In the End, a Painful Choice

That's one description; another came from U.S. Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski as he explained Saleh's unease with NDI's tribal program: "His ability to resolve tribal disputes in a variety of ways, whether by offering favors, offering concessions, applying pressure -- this has been his method, and he has been successful at it, where many before him failed. He considers it his responsibility, and he considers it his success. I think that any involvement by the United States, by any international agency, but especially perhaps the United Sates, will raise his antennae. And in this case, we are certainly going to listen to what the president says."

Waiting for Saleh's call, Campbell and Madrid decided that if it came, Campbell would go alone, just in case Saleh was upset with Madrid. Madrid kept her cell phone on anyway. So did Campbell. Two days passed in silence. "I don't think it's going to work out," Campbell said, but at 10 a.m. on Dec. 5, his phone rang with instructions to go to the palace right away.

Without Madrid, then, who has believed in and worked harder on this program than anyone, at times to the point of exhaustion, Campbell went to see the man who has believed in it least of all. He was escorted through one gate, escorted through a second, and was heading toward a third when he saw Saleh off to the side, standing not on the dirt and rocks that dominate this part of Yemen, but on a lovely lawn of green grass. They shook hands and went inside, and 15 minutes later Campbell was back out.

"Kind of a formal meeting room," he said in the car afterward, describing what happened.

"He sat in his customary seat at the front of the room. There were the usual greetings. Then he started to speak. He said that he very much appreciated NDI's work in the country. That he trusted our motives. That he knew our motives were pure and he knew that we were in Yemen to provide assistance and help.

"But that there were some issues, and particularly the issue of blood feuds, which is how they translated it, that predated NDI in Yemen and in fact go back hundreds of years and are impossible for us to fully understand. He said that it is a big issue in Yemen, that he has instituted committees and other things to deal with this problem. He said, 'I don't care if you have $100 million or $500 million to spend on the problem, you as foreigners are not going to solve it.' He said, 'I would really prefer that you concentrate on the things that you do best.'

"So I said, 'I do understand that, I understand what you say. It's very clear.' I said, 'Having said that, I wonder if there are not misunderstandings about what we're trying to do,' and then he sort of interrupted me, not in a rude way, but he jumped in and he said, 'There have been misunderstandings.' He said, 'Some people high within the government, but even normal people, they think that you are either the CIA or the FBI.' He said, 'That's what people think,' and he said, 'I know that that's not true, and I don't distrust your motives, but if you continue down this path people will think that you are the FBI or the CIA.'

"And I interrupted him and said, 'That would be terrible because I've spent 10 to 12 years at NDI trying to convince people we're not the CIA, so if people are thinking we're the CIA, that's not something I want.' He said, 'Well they will think that because this is an area that you really shouldn't be involved in. You have a mandate here in Yemen, and we appreciate what you do. But this is not it.'

"So.

"That was the end of that conversation."

A few minutes passed.

"I mean, there was no equivocation," he said. "There's no way of mistaking that message anymore. Just very clear."