By Jack Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner
Friday, August 4, 2006
Everyone involved in the contentious negotiations between the White House and Congress over the proper form for military commissions seems to agree on at least one thing: that al-Qaeda and Taliban terrorists ought to be prosecuted. We think this assumption is wrong: Terrorist trials are both unnecessary and unwise.
The United States holds more than 400 terrorism suspects at Guantanamo Bay, and 500 or so more at Bagram air base in Afghanistan. Five years after the Sept. 11 attacks, it has announced plans for military trials for only 10 of these detainees. The 10 do not include the al-Qaeda leaders in U.S. custody or the numerous small fry who served as foot soldiers for al-Qaeda or the Taliban. They are, at best, medium-fry terrorists.
Why only 10? Because it is difficult to try terrorists in this war. For most detainees, the government lacks evidence of overt crimes such as murder. It can prosecute these detainees only for the vague and problematic crime of conspiracy to commit a terrorist act based on membership in and training with al-Qaeda or the Taliban. Beyond this problem, witnesses are scattered around the globe, and much of the evidence is in a foreign language, or classified, or hearsay -- in many cases all of these things.
Even if these obstacles are overcome, the prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui shows that trials of political enemies are more difficult, more time-consuming and, in the end, more circuslike than an ordinary criminal trial. The defendant or his lawyers will use a trial not to contest guilt but rather to rally followers and demoralize foes.
These are some of the reasons the Bush administration sought to use military commissions with fewer procedural protections than ordinary trials. But commissions have proved politically and legally difficult to implement. Even if they can be made to work, skeptics will still regard them as kangaroo courts.
There is a better and easier way to deal with captured terrorists. The Supreme Court has made clear that the conflicts with al-Qaeda and the Taliban are governed by the laws of war, and the laws of war permit detention of enemy soldiers without charge or trial until hostilities end. The purpose of wartime detention is not to punish but to prevent soldiers from returning to the battlefield. A legitimate wartime detainee is dangerous, like a violent mental patient subject to civil confinement, and that is reason enough to hold him. This has been the legal justification for terrorist detentions to date, and it will almost certainly be the basis for future detentions.
The main concern with military detentions is that the war will last a long time, perhaps indefinitely. If so, detention could mean a life sentence. We don't yet know whether this concern is warranted. But there are several ways to assure Americans and the world that the system is as fair and humane as circumstances permit.
Congress should require a rigorous process for determining the status of enemy combatants that includes some form of representation for the detainee. It should establish periodic review, perhaps yearly, to determine whether the detainee remains dangerous and thus warrants continued detention. It should insist that detainees live in genuinely humane conditions appropriate for very long-term detention. And it should urge the president to endeavor to transfer detainees to their home countries when feasible, and with appropriate human rights guarantees.
The executive branch has already introduced many elements of this system. With congressional blessing and amplification, the system will appear more legitimate and will better withstand judicial and public scrutiny.
Such a system will not assuage the complaints of those, especially our allies, who reject the military model for terrorism and abhor long-term detention without trial. But Congress and the president have consistently endorsed the military model since Sept. 11. And our allies have not proposed a better system than military detention that both ensures American security and respects human rights. Politicized trials would do little more to address these concerns of our allies, and we have no feasible alternative to military detention for most terrorists in custody.
When hostilities in the war against al-Qaeda and its affiliates cease, of course, the detention rationale will dissipate and detainees must be released or (if they have committed law-of-war violations) tried. For such people, if there are any, regular criminal trial procedures should be adequate. If hostilities are really over, the risk that a former terrorist might walk free as a result of insufficient evidence is no more troublesome than it is for trials of ordinary criminals.
Congress and the president are wasting political energy designing a trial system that will satisfy few and convict even fewer. They should instead focus on improving the military detention process, a tool that has the sanction of law and custom and that has proved itself more than adequate for wartime needs.
Jack Goldsmith, a law professor at Harvard, and Eric A. Posner, a law professor at the University of Chicago, are the authors of "The Limits of International Law."