Statement of George J. Tenet, Former Director of Central Intelligence

The paper in its overview section said that "coalition forces have uncovered the strongest evidence to date that Iraq was hiding a biological warfare program". It went on to say: "Our analysis of the mobile production plant found in April indicates the layout and equipment provided by the chemical engineer who has direct knowledge of Iraq's mobile BW program. The source recognized pictures of this trailer among photographs of unrelated equipment, as a mobile BW production plant similar to the one he managed, even pointing out specific pieces of equipment that were installed on his unit".

The production of this White Paper received enormous scrutiny inside the CIA and the Intelligence Community both in Washington and in Iraq.

We went to the foreign government in question to put pictures in front of Curveball. Yet, nobody came forward to say to me, or to the best of my knowledge to the team drafting the White Paper, to say that it would be a feckless exercise to do so because we have been told by the foreign representative of that government, as early as late September or October of 2002 of the concern that Curveball was a fabricator. Likewise, nobody came forward to say it would be a mistake to publish a paper that was based on the corroboration of a possible fabricator.

Soon after the invasion of Iraq, I began to chair meetings three times a week on the current progress of the military campaign and intelligence operations inside Iraq. Present at most meetings were senior agency officials representing all of our components, (DDI, DDO, and DDS&T) in addition to the ADCI for collection and the ADCI for Military support.

Once the ISG had been transferred to DCI control under the leadership of David Kay, Iraqi WMD issues were formally added to the agenda of these meeting. I recall that by the summer or fall of 2003, we began to learn about discrepancies in Curveball's reporting. I can recall no point during the discussion of these discrepancies where anybody said that what were learning corroborated what we had been told by the foreign service representative in late September or October of 2002.

Once discrepancies in Curveball's reporting began to accumulate, in the fall or later in 2003, I personally initiated a call to my counterpart, the chief of the foreign service in question requesting direct access to Curveball. At no point in preparation for this called was I apprised of what we supposedly had learned from the foreign service representative in late September or October of 2002.

I delivered a major speech at Georgetown University in February of 2004 entitled "Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction". The speech received extensive coverage in the media. I talked about the trailers that had been discovered in Iraq the previous summer and the fact that we had initially concluded that they resembled trailers described by human source for mobile biological agent. I talked about discrepancies in some claims made by human sources about mobile biological weapons production before the war and the fact that we lacked direct access to the most important source on the question. Yet at no point during extensive preparation and coordination of the speech within CIA and the National Intelligence Council was I told of the information that we now hear resided within CIA as early as late September or October of 2002, particularly the worry of the foreign service in question that Curveball was a fabricator.

I recall of learning, for the first time either in preparation of the Georgetown speech or soon thereafter of emails expressing concern by a detailee who met with Curveball. This occurred in the context of being briefed by a senior analyst and the team conducting an internal review of all our production on Iraq and WMD at the direction of the Deputy Director of Intelligence. In the course of spending many hours being personally briefed by the team, at no time was the information provided to CIA in late September or October of 2002 ever surfaced. Indeed, I have no knowledge that this information was ever shared with the review team.

Finally, on March 2, 2004, I testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the context of their ongoing investigation into Iraq's WMD programs. I included a lengthy discussion about Curveball. Again during the extensive coordination and preparation of a very important piece of testimony, nobody informed me that beyond the discrepancies we began discovering during the summer of 2003 with regard to Curveball, that there were far more fundamental concerns residing within CIA coming from the relevant foreign intelligence service dating back to late September or October of 2002.

Conclusion

It is deeply troubling to me that there was information apparently available within CIA as of late September or October of 2002 indicating that Curveball may have been a fabricator. There is nothing more serious or galvanizing in the intelligence business than associating the word fabricator with a human source. The assignment of the term "fabricator" to a human source by an official of the foreign service handling Curveball should have immediately prompted formal reporting up the chain of command to the DDO, DDCI and DCI.

It should have prompted the immediate formal dissemination of reports across the intelligence community and to policy officials, to all who would immediately understand the importance of the information provided by the foreign service official and to all the recipients of Curveball's previous reporting to alert them to the potential problems with Curveball's bona fides.

What is even more troubling is that given the extensive coordination involved in this very same time period, in the publication of an important National Intelligence Estimate, White Paper, testimony to Congressional Committees and briefings to Members of Congress that nobody came forward with information that would have allowed us to either eliminate, modify, or more carefully caveat our judgments based on the information that Curveball provided.

Certainly the clearance provided by the foreign government in question, allowing the use of Curveball's material in Secretary Powell's speech should have immediately surfaced the obvious contradiction of the clearance when juxtaposed with what we had learned from the same government's representative in late September or October of 2002. Certainly, the drafting and coordination of a prominent White Paper in May of 2003 on the mobile trailer we found in Iraq should have prompted the disclosure of the contradictory information we already had in our possession.

My recollection of both the context and substance of the conversation with the Division chief is far different from the one he recollects. It is simply wrong for anyone to intimate that I was at any point in time put on notice that Curveball was probably a fabricator.

This is not simply a case about a snapshot in time that focuses only on Secretary Powell's speech. From October 2002 through the Powell speech and beyond, I was never given information that would have allowed me to act urgently to: modify the national intelligence estimate as it was being produced, or to direct the preparation of a Memorandum to the recipients of the NIE after its production thereby altering our judgments because of the suspect nature of Curveball's information, modify our White Paper, notify the President and Members of Congress. I would have certainly done all of these things.

My Deputy, John McLaughlin, is a man known throughout his 32 year career for his professional discipline and meticulous care in evaluating the most difficult of issues. I am absolutely confident that if he had been briefed on the concerns regarding Curveball, he would have done whatever was necessary to ensure that unreliable information was not included in important products such as the Secretary of State's speech.