Transcript: Joint Press Conference with President Bush and Prime Minister Blair

QUESTION: For a brief period, Mr. President. Could I ask both leaders, I understand from what you say that you're pretty close to cracking the differences between you about how to pay for debt cancellation for the poorest countries. Is that the case? And can you tell us any more about that? And also, if I may, to the president, Mr. Blair's Africa commission has really raised the ante quite a lot in Africa, talking about this being a historic moment for the world and the continent. Do you see it that way, too?

BUSH: I do. That's why we have tripled aid. I see we've got a fantastic opportunity, presuming that the countries in Africa make the right decisions. Nobody wants to give money to a country that's corrupt, where leaders take money and put it in their pocket. No developed nation is going to want to support a government that doesn't take an interest in their people, that doesn't focus on education and health care.

We're really not interested in supporting a government that doesn't have open economies and open markets. We expect there to be, you know, reciprocation. That's what the prime minister talked about. But absolutely, it's a great opportunity. And I'm honored to be working with the prime minister on this important subject.

BLAIR: I think in relation to the debt cancellation, yes, I think we're well on the way to agreement on that. But it's important to realize, we need, obviously, America and the U.K. to be in agreement, but then we need to get the agreement of the others.

So we've got to watch how we manage that process and bring everyone into it. But, yes, I think there is a real desire to make sure that we cancel the debt, and cancel the debt in such a way that it doesn't inhibit or disadvantage the international institutions. I think in relation to Africa more generally, it's important -- in respect to the Africa Commission report -- we set out a figure of the doubling of aid, and the $25 billion extra is effectively what that would mean.

But the important thing is not to take the figure out of the air but to realize the Commission for Africa reached that figure on the basis of an analysis of what Africa needs. And I think that this is what we can do over the coming weeks. In relation to specific areas where we have said there is a real need and we can act and we can act in a way, what is more, that is not going to waste the money we give them but is going to put it to the use to which it's supposed to be put -- on education, on malaria, on HIV/AIDS, on things like water sanitation, you know, on the peacekeeping/peace enforcement aspect of conflict resolution in Africa -- we have got the chance over the next period of time to make a definitive commitment.

But it is a two-way commitment. We require the African leadership -- this is what the president is saying -- we require the African leadership also to be prepared to make the commitment on governance against corruption, in favor of democracy, in favor of the rule of law. Now, there are African nations that are prepared to make that commitment today. They're going to get help. What we're not going to do is waste our country's money.

So that is the nature of what we are trying to put together. And, obviously, there's going to be a lot of discussions over the next few weeks to -- because it's at Gleneagles that we will get the final package there. But I'm hopeful, after the discussions that we've had today, that we can get there.

QUESTION: Thank you, sir. On Iraq, the so-called Downing Street Memo from July, 2002, says, "Intelligence and facts remain fixed around the policy of removing Saddam through military actions." Is this an accurate reflection of what happened? Could both of you respond?

BLAIR: Well, I can respond to that very easily. No, the facts were not being fixed in any shape or form at all. And let me remind you that that memorandum was written before we then went to the United Nations. Now, no one knows more intimately the discussions that we were conducting as two countries at the time than me.

And the fact is, we decided to go to the United Nations and went through that process, which resulted in the November, 2002, United Nations resolution to give a final change to Saddam Hussein to comply with international law. He didn't do so. And that was the reason why we had to take military action. But, all the way through that period of time, we were trying to look for a way of managing to resolve this without conflict.

As it happened, we weren't able to do that because, as I think was very clear, there was no way that Saddam Hussein was ever going to change the way that he worked or the way that he acted.