the attorney general briefly and asked him if I could appeal it and he told me, yes, I could; put it in writing. I had our finance and counterterrorism people put together an appeal of that decision. And then on September 12th, I read the denial of that appeal from the attorney general.

ROEMER: So you had a May 10th memo on the attorney general's priorities that you objected to.

PICKARD: I received that on September 12th, that denial.

ROEMER: So what does this say about counterterrorism as a priority for the attorney general? Do you think it was not the priority that you hoped it would be, commensurate with the FBI's?

PICKARD: I only had the perspective to see it from my view of the FBI. I don't know all that the attorney general had to look at with the hundred thousand employees of the Department of Justice.

ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

KEAN: Just got a couple of questions.

During the summer of 2001, the Minneapolis office had Moussaoui detained and they were concerned that he might be part of a larger plot. Were you aware of his detention and aware of his...

PICKARD: No, I was not.

KEAN: Were you aware of those concerns any time before September 11th?

PICKARD: No, I was not.

KEAN: The New York office began searching for al Hazmi and al Mihdhar -- knew that they were in the country and were searching for them that same summer.

PICKARD: Right.

KEAN: Were you aware of that?

PICKARD: No, I was not before September 11th.

KEAN: Do you think if those two matters from those different offices had been brought to your attention, do you think you might have thought a little differently about the plot, or whether there was a plot, or you might have acted differently based on those pieces of information?

PICKARD: I've thought long and hard about that, Governor, and it's a frightening thought to think that that could have been on my desk on September 10th and would I have done something differently or not. And I can't answer that.

I go back and forth on that constantly. It keeps me up at night, thinking, If I had that information, would I have had the intuitiveness to recognize, to go to the president, to do something different.

KEAN: What bothers me is just the fact it didn't get to you. You know, that something in the FBI stopped those very two important pieces of information from different parts of the country from rising to the kind of level where you might have seen them and might have acted on them.

I spoke recently with the individual who is in charge of the Minneapolis office. I asked him, I said, Why didn't you call me? I said, You know me, I send once a year out an e-mail out to all FBI employees, to tell them to come to me with any issue you have, whether it's investigative, administrative, your pay, or some other problem.

And I'd heard frequently from individuals who said, I can't get a group one (ph) undercover operation through, or I'm not getting my annual leave corrected, or whatever it might be. And my secretary used to kid me about it because she'd print it out each night and say, Here's your homework, do it tonight and bring it back tomorrow morning, because I don't type.

Those things bothered me, but those employees working down in the Counterterrorism Division were working very hard. They were trying to do the best they could with the hundreds of pieces of information they could. And as we sit here with 20/20 hindsight, picking out three or four pieces of information, I think it's a disservice to them to recognize what pieces, in light of 9/11, were relevant.

KEAN: Hindsight is a word -- we've all got to be careful to look at the world as it was before 9/11.

Ambassador Black, using hindsight now, if we were able to recognize the kind of tragedy that was going to happen, what would you have done differently? What did we do wrong?

BLACK: Well, I tell you, I would start from the standpoint that when I started this job in 1999, I thought there was a good chance I was going to be sitting right here in front of you. And I was mentally prepared for it all along.

The enemy we're up against is one that I've been operating against since the early '90s. I know these guys. I know what they want to do. I know how dedicated they are. And they were coming at us hard.

And, you know, we did all that we could at our level to engage these guys to try and produce the kinds of intelligence, produce the kinds of leads. And the men and women that did this, Governor, that serve this country in war, out front, did a fantastic job.

The big bottom line here, you know, people come up with these grand ideas for improvement, you know, big computers, whatever. The bottom line here, I've got to tell you -- and I'll take part of the blame on this, I kind of failed my people, despite doing everything I could. We didn't have enough people to do the job. And we didn't have enough money by magnitudes. And that could give you comparisons you like wouldn't believe. We used to talk about it at the Counterterrorism Center.

You know, this goes in the '90s. I mean, this has been so hard- wired. You know, by the time we get up to the recent past, and this train is on this track and this is where it's going. Hell, I don't even know if we ever could have got it off without some kind of catastrophe. I will tell you, you know, going back to the '90s, doing the terrorist target, the only way we ever got more money essentially, was we would spent ahead of the curve and run out.

And people talk about the millennium threat. I can remember, we were spending money on the millennium threat, went to the director. I said, Mr. Tenet, we're spending money here. We are not going to make it to the end of the fiscal year. We're going to be three months short. We're going to have to stop. And, you know, we won't be able to operate. He signaled me aside, and he said, Well, you know, do what's right for the country, blow it out. So we did.

We spent, you know, after the millennium threat was over, we spent our time trying to get the money to make up for that which we spent, or -- and I'm just not going to go into that kind of language I use, which is very graphic -- but, unfortunately, when Americans get killed it would translate into additional resources.

But what I want to leave you with, I mean, that's all I want to leave you with: The people that did this are heroes and we didn't give them what they needed to fight and win. It's that simple. Thank you.

KEAN: Senator Gorton?

GORTON: Mr. Pickard, you answered some of these questions at the beginning of Commissioner Lehman's testimony, but I want to press you a little bit further on it.

In the now famous presidential daily briefing of August 6th, 2001, after a statement that the CIA had not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, there is that single line: The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the United States that it considers bin Laden-related.

Now, you quite rightly said that wasn't your sentence. You didn't write it. No one from the FBI wrote it. It was written by someone from the CIA after a conversation, a telephone conversation...

PICKARD: That's correct.

GORTON: ... with someone at the FBI.

Now, our staff says this about that statement. The 70 full field investigations number was checked out by the joint inquiry and we looked at it, too. It was indeed a number the bureau used at the time. It was generously calculated to include all fund-raising investigations around the country that might have a connection with OBL.

I recall the point about the computer systems at the FBI. I don't recall the other two.

ROEMER: So he did say two or three things to you.

PICKARD: Right.

ROEMER: Did he follow up with you in the spring and summer when the warning was getting bigger and bigger about the al Qaeda presence...

PICKARD: I believe he had another meeting with Director Freeh, but I was not at it.

ROEMER: In the spring or the summer?

PICKARD: In the spring. Director Freeh left -- retired from the FBI about June 22nd.

ROEMER: Well, I'd certainly like to follow up with you a bit more on that particular topic as you recollect those three items.

Did you brief the national security adviser to the president, Dr. Rice, on counterterrorism?

PICKARD: Shortly after Dr. Rice came in, Director Freeh and I went up and met with her and Steve Hadley, and briefed her on both counterintelligence and counterterrorism issues.

ROEMER: And how specific were you on counterterrorism issues? Did you generally brief her on counterterrorism? Was it specifically on al Qaeda and bin Laden?

PICKARD: It wasn't specifically on them. It was the whole counterintelligence and counterterrorism program at the FBI.

ROEMER: And this is in February 2001?

PICKARD: I believe it was January 26th.

ROEMER: January 26th is one of the meetings. I believe you also briefed her in February on Khobar Towers.

PICKARD: That's correct.

ROEMER: So you had two?

PICKARD: Yes. At least two.

ROEMER: And did bin Laden come up in the second briefing?

PICKARD: No, it didn't.

ROEMER: OK. You're sure.

PICKARD: Yes. It was specifically on Khobar Towers because we were running toward the end of the statute of limitations on it, which was June 25th.

ROEMER: OK.

Well, again, I'd like to talk to you about that in terms of your comments to the staff.

Did you brief the attorney general on terrorism?

PICKARD: Yes, I did.

ROEMER: And what -- how many times did you brief him on terrorism?

PICKARD: After Director Freeh left the FBI, the attorney general had me come in on June 22nd to meet with him and he appointed me as the acting director of the FBI.

ROEMER: So what would you guess, Mr. Pickard? How many times did you brief...

PICKARD: At least three times.

ROEMER: Three times.

And what were the attorney general's priorities with respect to terrorism? Was it a top tier priority for the attorney general?

PICKARD: It was a top tier for the FBI. The attorney general on May 10th issued budget guidance for us and I did not see that as a top item on his agenda.

ROEMER: Did you take that to the attorney general that you were concerned that that was not a top item for him? And is this the $58 million that you're concerned about?

PICKARD: No, that was later. This was the budget guidance that came out on May 10th.

During the summer of 2001, the FBI submitted what I believe was our 2003 budget proposal. That proposal came back and the additional funds that we were looking for on counterterrorism were denied. I spoke to the attorney general briefly and asked him if I could appeal it and he told me, yes, I could; put it in writing. I had our finance and counterterrorism people put together an appeal of that decision. And then on September 12th, I read the denial of that appeal from the attorney general.