The Metrics Of Success In Iraq

ronment as the number of engagements per day, the count of trained Iraqi forces, the estimated strength of the Iraqi insurgency and the role of foreign fighters.

It orders up indicators of economic activity, including unemployment levels, electricity, water and oil production rates, and hunger and poverty levels.

It requires detailed information on the training of Iraqi military and security forces, their equipment, and their capabilities -- and the timetables for achieving full readiness.

It aims to end the confusion over Iraq's forces by asking specifically which Iraqi battalions are capable of operating independently, which can fight if supported by coalition forces and which are not ready to conduct counterinsurgency operations even with help. It also requires documentation on their absentee rates and calls for similar information on the Iraqi police forces and their training.

Finally, it directs Rumsfeld to provide -- either in public or in classified annexes -- an estimate of U.S. military forces needed in Iraq through the end of calendar 2006 and the criteria the administration will use to determine when it is safe to begin withdrawing forces from that country.

As a senior congressional aide told me, "if the Pentagon takes the law seriously and responds as robustly as it is capable of doing," we may finally begin to learn where we stand. Candid answers could restore the trust required to sustain the effort in Iraq. Bush's speeches don't meet that need.

davidbroder@washpost.com