Thursday, July 27, 2006; A24
AS A CONFERENCE in Rome yesterday demonstrated, the Bush administration and European and Arab governments nominally agree on what should be the outcome of the fighting in Lebanon: a "lasting, permanent and sustainable" cease-fire, the disarmament of Hezbollah, and the creation of a new international force that would deploy to southern Lebanon along with the Lebanese army. That would be a good outcome for all who favor consolidating Lebanon's democracy and a Middle East peace settlement. It would be a defeat for the Hezbollah movement and its backers in Syria and Iran.
There are two big problems, however, with this endgame. One is that the goals laid out in Rome will be extremely difficult to achieve on the ground, where they will be strongly resisted by Hezbollah. By its own account Hezbollah maintains its militia for the sole purpose of threatening Israel -- and it will fight to preserve that threat. It's not clear that Israel's attempt to destroy Hezbollah's military capability will succeed; so far the cost in civilian casualties has been disturbingly high. If the offensive fails or is checked by international intervention, then some other force will have to be brought to bear.
That brings us to the other problem, which is the unwillingness of many of the European and Arab participants in Rome to support means that might achieve the ends they endorsed. The governments say they want to create "lasting security" along the border, but they also demand an immediate cease-fire, which would leave Hezbollah and its arsenal of rockets in place in southern Lebanon. Germany, among other European governments, has said an international force should not forcibly disarm Hezbollah and should deploy only with its agreement. But how, then, would the militia be disarmed? U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan argues that Iran and Syria should be part of the settlement. But the goals of those two nations -- which include reversing Lebanon's Cedar Revolution -- are utterly incompatible with those of the Rome group.
The truth is that there is no reasonable compromise to be made with the extremists who began this war: Either they will retain an extra-governmental military force that can attack Israel whenever it suits the interests of the Iranian or Syrian regimes, or they will lose that capacity. If they are to lose it, then the Rome conference governments must be prepared to support realistic measures to achieve that result. These need not be only military; just as important will be the effort to bolster the Lebanese government so that it attains the political strength and will to assert its authority.
Israel can contribute to that process by supporting humanitarian relief and reconstruction now and by being ready to negotiate with Lebanon in the future about outstanding issues. But Israel should not be asked to meet the terms of Hezbollah or its sponsors, or to accept a continuing military threat from Lebanon. That would be a defeat not just for Israel but for all the countries that met yesterday in Rome.