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Should He Stay?
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Karl Rove, Bush's top political adviser, weighed in with the president. A contentious session with Congress was coming up. As he saw it, the Democrats were in no mood for a honeymoon. With Rice's confirmation hearing to replace Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, and with the expected nomination of White House counsel Alberto R. Gonzales to be attorney general, would another Senate confirmation overload the system?
"I've got Powell going. I'm going to have to replace Condi," the president told Rove. "Do I have to have some continuity in all of this?" And, clearly, the conduct of the war in Iraq would be the subject of confirmation hearings for anyone Bush nominated to be the new secretary of defense.
Rove agreed they did not want to do anything that would prompt hearings on the war.
"If we need to do it, we need to do it. But if we don't need to do it, you know," Bush said, deciding nothing but sounding reluctant to make a change.
With Card's knowledge and encouragement, Michael Gerson, the chief White House speechwriter, also lobbied the president. Gerson said he believed that Rumsfeld should be replaced, as a symbol of change. The president should talk to Lieberman about taking over for Rumsfeld, Gerson recommended. What better symbol of change could there be than to bring in Gore's running mate?
Knowing how important loyalty was to Bush, he said, "Mr. President, it's not disloyal to have someone in for four years, four and a half years, in a job like this, and then for a variety of reasons, many of them not of his own doing, okay, to say that it would be advantageous to have a change."
Interesting idea, Bush said.
Card kept pushing, at one point raising the possibility of change at the Pentagon with Vice President Cheney.
No, Cheney said, he was predisposed to recommend that the president keep Rumsfeld right where he was. Card was not surprised.
In private conversations with Bush, Cheney said Rumsfeld's departure, no matter how it might be spun, would be seen only as an expression of doubt and hesitation on the war. It would give the war critics great heart and momentum, he confided to an aide, and soon they would be after him and then the president. He virtually insisted that Rumsfeld stay.
In mid-December 2004, the president made his final decision. Rumsfeld would stay, he indicated to Cheney and Card. He couldn't change Rumsfeld.
"That didn't mean he didn't want to," Card later said.



