To Surveil or Not? That Is the Question

To Surveil or Not? That Is the Question

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By Jack Levin
Sunday, August 13, 2006

The District has just launched a host of aggressive anti-crime measures following a crime wave that left 14 people dead in the first 12 days of July. Police have been put on six-day workweeks , and detectives are being added to target violent offenders ; the city has installed the first of dozens of surveillance cameras in high-crime neighborhoods ; and it has modified the time of its youth curfew, now making it illegal for anyone younger than 17 to be out on the street after 10 p.m. But do such measures really work? Jack Levin, director of the Brudnick Center on Violence and Conflict at Northeastern University in Boston , weighs in on the key provisions of the District's emergency crime bill and some other crime - prevention techniques .

INCREASING POLICE PRESENCE

In the short run, it is often an effective strategy to place large numbers of officers conspicuously in high-crime areas. Better still is when police leave their patrol cars and walk a beat, increasing their visibility and their interaction with tourists and other pedestrians. In the long run, community policing -- in which officers collaborate with residents in their crime-fighting efforts -- can help stem crime in a city. Of course, a stronger police presence also results in a displacement effect: Criminals will simply move on to a new block. In some neighborhoods, police are still seen as the enemy or even as occupiers, almost as unwelcome as gangs and guns. Moreover, too many officers in an area that is considered safe can give the false impression that residents are at risk and discourage business and tourism.

SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS

Locating cameras in crime hot spots does have a deterrent effect, but only when criminals know that they are likely to be identified and apprehended. It is therefore essential to publicize the presence of monitoring devices. Some object to the presence of cameras based on misplaced concerns over privacy and civil liberties. But they should be reminded that the Mall, for example, is a public space, and a police presence there is just as likely as a camera to limit privacy. The only true downside to electronic surveillance is that -- much like expanded police presence -- it tends to displace crime to areas where cameras have not been installed.

CURFEWS

Imposing a curfew on teenagers is a politically expedient, easy response to spikes in crime. The only problem is the lack of evidence that curfews work. During the 1990s, for example, San Jose imposed a nighttime curfew at the same time that San Francisco eliminated its curfew. San Jose's law had no effect on teenage crime; San Francisco's juvenile crime rate plummeted. Adults tend to commit crimes in the dead of night; teenagers commit a disproportionate number of offenses in the afternoon -- after the school bell rings and before Mom and Dad come home from work. It would be effective to place a 10 p.m. curfew on individuals older than 18, but not on the younger crowd.

ADULT SUPERVISION

Teenagers need adult supervision -- in after-school programs, athletic programs, jobs and community centers. The afternoon hours are prime time for teenage crime and teenage sex. Teenage violence will be reduced permanently only when adults recognize the need to be fully involved in youngsters' lives. A community approach involving police, clergy, business leaders, probation officers, teachers, college students and parents working together to reach young people was responsible for bringing down the rate of teenage violence in Boston in the 1990s. The policy was so effective that it became known as "the Boston Miracle." In 1990, 34 homicides were committed by Boston teenagers; by 1998, the number had dropped to three. The same approach can make our streets safer in 2006.

ASSISTING EX-CONS

Increasing numbers of prisoners who were incarcerated during the war on drugs in the 1980s are being released into the community. Most have no job skills and little hope for the future. As a result, they are rejoining gangs, sometimes in leadership positions. We need to reach out to ex-convicts with programs and policies that provide training and employment. Otherwise, they will commit more crimes on the streets of our major cities in the years to come.

JLevin1049@aol.com



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