By Zaki Chehab
Sunday, December 11, 2005

LONDON

Immediate withdrawal from Iraq is not an option the U.S. administration can or should entertain. It would give Abu Musab Zarqawi and his small band of foreign fighters the opportunity to claim victory and to announce that they have successfully defeated a superpower. This would strengthen al Qaeda's hand across the Middle East and elsewhere, and lead to greater instability throughout the region. In addition, withdrawal at this time would cause the United States to lose face internationally, would send a signal of vulnerability to Iran and Syria, and would further undermine American claims that it is a serious force for peace and stability in the Middle East.

Perhaps more importantly, most Iraqis do not want the United States to pull out. As I traveled through Iraq in recent months, from Irbil and Dahuk to Basra via Mosul, Fallujah and Ramadi, I asked many people whether they really wanted to see American forces leave their country in the near future. Almost invariably, they would be surprised at the question. They know that a premature U.S. departure could fragment Iraq even further, and that they would then face the possibility of the civil war that they have so far succeeded in avoiding.

Even the recent calls by many Sunni religious and political leaders for the Americans to set a date for withdrawal from Iraq as a condition for stopping the insurgency can't be taken entirely seriously, even though U.S.--led coalition forces are under fierce attack across the Sunni Triangle.

When I asked a respected and influential Sunni in Ramadi if this is what Sunnis really want, he said no. What Sunnis want is recognition from the Americans that they have a vital role to play in the making of their new country.

Sunnis feel that they have been sidelined by the leadership of the coalition and by L. Paul Bremer, former head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, who chose to listen to the Kurdish and Shiite leadership and ignored Sunni anxieties. They also feel that the U.S. policies of dissolving the army and of de-Baathification were designed to target Sunnis and force them into unemployment.

Iraqis know that they need American help in so many ways, and indeed, most have a real affection for the United States, despite the errors of the occupation. A Sunni businessman from Mosul told me that Iraqis want a good relationship with the United States, as they need American technology. He said Iraqis also need the support of the U.S. military in getting back on their feet and in protecting their long borders with neighboring Turkey, Iran and Syria, which have never hidden their desire to influence policy inside Iraq. As for Iraqi oil, he said, Iraqis can't drink it. They need to sell it, and the United States is one of the countries capable of being a partner in that transaction.

When you talk to them, Iraqis often mention sorrowfully that in the past they had an excellent relationship with the West, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom. Tens of thousands of Iraqis have studied at American and British universities, and high-ranking Iraqi officers had received training in American and British military schools. Iraqis want this good relationship restored. But while they don't want immediate withdrawal, they don't want to be occupied forever.

So how can the United States iron out the many disastrous mistakes made by the occupying forces since the fall of Saddam Hussein? The U.S. administration's recent moves to stress the importance of involving the Sunnis in the political process and trying to engage some resistance groups through dialogue either directly or via a third Iraqi party are a hopeful sign. The recognition that mistakes have been made will make it easier for the United States to stay the course, and to have a stable relationship with Iraq in the long-term. Pulling out now runs the risk of destroying that opportunity.

Author's e-mail: zaki@alhayat.com

Zaki Chehab is political editor of the London-based Al Hayat-LBC TVand the author of "Inside the Resistance: The Iraqi Insurgency and the Future of the Middle East" (Nation Books).