. . . But a U.S. Policy Czar Might Help

Political rhetoric serves in an election season to deny the obvious and get voters to suspend belief in their own judgments. Thus George W. Bush in recent days, urging the American public not to "allow our dissatisfaction to turn into disillusionment about our purpose" in Iraq.

The reality is that deep disillusionment has already taken hold, especially among those who supported "our purpose" of regime change in Iraq. It is the conduct of the war in Bush's hands that has spread -- precisely, Mr. President -- disillusionment that will almost certainly cost the Republicans the House and perhaps the Senate on Nov. 7.

Admitting this has to be the point of departure in Bush's search for a new approach to Iraq and a new approach to an American public that -- for good reason -- has largely stopped believing him on Iraq.

There seems to be almost no learning curve in Washington's dealing with Iraq's societal and religious cleavages and prickly nationalistic politicians, who have been shoved aside or undermined for not showering effusive praise on Bush for their liberation or for asserting their own priorities and political legitimacy.

It was Groundhog Day all over again last week as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki reacted irritably to Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Bush announcing that Maliki would do X, Y and Z -- "benchmarks" in presidential parlance -- or else. Nobody seems to have imagined that the besieged Maliki would want to announce his government's programs instead. Bush sought to placate the Iraqi yesterday by holding and then publicizing a 50-minute video conference with the still-fuming Maliki.

Until then, the sequence was a culturally insensitive replay of the moments that quickly soured the initial chances in 2003 to let Iraqis take charge and to try to come to terms with their Arab and Iranian neighbors, who have instead helped destabilize Iraq since.

First, proconsul L. Paul Bremer cavalierly dismissed the proposed six-person provisional government that had been constructed over two years of painful negotiations abroad between Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis. Bremer then threatened to dismiss the subsequent interim government if it did not carry out his wishes. And so on.

This is not ancient history. On orders from a myopic White House last spring, Khalilzad openly intervened in the negotiations for an Iraqi prime minister to block incumbent Ibrahim al-Jafari and create a situation in which Maliki -- Jafari's deputy and dependent on Shiite radicals for votes -- was the only viable candidate to run Iraq.

Maliki's claims to legitimacy were destroyed by that open American micromanagement. Khalilzad's subsequent sales campaign for the "national unity" government -- which has quickly become a collection of corrupt and sectarian fiefdoms -- has damaged his effectiveness.

I have written relatively little about Iraq's tortured path since that moment, in part because I hoped Maliki would prove me wrong but also because what would happen, and was happening, seemed so depressingly obvious.

This midterm election is a moment of accountability, as Bush acknowledged at the news conference where he sought to fend off intimations of disillusionment. It is the time for voters and citizens to examine recent and past mistakes and omissions of U.S. policy in Iraq and then vote accordingly.