At Camp David, Advise and Dissent

Powell didn't reply, but going it alone was precisely what he wanted to avoid if possible. In Powell's view, the president's formulation was not realistic. The United States could not launch an effective war in Afghanistan or worldwide without a coalition. He believed the president made such statements knowing they might not withstand a second analysis. The tough talk might be necessary but it was not policy.

In contrast, Cheney took the president at his word, and was convinced the president was absolutely serious when he said they would go it alone if necessary.

Rumsfeld raised another problem. Although everyone agreed that destroying al Qaeda was the first priority, singling out bin Laden, particularly by the president, would elevate bin Laden the way Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had been elevated during the Gulf War.

Rumsfeld told the others the worst thing they could do in such a situation was to misstate their objective. It would not be effective to succeed in your objective of removing or killing bin Laden or Taliban leader Mohammad Omar without solving the basic problem of terrorism. Vilification of bin Laden could rob the United States of its ability to frame this as a larger war.

Another puzzle to the group was the Taliban itself. The Taliban clearly would be pressured in hopes that it would break with al Qaeda and perhaps give up bin Laden. Few thought this was likely, but they agreed they had to make the effort. Some of Bush's advisers believed the Taliban might fracture, that some faction might break off and help in rounding up bin Laden, but there was no reliable evidence or intelligence to support this notion.

Bush noted that British Prime Minister Tony Blair had suggested giving the Taliban not just an ultimatum but also a deadline.

Several others argued against a deadline; they did not want a deadline to dictate the timing of when to start military action. As Bush had said the previous day at Washington National Cathedral, the military campaign would begin at "an hour of our choosing." During this part of the discussion, Bush said, according to notes of one participant, "I want to give the Taliban a right to turn over al Qaeda; if they don't, there have to be consequences that show the United States is serious."

Afghanistan's history nagged at the president's advisers. Its geography was forbidding and its record of rebuffing outside forces was real. Despite attractive options presented earlier in the morning, several advisers seemed worried. Bush asked his advisers: What are the worst cases out there? What are the real downside risks?

One was triggering chaos in Afghanistan that would spill over into Pakistan. This was seen as a great danger by many, particularly Rice and Cheney. Afghanistan was already a mess, Cheney noted. If Pakistan went, then you have unleashed a whole other set of demons. He was worried that Pakistan's choice to support the United States could lead to internal unrest that might bring down the government -- and give Islamic fundamentalists access to Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

The discussion highlighted the critical importance of Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who, everyone now understood, was the most important barrier between stability and a worst-case scenario. Have the Pakistanis fully thought through the risks of supporting the United States, Bush asked.

Powell said he believed they had. First, Musharraf had seen how serious the administration was about terrorism. Second, he said, the general realizes he has gradually been losing control of his country, and he may see this as an opportunity to stop the slide into extremism. Musharraf did not want Pakistan to turn into a rogue state, Powell believed. He wanted a more secular, westernized country.

President Musharraf is taking a tremendous risk, the president said. We need to make it worth his while. We should help him with a number of things, including nuclear security. Put together a package of support for Pakistan, he directed.

Another risk they faced was getting bogged down in Afghanistan. Rice knew it had been the nemesis of the British in the 19th century and the Soviets in the 20th. She wondered whether it might be the same for the United States in the 21st.

These fears were shared by others, which led to a different discussion: Should they think about launching military action elsewhere as an insurance policy in case things in Afghanistan went bad? They would need successes early in any war to maintain domestic and international support. Rice asked whether they could envision a successful military campaign beyond Afghanistan.

In this context, the issue of Iraq once again was on the table. The full sequence is not clear from the recollections and notes of several key participants. But all agree that the Iraq strategy's principal advocate in the group was Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. He had been the department's third-ranking official under Cheney during the Gulf War and believed that the abrupt and incomplete end to the ground campaign, with Hussein still in power, had been a mistake.

The Bush administration had been seeking to undermine Hussein from the start, with Wolfowitz pushing efforts to aid opposition groups and Powell seeking support for a new set of sanctions. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz had been examining military options in Iraq for months but nothing had emerged. The fear was that Hussein was still attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction, and without United Nations inspectors in the country, there was no way to know the exact nature of the threat they faced.

Wolfowitz argued that the real source of all the trouble and terrorism was probably Hussein. The terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 created an opportunity to strike. Hussein was a bad guy, a dangerous leader bent on obtaining and probably using weapons of mass destruction. He also likely was culpable in the attacks of the previous Tuesday, at least indirectly, and all of them ought to acknowledge it.

Rumsfeld had helped raise the Iraq issue in previous meetings, but not as vehemently as his deputy. Now, Rumsfeld asked again: Is this the time to attack Iraq? He noted that there would be a big buildup of forces, with not that many good targets in Afghanistan. At some point, if the United States was serious about terrorism, it would have to deal with Iraq. Is this the opportunity?

Powell objected. You're going to hear from your coalition partners, he told the president. They're all with you, every one, but they will go away if you hit Iraq. If you get something pinning Sept. 11 on Iraq, great -- let's put it out and kick them at the right time. But let's get Afghanistan now. If we do that, we will have increased our ability to go after Iraq -- if we can prove Iraq had a role.

Bush let the discussion continue but he had strong reservations about Iraq. He was concerned about two things, which he described in an interview last month. "My theory is you've got to do something and do it well and that . . . if we could prove that we could be successful in this theater, then the rest of the task would be easier," he said. "If we tried to do too many things -- two things, for example, or three things -- militarily, then . . . the lack of focus would have been a huge risk."

His other concern was one that he did not express to his war cabinet but that he said later was part of his own thinking. He knew that around the table were a number of advisers -- Powell, Cheney and Wolfowitz -- who had been with his father during the Gulf War deliberations. "And one of the things I wasn't going to allow to happen is, that we weren't going to let their previous experience in this theater dictate a rational course for the new war," the president said.

Bush also noted that, whatever his comments were about Iraq that morning, they seemed to bring the debate to a close. "There wasn't a lot of talk about Iraq in the second [afternoon] round," he said. "The second round of discussion was focused only on Afghanistan, let me put it to you that way."

Wolfowitz had persisted in making his arguments about Iraq and other issues, and had annoyed some of his colleagues by showing up at meetings that were called for principals only -- not for deputies. To Card, the president's chief of staff, it seemed as if Wolfowitz was just banging a drum, not providing additional information or new arguments.

At one point during the morning, Wolfowitz interrupted his boss, Rumsfeld, and repeated a point he had made earlier in the discussion. There was an awkward silence around the table. Rumsfeld seemed to ignore the interruption but his eyes narrowed. Some thought he might be annoyed; others thought he was just listening carefully.

Bush flashed a pointed look in Card's direction. During a break in the meeting, the chief of staff took Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz aside.

"The president will expect one person to speak for the Department of Defense," Card said.

Lunch was finally served, and Bush told his advisers that they should take some time to exercise or rest. He said: Then I want everybody back here at 4 o'clock, and I want to hear what you think we ought to do.

Rice was concerned about the apparent lack of focus during the last part of the morning. The National Security Council meetings usually were more structured, with the principals reporting on their departments or agencies, and then together they would work through the problem and come up with options. The morning meeting had started well, but then had become repetitious, unusually freewheeling. She didn't know where the morning discussion had left them.

How are we going to get a plan out of this? she wondered. Have we got anything here?

She had listened carefully to the president that morning and she could tell he was heading toward action. He had remarked, "After today, we'll have a plan of action now," and referred to the session as "an action meeting."

Rice convened the principals -- Powell, Rumsfeld, Tenet, Card -- without the president. She expressed her concerns to the others. We need to bring more discipline to the discussion in the afternoon, she said.

Powell went back to his cabin, where Alma, his wife, was reading a book. As he saw it, the big questions were still on the table: what to do, when to do it, and do you go after this one thing -- al Qaeda and Afghanistan -- that they knew was out there, or do you expand the war at this time? Back in the cabin, he sat down in a chair and closed his eyes for half an hour.

Rice went back to her cabin, returned some phone calls and went off to exercise. About 3:45 p.m., she ran into the president outside his cabin. He had worked out on the elliptical machine and lifted weights. Now he told his national security adviser he had a plan for the afternoon. "I'm going to go around the table and I'm going to ask people what they think," the president said. "What do you think about that?"

"That's fine," she replied. "Do you want me just to listen?"

"I want you to listen," Bush said.

That was consistent with their usual working arrangement. Rice would listen for him and then offer assessments in private. Her principal role was to help make the decision-making process orderly, to ensure that Bush had received all the information he needed. Every morning about 7:15, she, Powell and Rumsfeld were on the phone together to share information and ideas.

The entire team reconvened in Laurel Lodge. The president said he wanted to hear recommendations from the principals -- Powell, Rumsfeld, Tenet, Card and the vice president. Okay, who will start? He looked at Powell.

Powell expected more general discussion but plunged ahead. The focus ought to be on bin Laden and al Qaeda, he said, their camps and their infrastructure. Make them the target. All the states that supported terror, you can do at a time of your choosing. They are not going anywhere. The coalition and the energy that had been created were directed against Sept. 11.

It looked as if 6,000 people were dead from the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks (by January, the estimate was down to 3,100). To do anything that did not focus on al Qaeda would not be understood, either by the American people, the coalition or, he argued, international opinion.

If we weren't going after Iraq prior to Sept. 11, why would we be going after them now when the current outrage is not directed at Iraq, Powell asked. Nobody could look at Iraq and say it was responsible for Sept. 11. It was important not to lose focus.

Powell also felt that the Defense Department was overestimating its ability to do two things at the same time from the same command, with the same commander and staff. Military attacks on both Afghanistan and Iraq would be under the jurisdiction of the Central Command, which is responsible for the region that included the Middle East and South Asia.

He didn't make that point, but figured it was his ace in the hole. Powell also noticed that no military plan had been presented for Iraq. No one, neither Rumsfeld nor Wolfowitz, had told the president precisely what should be done in Iraq and how it might be done. Nobody had taken it to the next step and said, This is what we're talking about. The absence of a plan was a gaping hole.

Continuing, Powell said, tell the Taliban, "You're responsible." Be firm with the Taliban's leaders. If they don't act and throw bin Laden and his terrorists out of Afghanistan, then we tell them, "We're going to hold you accountable." The focus should be on military targets. Also, a public case should be made that bin Laden was the guilty one. That was important. Evidence mattered.

Rumsfeld was next. We must not undercut our ability to act over the long term, he said, which meant they should keep thinking about what to do about terrorism in general. Patience was important. Rooting out bin Laden would take very different intelligence than they had. The doctrine of "hit, talk, hit," in which the United States would strike, pause to see the reaction, and then hit again, sounded too much like Vietnam. Rumsfeld said there was a need for unconventional approaches, especially the Special Forces information operations, in gathering intelligence on the ground.

But Rumsfeld, significantly, did not make a recommendation on Iraq.

Tenet attempted to summarize. The plan, he said, should include the elements of strike, strangle, surround and sustain. He mentioned his own plan for a global approach but basically supported the position that the initial military focus should be on Afghanistan.

Card was next. He did not have much foreign policy experience, so he began by speaking generally. "What is the definition of success?" he asked. He said it would first be proving that this was not just an effort to pound sand -- as the president had repeatedly made clear. They should demonstrate to the world that the effort was directed at terrorists beyond Afghanistan.

Consideration should be given to contemporaneous actions in other parts of the world -- that could be in Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Yemen or Somalia, he said. This could be covert, not overt military action, though it was important to consider a plan that would demonstrate to the world relatively quickly the worldwide nature of the problem.

Card also said he didn't think the case had been made for Iraq to be a principal target.

Cheney was last and, according to notes from that day, talked the longest and most comprehensively. We need to do everything we can to stop the next attack, he said. Are we being aggressive enough? We need a group now that's going to look at lessons learned from where we've been. And in going after bin Laden we need to consider the broader context. A week ago, before Sept. 11, we were worried about the strength of our whole position in the Middle East -- where we stood with the Saudis, the Turks and others in the region. Now they all want to be part of our efforts, and that's an opportunity. We need to reach out for that opportunity.

Building a coalition to take advantage of the opportunities, he said, suggests that this may be a bad time to take on Saddam Hussein in Iraq. We would lose momentum.

Cheney thus joined Powell, Tenet and Card in opposing action on Iraq. Rumsfeld had not committed one way or the other. To anyone keeping a tally, it was 4 to 0 with Rumsfeld abstaining -- a heavy body of advice against Iraq.

Still, the vice president expressed deep concern about Hussein and said he was not going to rule out going after Iraq at some point -- just not now.

Earlier in the day he told the group, "We've indicted bin Laden, but now we must wage war against him." He said the CIA must push every button it could and said it was also crucial to deal with the charitable organizations that helped finance bin Laden. He recommended strengthening the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and hitting the Taliban -- but not necessarily in a massive way at first. We need to knock out their air defenses and their air power at the start, he said. We need to be ready to put boots on the ground. There are some places only special operations forces will get them, he added. And we need to ask: Do we have the right mix of forces?

Finally, he returned to the question of homeland defense. They must do everything possible to defend, prevent or disrupt the next attack on America, he said. The issue was very worrisome. He had reviewed the work of five government commissions that had recently studied terrorism. The president had assigned him the task of coming up with a homeland security plan back in May. It's not just borders and airline security, but biological and other threats that they had to think about, he said.

Cheney was the last to make any recommendations. There was some additional discussion, including the themes to strike on the Sunday morning talk shows where Cheney, Powell, Rumsfeld and Ashcroft would be appearing. At the end of the meeting, Bush went around the table and thanked everyone. No one was quite certain where things stood.

"I'm going to go think about it and I'll let you know what I've decided," Bush said.

Powell and Rumsfeld left Camp David, but most of the others stayed over for dinner and the night. Bush had invited his advisers to bring their spouses, and after dinner that evening someone suggested to Ashcroft, who in the Senate had been a member of a group called the Singing Senators, that he sing some songs.

"I don't want to sing," he said, "but if you'll sing, I'll play."

He sat down at the piano and began playing a number of traditional American melodies, from "Old Man River" and "Nobody Knows the Trouble I've Seen" to "America the Beautiful" and "God Bless America." Rice, herself an accomplished pianist, was the principal vocalist. Bush was at a table nearby, joining in trying to assemble an elaborate wooden jigsaw puzzle.

Staff researcher Jeff Himmelman contributed to this report.