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Dozing Operator Blamed in Rail Crash
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At the time of the 2004 accident, investigators said, Metro "was unaware" that the rollback protection feature "was generally not available when a train was operated in the manual mode and consequently no specific training was provided to operators about the lack of this feature on all cars."
Metro officials said that they have been constantly retraining operators and that they are studying the older cars to determine the best way to improve their "crashworthiness."
The agency plans to start adding the rollback protection in manual to about 300 cars within two years.
"In Metrorail's 30-year history, the Woodley Park collision is the only time in which one train rolled backward into another," said Steve Feil, Metro's chief operating officer for rail. "The Metro fleet is safe, and we are confident that our train operators know how to brake trains." He called the accident an "isolated incident due to operator error."
Metro fired the operator, Lamont Lewis, about a month after the accident, accusing him of "gross violation of basic operations procedure."
The board also recommended that the Federal Transit Administration develop transit rail car standards to provide better ways for emergency responders to enter and for passengers to evacuate. Emergency crews needed more than 45 minutes to enter the last car of the runaway because its windows could not be opened. Investigators said they were not designed to be removed by rescuers or passengers.
The board is also asking the FTA to require transit agencies to ensure that the time off between daily work shifts allows train operators to sleep at least eight hours.
Investigators said the operator had slept poorly the night before the accident, interrupted by two cellphone calls. He had worked numerous overtime shifts and was finishing an overtime shift when the accident occurred. Many train operators work overtime.
Asked by Rosenker whether the operator was asleep, investigator Steve Jenner replied: "I've consulted with sleep experts, and they would be very comfortable describing him as being in Stage 1 sleep."
Jenner said investigators had simulated the incident and found it "quite remarkable" how "quiet and comfortable" the train was while rolling backward in a tunnel.
Staff writer Lyndsey Layton contributed to this report.
