| Page 2 of 2 < |
DHS Considers Alternatives To Color-Coded Warnings
|
Discussion Policy
Comments that include profanity or personal attacks or other inappropriate comments or material will be removed from the site. Additionally, entries that are unsigned or contain "signatures" by someone other than the actual author will be removed. Finally, we will take steps to block users who violate any of our posting standards, terms of use or privacy policies or any other policies governing this site. Please review the full rules governing commentaries and discussions. You are fully responsible for the content that you post.
|
The color-coded system was originally designed to create tiers of perceived threat for state and local authorities, as well as industry sectors, providing a menu of security options. While officials knew they would make the threat alerts public, they spent little time planning how to communicate with the public, or anticipating how people would react, several ranking officials said.
Late-night comedians were unsparing when the five-tier color system was unveiled in March 2002. Conan O'Brien said "red means we're in extreme danger, and champagne-fuchsia means we're being attacked by Martha Stewart."
Instead of being narrowly targeted, the first five alerts covered the entire nation, partly because officials feared they would be criticized if an attack occurred without their having issued warnings, they acknowledged.
In the summer of 2002, as the anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks approached and terrorism fears escalated, 10 federal agencies disseminated often contradictory warnings to different constituencies and the public.
Ridge, then in the White House, said on Sept. 3 that there were no plans to raise the alert to orange. But on Sept. 11, Attorney General John D. Ashcroft, who at the time had the authority to invoke threat alerts, did just that, saying U.S. intelligence had new information.
By May 26, 2004, Ridge, as secretary of homeland security, had sole responsibility for addressing the public about terrorism threats. He appeared that day on several news shows playing down the danger of a terrorist strike while Ashcroft announced that al Qaeda was "almost ready to attack."
"That instance really challenged the likelihood that people would trust messages from the administration" about terrorism threats, said Roxane Cohen Silver, a University of California at Irvine psychologist who has advised the Department of Homeland Security about the color-coded system.
In today's political environment, with many Americans skeptical about Bush administration invocations of terrorism threats, "the challenge for DHS is enlisting the public's trust," she added.
She said she has told officials that "maybe it would be advisable not to hold a press conference unless officials can give people something they can do about it.
"To just say 'Be alert, look around,' that's a little too vague," said Silver, who is leading a research project into Americans' emotional reactions to Sept. 11.
Some of the possible changes may be cosmetic. Switching from colors to letters or numbers may not provide the public with much additional information, but it would allow the department to move away from the current system. A more substantive option is for officials, when issuing warnings, to publicly concede ambiguities or gaps in their information, officials said.
In 2003, Ridge said that with local officials weary of the expense of orange alerts, and many Americans jaded, he might not issue more nationwide alerts. The last orange alert, released in August 2004 after the discovery of al Qaeda documents in Pakistan, was directed only at financial sites in Washington, New York and Newark.
Homeland Security officials understand that they need to improve, one DHS official said. "Public communication of risk is an inherent part of this job," he said, "and something we'll be doing forever."


