A Boost for Mr. Abbas

THE FIRST ATTEMPT by Mahmoud Abbas to lead Palestinians toward a peaceful settlement with Israel two years ago failed in part because of the obstructionism of Yasser Arafat. But it failed also, as many in Washington and Israel later conceded, because President Bush and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon did not do enough to support the Palestinian leader. Now Mr. Arafat is gone, and Mr. Abbas is an elected president, but familiar dangers remain: Mr. Abbas's relative weakness; Mr. Sharon's reluctance to deliver on his own promises; and Mr. Bush's tendency to line up behind Mr. Sharon rather than prod both sides forward. In that context, Mr. Bush's relatively strong support for Mr. Abbas during his visit to Washington this week was constructive and necessary.

In little more than four months in office Mr. Abbas has accomplished several key reforms previously thwarted by Mr. Arafat. A Palestinian cease-fire he negotiated has mostly held, giving Israelis and Palestinians their most sustained respite from violence in five years. Palestinian security forces have been reorganized and scores of commanders forced into retirement. U.S. Lt. Gen. William E. Ward, who has been monitoring the Palestinian security efforts, delivered a mostly positive assessment to the White House, countering an Israeli campaign to portray Mr. Abbas as having failed to act. But Mr. Abbas is still not a strong leader, partly because of his own cautiousness and partly because of the continuing strength of corrupt and conservative officials who once surrounded Mr. Arafat. The Islamic militant group Hamas poses a formidable challenge to Mr. Abbas's Fatah in upcoming legislative elections; efforts by Fatah hardliners to postpone or cancel the ballot may only weaken the party further.

To survive and to sustain his reforms -- which sooner rather than later must include the disarmament of Hamas and other militants -- Mr. Abbas needs to deliver concrete improvements to long-suffering Palestinians, as well as evidence that his policy of pursuing negotiations rather than violence will lead to a Palestinian state. Mr. Bush's provision of $50 million in direct U.S. aid to the Palestinian Authority was therefore useful in pragmatic terms, as well as a political tonic, since Congress had previously diverted Palestinian aid to Israel or nongovernmental organizations. Without contradicting previous assurances to Israel, Mr. Bush also boosted Mr. Abbas by declaring that changes in Israel's 1967 border must occur by agreement between Israel and the Palestinians and that

Israel should not meanwhile take steps

that would prejudice an accord in the West Bank and Jerusalem, such as settlement

construction.

Perhaps calculating that he had gone too far in denying support to Mr. Abbas, Mr. Sharon promised during his own visit to Washington this week to move ahead with the release of 400 Palestinian prisoners and the gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from West Bank towns. The Israeli leader will be preoccupied for the next several months with the withdrawal of Israeli settlements from the Gaza Strip, itself a major step toward peace. But if the final settlement Mr. Bush aspires to is to remain a possibility, Mr. Sharon cannot limit himself to Gaza: He must also begin to engage seriously with Mr. Abbas and diminish rather than expand Israel's presence in the West Bank. Palestinian reform and disarmament remain necessary preconditions to a successful peace process. But as Mr. Bush seemed to recognize this week, the best chance of achieving those goals is to empower the Palestinian leader who supports them.