It's Time for Him to Go

Within weeks, however, the outcry turned into acceptance of the president's assertion of civilian authority over military power. MacArthur's firing eventually led to a sober examination of what best served U.S. interests in Asia -- a wider war with China or a conflict confined to Korea that contained communist aggression and left the United States free to defend its security in other parts of the world? In hindsight, MacArthur's firing encouraged a realistic understanding that containment made more sense than war. "Victory" was no more the only exit strategy in Korea than it was decades later in Vietnam or than it is today in Iraq -- no matter what Henry Kissinger said to Nixon in the 1970s or whispers to Bush and Vice President Cheney today.

McNamara's departure from the Johnson administration in 1967 was nothing like MacArthur's. McNamara left with his boss's blessing and received the presidency of the World Bank as a reward. But the real story behind the resignation was different from the image of a public servant in sync with his president on the Vietnam War and taking his leave after years of exhausting service. By the fall of 1967, McNamara had concluded that the war was a lost cause and urged Johnson to reduce U.S. involvement and shift responsibility for the fighting to the South Vietnamese -- a strategy reminiscent of today's "As Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." Indeed, the failed "Vietnamization" experiment of the Vietnam War should only deepen doubts that a rebuilt Iraqi army can deal effectively with Iraq's violent insurgency.

Johnson became angry with his defense secretary for abandoning a strategy that McNamara himself had done so much to put in place, and the president considered his removal a way to sustain the U.S. effort in Vietnam. But instead, McNamara's departure forced Johnson to reconsider the secretary's proposal and, eventually, to adopt it. Following the resignation, the president consulted with America's foreign policy "wise men" -- such as Acheson, W. Averell Harriman and Maxwell D. Taylor -- who convinced him that the country would not pay the price in blood and treasure to win in Vietnam. However uncomfortable and wrenching the departure may have been for both men, it was also a constructive step toward ending what had become a divisive and unpopular war, and one that was ultimately unproductive in the larger contest with Soviet communism.

Today, the nation again faces a divisive and unpopular war, and one that appears counterproductive in the larger battle against Islamic extremism. And in this war, Bush and Rumsfeld -- and, in particular, Cheney and Rumsfeld -- seem joined at the hip.

Yet the president should consider how the departures of Bryan, MacArthur and McNamara helped spark useful national debates and critical course corrections during World War I, Korea and Vietnam. Rather than considering Rumsfeld's exit as strictly an embarrassing confession of failure -- which of course it would be in part -- Bush could regard the appointment of a new defense secretary as an opportunity to stand back, review past actions and move in new directions.

Robert Lansing, a competent diplomat, took over for Bryan as Wilson's secretary of state. Johnson chose Clark Clifford, a respected and independent Washington figure, to fill in for McNamara. Both were instrumental in shifting policy on their respective wars, and were just as successful in renewing public confidence in U.S. efforts and intentions. Similarly, Bush could consider replacing Rumsfeld with someone of the stature of former senator George Mitchell or, as former chief of staff Card suggested (according to Bob Woodward's account in his new book "State of Denial"), former secretary of state James A. Baker III.

Finally, there is one candidate who is as qualified as he is unlikely to ever get the job: Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser under Carter. Brzezinski has proved brilliant and incisive in his criticism of the war. He notes, correctly, that there is no real U.S. strategy underpinning this conflict, as containment and deterrence focused the Cold War. Preemption has been disastrous, and victory is an outcome, not a strategy. Brzezinski also has the force of will and personality to demand real change. But that sort of change would require more than a new defense secretary -- it would require a new administration.

rdallek@aol.com

Robert Dallek's book, "Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power,"

will be published by HarperCollins next spring.