A Case of Dollars and Sense
The reaction throughout a town tired of a quarter-century of dysfunction was predictable and understandable: How in the world could the Washington Wizards let Larry Hughes leave? How could they say so publicly that they were going to show him the money, then essentially get outbid by a conference rival with no history of scoring free agents? Wasn't Hughes the only defensive-minded player among the starters? Didn't he just average 22.5 points in the six-game playoff series victory over the Bulls?
Of course, the mood here among basketball fans ranges from annoyed to outraged. Hughes, still just 26 years old, was one of the Big Three, along with Gilbert Arenas and Antawn Jamison, and now he's gone. This seems like more of exactly what the Bullets/Wizards have become known for, right? They screw up. They tease. They undermine their own progress every time and therefore the credibility of the franchise, whether we're talking the draft, free agency or trades. And this simply fits the pattern of their sorry recent history, doesn't it?
Well, probably not.
Oh, losing Hughes is a setback, no question.
But Hughes, good as he is, isn't a franchise player, and $14 million a year is awfully close to max money, franchise player money. At $14 million, Hughes would make $3.4 million, on average, more than Arenas, who is the Wizards' best player. If we're playing virtual GM, I'd have stopped around $12 million a year, which is where the club's GM-in-reality, Ernie Grunfeld, stopped.
As somebody who has very often ridiculed the Wizards for being penny-wise and dollar foolish, I'm not sure I want to go down that road in this particular instance. Paying nearly half your salary cap to the starting back court on a team still in need of a marquee power player is very, very risky if we're talking serious championship contention in 2007 or 2008. At $14 million, you wince and say, "Larry, it was fun . . . Jarvis [Hayes], get in there."
And if you're Hughes, you're going to earn between $13 million and $14 million a year (for a total of $65 million to $70 million) for the next five years playing (presumably) next to LeBron James in Cleveland. Who doesn't see the attraction in that?
Hughes doesn't address Cleveland's need for a deep and accurate shooter to play alongside LeBron, not when Hughes is a 27 percent three-point shooter. But the Cavaliers, having been rebuffed by Ray Allen, Joe Johnson and Ohio native Michael Redd, needed a big-splash signing to appease not just LeBron but a suddenly nervous fan base worried by the growing rumors that the savior is soon off to New York if the club doesn't surround him with good players quick and in a hurry.
Hughes, financially, was sitting in the perfect situation at the perfect time.
But that doesn't mean the Wizards were in the same situation and had to up the ante.
Maximum and near-maximum contracts for players who simply aren't franchise-best players have become a pox on NBA teams. In fact, the one-time opportunity to waive a player for luxury tax purposes in the newly bargained labor agreement is an acknowledgment that max-deals too often backfire in two or three years.
Specifically, I'm talking about Shareef Abdur-Rahim, Antoine Walker, Jalen Rose, Keith Van Horn, Stephon Marbury and Penny Hardaway (among others), all of whom have been traded and none of whom is worth building around. Throw in Damon Stoudamire and even my man Michael Finley, who both haven't yet been moved but could be, and you see why Grunfeld had to put a price on how much he liked Hughes.