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Foggy Morning, Misty Eyes Usher Out Independence
Independence Air workers Alfredo Rigalt, Valarie Rabung and Claudia Hale watch as a flight, bound for White Plains, N.Y., pulls away from the gate.
(By Rich Lipski -- The Washington Post)
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"They went into a cost-savings program maybe three months ago, telling us things like, 'Don't waste paper,' " pilot Brown said. "But it was too late."
Atlantic Coast Airlines was a moneymaker when it was aligned with United, receiving a fixed fee for every departure. In late 2002, however, United filed for bankruptcy protection and decided to cuts the fees it paid its regional partners.
By then, Atlantic Coast chief executive Kerry B. Skeen had posed this question to his board members in a presentation: "Seize Opportunities or 'Hunker Down'?"
That question, according to internal company documents, was followed by another: "Does there exist a profitable, defensible niche for a low-fare, low cost airline using regional jets?"
The risks of starting over with an "unknown brand" were many, the presentation on July 31, 2002, suggested. The plan that emerged from that meeting was code-named "Goldilocks."
Just as Goldilocks had declared the three bears' porridge "too cold" and "too hot" before settling on a bowl that was "just right," Atlantic Coast Airlines "was trying to find something that wasn't too big, wasn't too small but was just right," said pilot Kevin P. Moore, who joined the company in 1993.
Under Goldilocks, the airline would flood the market with short-hop, low-fare flights on 50-seat regional jets that Atlantic Coast already owned or leased, then add longer-haul service on new Airbus jets as the company grew.
But the regional jets were "ill-suited to making money," Moore said, because they are expensive to operate and designed for business travelers willing to pay higher fares.
"We started the business with the equipment we had, not what we wish we had," said Moore, whose final schedule yesterday included runs to Orlando International Airport and New York's La Guardia Airport. "It was a risky proposition, but it was a balanced risk against staying with the United operation, which was pretty much believed to be a dead end."
Former Flyi pilot Katie Pribyl, who was furloughed last March, said the airline simply flew too many 50-seat jets -- it started with 87 -- to too many cities -- 47 early on.
"I remember flying from Dulles to Providence, Rhode Island, one morning in the fall of 2004 and we had zero passengers," she said. "We couldn't cancel the flight because we had 20 passengers to bring back from Providence. I remember thinking: We can't sustain this very long."
The passenger totals increased but not enough to rescue the airline.
Many Flyi workers do not have jobs lined up, though yesterday the company received bankruptcy court approval to pay $4.4 million in salary and bonuses to 165 workers who will help the operation wind down.
In Concourse A, Bill Race, who headed the airline's baggage and ticket counter operations, waxed philosophic as he bid farewell to Rick DeLisi, the company's public relations director.
"All things must end," Race said, shaking hands with his soon-to-be former colleague. "And when one door closes, another one usually opens."
