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The World Is J-Curved
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The dip in the J curve is a frightening place. Sectarian violence and insurgent attacks kill hundreds of Iraqis each week. In such an environment, it is natural for the public to demand a quick return to stability, even if it means sacrificing openness. (Russia, for instance, responded to the chaos of the Boris Yeltsin years by embracing Vladimir Putin -- essentially voting its way back up the left side of the J curve, toward a more stable but authoritarian state.)
Moving right along the J curve is harder; it requires plenty of time and political capital, and neither is abundant in Iraq. Success will require years of troop support and financial assistance. The Bush administration has done little to prepare the American people or the international community for such commitments. And the Iraqi people may not have enough faith in their new government to make the sacrifices necessary to ensure its success. If violence intensifies further, Iraq could eventually generate a new authoritarian regime or collapse into chaos as locals increasingly rely on sectarian militias to defend their interests.
With such turmoil in mind, it's easy to see why the leaders of left-side states will do their best to resist any incremental opening or transition. Kim has no interest in allowing the Peace Corps to move freely around the North Korean countryside letting people know what life is like on the outside. Iran's clerics point their restive youth away from the temptations of Western culture and instead emphasize Western attempts to deny Iran its nuclear program.
Indeed, many authoritarian leaders know that if they provoke the United States, Washington will isolate their countries and thus strengthen their authority. Some of these provocations may seem a little crazy. (See Ahmadinejad on the Holocaust or Kim on, well, any number of things.) But when Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and Burma's ruling military junta warn of a U.S. invasion, they are not out of touch with reality; they're merely stealing ideas from the playbook that has helped keep Cuban President Fidel Castro in power for 47 years.
In Iran, standing up to the United States is a winning issue. Indeed, many in Iran's government probably would welcome international sanctions as a useful tool with which to unify Iranians behind the regime, deprive domestic rivals of public support, and rewrite laws to ensure that would-be reformers cannot regain a foothold in government.
By contrast, China's experience with stability and openness is not as clear. The country's openness to trade, foreign investment and advanced communications seems to place it on the right side of the J curve. But in reality, its police-state politics consign it to the left side. In essence, Chinese leaders hope to beat the J curve -- they're gambling that by generating greater prosperity for China's people, they can bring the country into the international community without unleashing the turmoil that flows from opening up an authoritarian state.
Can the Chinese Communist Party survive China's dip in the J curve? Perhaps 11 percent growth will fend off public anger with the country's authoritarian system. Maybe it won't. About 50,000 Chinese police are now charged with monitoring the Internet, but each day, 100,000 Chinese log on for the very first time. And the dangers of a sudden economic slowdown -- which can emerge from a sustained oil price spike or from the imposition of severe travel restrictions following an avian flu outbreak -- could quickly derail China's longer-term political stability. The country could be closer to dangerous instability than many realize.
In one way or another, all states -- even open, stable ones -- are constantly moving along the J curve. Some states swing widely; others shift imperceptibly over time. However, history suggests that all closed states eventually wither or explode; their walls merely hide their potential instability from the world. Only an openness that links citizens within and across nations can help states build stability and social and economic dynamism. Only the free exchange of information, values and people can build global stability that enriches all who take part in it.
Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group, is author of "The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall" (Simon and Schuster).


