Gates' Views Have Differed From Bush

Outgoing Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, left, looks on as Robert Gates, President Bush's nominee to replace him, speaks in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, in this Nov. 8, 2006 file photo. (AP Photo/Gerald Herbert, File) (Gerald Herbert - AP)

WASHINGTON -- Robert Gates, President Bush's choice to lead the Pentagon, argues that the United States should be talking with Iran instead of shunning it. He says America's spy agencies misled the president on whether Saddam Hussein harbored weapons of mass destruction _ but also believes the nation should never launch another pre-emptive military strike without "unambiguous" intelligence.

Gates, a former CIA director, has expressed his beliefs during three decades of experience at the spy agency, the White House and at the helm of Texas A&M University. It's a trail of words that senators will pore over as they weigh his nomination to replace Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.

As a participant in 2004 in a task force studying U.S. policy toward Iran, Gates concluded that overthrowing the religious government was unlikely without major military action. And U.S. military commitments as well as the political environment in the region made that a remote possibility, he said.

He argued for an approach that President Bush has resisted: talking to Tehran.

"Engagement could encourage Iran to adopt a more clear, positive attitude toward the new governments in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and it could also create opportunities for greater interaction between Iranians and the rest of the world," said Gates, who diplomatically stated at the outset that he didn't want his words to be viewed as criticism of the administration.

He also urged Washington to play an active role in the Middle East peace process to counter Iran's sway in the region. "These efforts will help marginalize the destabilizing forces that Iranian hard-liners continue to support," he told the Council on Foreign Relations in July 2004. The Bush administration has been criticized for not making the peace process a priority.

In a 1994 newspaper column, Gates advocated bombing North Korea's nuclear reprocessing plant and backing the action with a swift reinforcement of military might in South Korea. Diplomacy _ what Gates called a "carrot-without-the-stick strategy" _ had failed, he said. Today, the Bush administration is pinning its hopes on diplomacy, and has muted any talk of military threats against Pyongyang.

If confirmed by the Senate to be defense secretary, Gates will oversee a $470 billion budget and deal with conflicts facing the United States in the Middle East and beyond. Along with the uniformed armed forces, his department includes half of the 16 U.S. spy agencies, including the eavesdroppers at the National Security Agency and satellite architects at the National Reconnaissance Office.

It was in that spy world that Gates began his career in Air Force intelligence and then worked as a CIA analyst. While climbing the ranks at the CIA, he took detours to serve on the National Security Council for Presidents Carter, Reagan and the elder Bush.

As a result, when Gates is critical of the intelligence used to justify the 2003 Iraq invasion, his statements carry some heft. His personal opinion: Bush believed Saddam Hussein was hiding weapons of mass destruction.

"I don't think the president misled the American people. I think intelligence misled the president," Gates said in March 2005, speaking to a conference at Texas A&M, where he is president.

Looking forward, Gates fretted that the mistakes made on Iraq have reshaped how spy agencies will work with presidents who must decide whether to act pre-emptively to thwart terrorist attacks or destabilize other nations. Yet, he acknowledged, murky information may be all that's available.