Odyssey of Frustration

The search is not over, and one major part of it -- interrogation of Iraq's senior scientists and leaders -- is concealed from view. Some of Team 3's counterparts have unearthed ingredients and gear -- including transportable biological laboratories -- that could be used to build illegal arms. Any such concealment breached Iraq's obligation, under U.N. Security Council resolutions, to disclose all "dual-use" facilities.

But no one has confirmed that Iraq actually manufactured or retained a biological or chemical weapon after the last ones accounted for by U.N. inspectors in 1998.

The experience of Allison's unit is typical of the weapons hunt as a whole. All four of the original site survey teams, including Allison's, are dedicating much of their time to "sensitive sites" that have no known connection to weapons of mass destruction. These sites are of interest to U.S. intelligence agencies for evidence of crimes against humanity or links to terrorists, among other subjects. Three of the four "mobile exploitation teams" -- another kind of search unit -- have also shed their weapons experts and moved on to other missions. Only one is still searching full time for weapons of mass destruction.

"Supposedly the weapons were a primary goal," said Anderson, a Navy cryptologic and nuclear specialist whose job at home is to verify arms control pacts. In comments echoed strongly by others, he added: "I mean, the president said, 'Go find the weapons of mass destruction.' But it has become a secondary mission."

For this account, a reporter lived and traveled with Team 3 for a week and consulted the personal records of team members. Interviews were conducted with 46 participants in the weapons hunt, including members of four other search teams and two higher-level headquarters units directing their work.

Collectively, the conversations portrayed a hunt without the means, so far, to flush its quarry. Team 3 was sent to some facilities without being briefed on inventories already known from years of U.N. inspections. At other sites, the team could not work effectively for lack of Arabic language skills. In a repository for disabled nuclear equipment, Allison and his inspectors had to labor side by side with looters too numerous to evict. More often, the looters had come and gone. Twice, the team found signs of machinery disassembled and expertly removed.

Of those interviewed, the great majority said they remained convinced of President Bush's charge that Hussein concealed forbidden weapons to the end. But many also said they no longer know how they will find proof.

"The way everybody was talking, the way the intel was -- we're still waiting to find it," said Smith, who normally works in biological and chemical arms treaty enforcement. "But we haven't even begun to scratch the surface of 1 percent of the land mass. It might be right next door."

Three days into the war, Team 3's tactical radio squawked a summons. Marine combat troops reported finding anthrax in an abandoned building near Basra.

Allison had been expecting just such a call. Iraq's government admitted in 1995 that it secretly manufactured thousands of liters of anthrax. But Iraq also said it had disposed of all the stocks. U.N. inspectors could not verify that claim, and the Bush administration said it was a lie. Secretary of State Colin Powell told the U.N. Security Council on Feb. 5 that as many as 16,500 liters of Iraqi anthrax were unaccounted for.

A soft-spoken man who reads a bible by headlamp at night, Allison followed his father into the Army. He is 51 years old, lanky and tall, his neck and forearms three shades darker than they were before he left his suburban Virginia desk job for the desert.

After 15 years around nuclear munitions, he seldom displays strong emotion. But the March 22 summons, he recalled, "spun us up. It was really exciting."