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Is This Intelligence?
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Even with the best team and clearest of visions, however, remaking the intelligence community depends on several factors. First, there must be political and public acceptance that intelligence reform will not be fast, easy or inexpensive. It took Congress four years to adopt the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which directed the Pentagon to unite individual services -- with the help of billions of dollars -- into joint regional and functional commands. Intelligence transformation, much more complex because of the range of intelligence missions, needs a similar prolonged effort -- not the several months of wrangling that gave birth to the IRTPA.
Second, senior administration officials need to better understand the complexity of the intelligence business before they redesign the community. Most department and agency heads have only a narrow understanding of how intelligence works and the roles their organizations should play. And Congress needs more lawmakers like Susan Collins, the Republican senator from Maine, and Joseph Lieberman, the Democratic senator from Connecticut, who are willing to learn and to set aside partisan agendas. A two-year effort, with periodic briefings to administration officials and Congress, would educate policymakers and lawmakers while building support along the way.
Finally, the CIA needs to be helped out of its year-long tailspin. While far from perfect, the agency has contributed enormously to the nation's security over the past half-century. Making it a scapegoat for intelligence failures puts our security at risk.
When I turned in my CIA badge at Langley almost three weeks ago, the despondency of the agency's highly capable workforce, uncertain of its future role, was palpable. As I left the headquarters that afternoon, I was more convinced than ever that a civilian intelligence agency without a policy agenda is essential for the good of the nation. When Negroponte eventually presents President Bush and Congress with a plan, the CIA, under strong leadership, should be given a prominent position on the intelligence field.
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John Brennan most recently served as the interim director of the National Counterterrorism Center. His earlier assignments included deputy executive director of the CIA, chief of staff to CIA director George Tenet and CIA station chief in the Middle East. He is president and CEO of The Analysis Corp., which does counterterrorism analysis and information technology for government agencies.
