Sago Puts Spotlight On Safety Strategy

MSHA enforces safety laws through the efforts of more than 350 inspectors who review safety plans for individual mines and conduct inspections to ensure the rules are followed. Penalties can range from a warning for minor offenses, such as incomplete paperwork, to fines for "significant and substantial" infractions. More serious violations can potentially result in escalating fines, criminal prosecution or even the shut-down of all, or parts, of a mine.

At the Sago Mine, near the central West Virginia town of Tallmansville, the increase in safety violations in early 2004 quickly drew the attention of agency inspectors. During the two years that followed, regulators dramatically increased their oversight, writing citations for such problems as falling rocks and excessive levels of highly flammable coal dust. The 273 violations recorded in two years included 16 that were labeled "unwarrantable failures," a designation generally reserved for the most serious safety infractions, or those for which the operator had previously been warned.

The operator of the mine during most of the period was Anker West Virginia Mining Co., which was acquired in November by International Coal Group Inc. ICG officials say they have worked with MSHA to correct safety problems since acquiring the mine. A spokesman declined to comment further, saying the company's focus remains the Sago accident.

According to agency records, federal inspectors issued a total of 18 "withdrawal records" against Sago, forcing the company to temporarily suspend some operations. But in each case, mining was allowed to resume after Sago officials took steps to correct the problems, MSHA documents show. Over two years, the company racked up more than $24,000 in fines, although the individual penalties were all less than $450, and many were $60. The average fine was $150.

Former agency officials say the MSHA regional office that oversees West Virginia mines was unusually aggressive and might eventually have forced the mine to clean up or face a shutdown. But ultimately the agency's response was too little, too late, said Jack Spadaro, a retired agency inspector and engineer in West Virginia.

"The mine should have simply been closed," said Spadaro, who was granted federal whistle-blower status after being demoted four years ago because of what Spadaro says were disagreements with MSHA officials over his aggressive enforcement of safety laws. "The fines were absolutely absurd, but that's all the inspectors can do. The only other option they have is a closure order, and the managers in Washington won't let them close a mine."

Weaknesses in enforcement were the subject of criticism long before the Sago accident. In 2003, the Government Accountability Office faulted MSHA for failing to follow through when it found violations. Moreover, the agency's Washington leadership did "not provide adequate oversight" to ensure that inspectors were enforcing compliance, the GAO concluded.

Former MSHA officials and leaders of the United Mine Workers of America, which represents unionized coal miners, have accused the agency's Bush-appointed leaders of being too closely allied with the industry. They note that MSHA's first leader under President Bush, David D. Lauriski, was a former coal industry executive who advocated a less confrontational style and gave inspectors a less-intimidating job title: "compliance assistance specialists."

Under Bush, 17 of 26 regulations proposed by the Clinton administration were dropped or withdrawn, and the agency began a series of high-profile "cooperative alliance" agreements with industry to promote safety through education, posters and other voluntary programs. Bush-appointed officials leaders say they withdrew the Clinton proposals to pursue their own regulatory agenda.

The agency eliminated or scaled back programs favored by unions and watchdog groups that allowed public access to records related to safety performance and accident investigations. For example, MSHA halted the release of notes from mine inspections, which the agency had routinely released under the Freedom of Information Act for a quarter-century. It also shifted many routine accident investigations into closed-door proceedings, in some cases denying entry even to union officials and lawyers representing injured mineworkers, say union officials and former agency employees.

Joseph Main, a retired UMW health and safety official, said he worried that MSHA's investigation of the Sago accident would focus only on the source of the initial explosion -- instead of seeking answers to the broader questions about mine safety.

"The explosion is just one piece of it," Main said. "They should investigate all the factors that led to the deaths of these men, including the failure of the safety net that was supposed to be in place. If those other questions aren't answered, we will have more Sagos in the future."

Staff writer Cindy Skrzycki, researcher Alice Crites and database editor Sarah Cohen contributed to this report.