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Fighting Insurgents, By the Book
Certainly, one cause of the missteps in Iraq was the failure of top U.S. officials to foresee that after Saddam Hussein fell, they might find themselves battling an insurgency. As recently as last November, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld was still refusing to call the enemy " insurgents ."
The manual at one point lists various practices that have proved successful and unsuccessful in past counterinsurgency campaigns. The list came from a memo written in November 2004 by Kalev Sepp, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School who was advising Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the U.S. military commander in Iraq.
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It must have been clear that U.S. forces had followed many of the unsuccessful practices, among them: "Place priority on killing and capturing the enemy, not on engaging the population; Concentrate military forces in large bases for protection; . . . Focus special operations forces primarily on raiding"; and "Ignore peacetime government processes, including legal procedures."
The manual cites other principles of counterinsurgency that the U.S. military violated:
"The more force used, the less effective it is."
"An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if the collateral damage or the creation of blood feuds leads to the recruitment of fifty more."
"A defection is better than a surrender, a surrender better than a capture, and a capture better than a kill."
One page of the manual summarizes Napoleon's occupation of Spain in 1808: "Napoleon believed the conquest of Spain would be little more than a 'military promenade.' [He achieved] a rapid conventional military victory over Spain's armies but ignored the immediate requirement to provide a stable and secure environment for the people. . . . The French failed to analyze the history, culture, and motivations of the Spanish people, or to seriously consider their potential to support or hinder the achievement of French political objectives. Napoleon's cultural miscalculation resulted in a protracted struggle that lasted nearly six years and ultimately required approximately three-fifths of the French Empire's total armed strength."
No reader can miss the parallel to Rumsfeld and Iraq.
Would a smarter U.S. strategy have produced a more stable Iraq? Or were the long-suppressed sectarian feuds destined to gush forth once Hussein was removed?
A better question: Should we follow the authors' advice in the hope of waging a better counterinsurgency the next time around? Or should we give up these sorts of wars as futile and -- do what instead?
Fred Kaplan writes the "War Stories" column for Slate, the online magazine at www.slate.com.
