Internally, Metro's safety department investigates accidents and develops policy recommendations to reduce risks. But it cannot require other departments to abide by its recommendations.
The agency also lacks accountability, records show; it rarely fires people who commit serious violations.
Industry officials say there is no fair way to compare the safety records of subway systems. The layout of the tracks, the technology that runs the trains and the weather all vary and can affect injury and fatality numbers.
Still, Metro Chief Executive Richard A. White said his is one of the safest systems in the country. In response to terrorism concerns, the agency installed sensors to detect chemical agents, put bomb-proof trash cans in the stations and has taken numerous other measures to protect the public.
To ensure that other safety hazards are more quickly addressed, White reorganized the agency in March and has since taken other steps. For the first time, for instance, Metro is setting deadlines for compliance with internal safety recommendations, and White said he will discipline managers who fail to meet them.
"What we have here is a head cold," he said of the agency's lagging response to expert advice. "We'll take our medicine and get better. But it's not like there's a body on the operating table hemorrhaging to death."
Derailments, Mistakes
After the derailment at National Airport, Metro's safety department appointed a team of investigators to find out what went wrong. Reconstructing an accident is akin to solving a whodunit: Investigators look at physical evidence, interview witnesses and branch out to determine the cause and assign responsibility.
At the airport, they found a trail of errors with plenty of blame to go around.
The track in question wasn't designed for daily use; it was a sharply curved "storage track" that agency protocol said should be used only to pull trains aside temporarily. But the department that controls rail traffic had pressed it into service two months earlier because the regular inbound track was closed for construction of a canopy on the platform.
Several managers had warned superiors that the track wasn't engineered to carry heavy, routine traffic. But officials ignored the warnings.
Track manager Larry Fuller, for instance, told investigators that "it didn't make me very happy" to learn that the track was still being used for that purpose "because I already told my boss it wasn't a good idea," according to the post-accident report. His superior, Doug Gibson, said he passed the warning up the chain: "We were not comfortable with the amount of traffic on the track," he told investigators, adding that Don Painter, then the head of the track department, was aware of the concern.
Painter, who has since moved to a new job, said in an interview that he didn't recall anyone expressing specific concerns.
